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ABSTRACT 
 
 This study examines the return of Japanese Americans to Portland, Oregon, 
following their mass incarceration by the United States Federal government between 
1942 and 1945. This essay examines the motivations of both returning Japanese 
Americans and various groups within the white community with equal focus in the 
hopes of writing a history that provides agency to both groups. The return of Japanese 
Americans to Portland was an event with broader implications than a mere chapter in 
the history of Japanese Americans.  
 The rise of the Japanese Exclusion League and other groups interested in 
preventing the return of Japanese Americans to Oregon had their roots partly in the 
Oregon progressive coalition of the 1930s known as the Oregon Commonwealth 
Federation (OCF). Unified behind the cause of public ownership of electricity 
distribution, racially exclusive progressives such as Oregon Governor Walter M. 
Pierce and civil rights progressives such as American Civil Liberties Union lawyer 
Gus J. Solomon sought to protect Oregon’s producer class of farmers and workers 
from exploitation by Portland business interests. After the dissolution of the OCF in 
1940 and the attack on Pearl Harbor, the two progressive factions took opposite sides 
on the issues of the rights of Japanese Americans. 
 In 1945, anti-Japanese organizers across the state, including Pierce, American 
Legion officials, and Portland politicians called for the permanent exclusion of 
Japanese Americans. The racist rhetoric of these organizers drew the ire of the 
Portland Council of Churches, civic leaders, and War Relocation Authority officials, 
 ii 
who formed the Portland Citizens Committee to Aid Relocation, the main white group 
to help returners find housing and employment. Their arguments for tolerance 
depended heavily on the story of Japanese American military service during World 
War II.  
 Responding to the shape of debates within the white community, returning 
Japanese Americans community leaders, especially Toshi Kuge and George Azumano 
of the Portland Japanese American Citizen’s League (JACL), used the rhetoric of 
military service to demonstrate their Americanness after World War II. The rhetoric of 
valorous military service provided the ideological center of both remerging Japanese 
American leadership organizations and connections between the Nikkei community 
and white civic leaders.   
After the reestablishment of Japanese American community organizations in 
Portland, Issei leaders lead a successful fundraising campaign to support a legal 
challenge to overturn the Oregon Alien Land Law and fund the Portland JACL. 
Subsequently, between 1946 and 1948, the Portland JACL served as liaisons between 
the Japanese American community and the white Portlanders interested in overturning 
laws that challenged Issei social and economic rights. Despite their efforts, Japanese 
Americans in the early postwar period, along with other Portland minority groups, 
faced significant discrimination in housing options, employment, and even blood 
supply. Their experience demonstrates both the power and limitations of arguments 
for racial tolerance in the early postwar period.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 Demographically, Portland has a distinct place in the historiography of the 
Japanese American experience. In 1940, just 4,071 Japanese Americans lived in 
Oregon (1,617 Issei and 2,454 Nisei), of which 1,680 lived in Portland.1 Conversely, 
California was home to nearly 94,000 Japanese Americans in 1942.2 Subsequently, the 
majority of histories written about Japanese Americans before World War II, the 
wartime incarceration of the 120,000 Japanese Americans living on the West Coast, 
and the resettlement era between 1945 and 1952 focus on the experience of 
Californian individuals of Japanese descent. For instance, Dorothy Swaine Thomas’ 
authoritative examination of the return of Japanese Americans to the West Coast 
contains no statistics on Oregon Nikkei.3  
On those occasions when Oregon does comes up in scholarship on Japanese 
American resettlement, authors point to anti-Japanese racism, mainly in rural areas, to 
show that it was widespread up and down the West Coast.4 Population statistics seem 
to justify this academic focus. However, the small size of the Portland Japanese                                                         
1 Barbara Yasui, “The Nikkei in Oregon, 1843-1940,” Oregon Historical Quarterly 76 (September 
1975), p. 253. Hito Okada, President Portland Japanese American Citizen’s League, Statement Before 
House Defense Migration Committee, 26 February 1942, Hito Okada File, PDX JACL Collection. 
2 War Agency Liquidation Unit, People in Motion: The Postwar Adjustment of the Evacuated Japanese 
Americans, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 82. 
3 Dorothy Swaine Thomas, The Salvage: Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement, (Berkeley: 
UC Berkeley Press, 1952). People in Motion gives a similar report, focusing on factors that effected 
Japanese Americans in postwar business and housing readjustment, but makes no substantive 
examination of conditions in Oregon.  
4 For instance, People In Motion, p. 69. Audrie Girdner and Anne Loftis, The Great Betrayal: The 
Evacuation of the Japanese Americans During World War II, (London: MacMillan, 1969), p. 360. 
Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japanese America, 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005), pp. 58, 74, 79-80, 127. 
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American community is a major part of what makes it an ideal case study of how 
Japanese Americans in the postwar era carved out a social and economic space for 
themselves in an overwhelmingly white community. 
The story of the return of Japanese American evacuees to Portland, Oregon, is 
more than just one of coping with economic hardship and racial discrimination. The 
return was also a time of negotiated social space and identity. While busy finding 
work and housing in Portland between 1945 and 1948, Japanese Americans also 
sought to secure the full rights and privileges of American citizenship for themselves 
in legal codes and in the public eye. An understanding of the changing attitudes of the 
white majority, especially progressives, is paramount to interpreting the strategies of 
acceptance employed by self-proclaimed Japanese American community leaders.  
 This study examines Japanese American resettlement in Portland, Oregon, in 
two respects. The first focuses on white progressives in pre-World War II Portland and 
the very public debates over the rights of Japanese Americans during the Pacific War. 
The second examines methods the Portland Japanese American Citizen’s League 
(JACL) employed to establish Japanese American claims to the full rights of 
American citizenship, their relationship to the white community, and the environment 
of anti-Japanese discrimination in postwar Portland. Transnational, national, and local 
conflicts and identity construction intersect in the story of the return of Japanese 
Americans to Portland.5  
                                                        
5 As in Gary Y. Okihiro’s work, this thesis attempts to sketch out transnational, national, and local 
dimensions of identity by placing Asian American history in a more central place, rather than treating 
their experience as peripheral to larger movements. Okihiro uses an emphasis on Asian Americans to 
recenter American history as a whole. Here the focus is far less ambitious, attempting to refocus and 
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Chapter One focuses on how the roots of progressivism in Oregon are partly 
transnational in origin. Progressivism in Oregon was both democratic and opposed to 
Asian immigration. To understand the linkage, one must problematize the term 
progressivism. In an attempt to historicize the story of progressivism in America, 
historians have erected a dichotomy between more “authentic” progressives who 
fought for economic and poltical rights despite race, religion, or creed and their 
populist counterparts who were often known for their nativist sentiment. A quandary 
for historians emerges from this dichotomy when attempting to make sense of figures 
like Oregon Governor Walter M. Pierce, who was a progressive proponent of 
democracy, but only for whites.6  
  A transnational focus helps make sense of this historical dilemma. In Drawing 
the Global Colour Line, Marylin Lake and Henry Reynolds argued that an 
international community of whiteness developed around the turn of the century that 
“defined their identity and rights in racial terms: the right of Anglo-Saxons to self-
government and the commitment of white workers to high wages and conditions, 
against those they saw as undermining their newfound status, whether they be 
aristocrats or ‘coolies.’”7 In a way perhaps shocking to the contemporary perspective,                                                         
reinterpret the history of Portland, Oregon using a focus on Japanese Americans. See: Gary Y. Okihiro, 
Common Ground: Reimagining American History, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2001), p. 17. 
 
6 Recently, Oregon historian Robert R. McCoy conceptualized Pierce’s seemingly contradictory stances 
as evidence of the coexistence dual political impulses in the early twentieth century. On one hand, 
Pierce “maintained his belief in direct democracy, moral capitalism, and the defense of civil liberties 
throughout his career.” On the other hand, he supported the nativist and racist attempts to racially purify 
Oregon. McCoy portrayed Pierce as a paradoxical embodiment of these reactionary and progressive 
impulse. See Robert R. McCoy, “The Paradox of Oregon’s Progressive Politics: The Political Career of 
Walter Marcus Pierce,” Oregon Historical Quarterly 110.3 (Fall 2009), pp. 391-392. 
7 Marylin Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the 
International Challenge of Racial Equality,  (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008), p. 7. 
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these whites were at once advocates of progressive democratic reform like women’s 
rights and workers’ rights, but sought to create a homogeneous, racially white society. 
In self-identifying white settler colonies in the majority of British Commonwealth 
countries and in the American West Coast states, Chinese and Japanese immigrants 
faced discrimination and wholesale exclusion. Racism and progressivism came from 
that same impulse to create a more perfect democratic society, but only for whites.  
 Oregon’s exclusionary and progressive movements both fit this model, which 
looks like a tortured version of progressivism from the modern perspective. Oregon 
progressives before World War II saw the cause of democratic reform as a fight 
between the ordinary man and monied interests. For progressive leaders like Pierce 
and leaders of the Oregon Grange, seeking the full benefits of American citizenship 
for the white worker meant opposing the interests of Portland financiers and 
conservatives and their desire to introduce non-white workers. In the case of Oregon, 
those non-white workers were largely Asians. This transnational political movement 
will be referred to here as racially exclusive progressivism.8 
In the 1930s, farm and labor groups in Oregon formed a broad progressive 
alliance known as the Oregon Commonwealth Federation (OCF) in support of New 
Deal programs.9 Although the OCF proclaimed an ideal of equality despite race,                                                         
8 This term is quite similar to Alexander Saxton’s “racially exclusive democracy” concept, which he 
used to explain that, “If there was an American orientation to newcomers, it was not towards giving 
equal opportunity to all, but towards inviting entry by white Europeans and excluding others.” By the 
twentieth century, in Oregon, progressives interested in bettering the economic situation of working 
class, white Americans, embraced racial exclusion. Conversely, conservatives and businesses interests 
in Oregon opposed racial exclusion. Alexander Saxton, The Rise and Fall of the White Republic: Class 
Politics and Mass Culture in Nineteenth-Century America, (London: Verso, 1990), p. 10.  
9 Oregon Commonwealth Federation pamphlet, “And Now—the Truth About the Oregon 
Commonwealth Federation,” Pierce Collection, University of Oregon Archives, Collection 68, Box 20, 
Folder 1. 
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religion, or creed, they mainly focused on ensuring that the abundant electricity 
produced by the 1930s era construction of hydroelectric dams on the Columbia River 
benefited Oregon’s working class. When their efforts failed in a series of ballot 
measures around 1940, the OCF collapsed. The collapse of this progressive coalition 
left Oregon’s progressives dispirited and disorganized.10 Progressives like lawyer Gus 
J. Solomon, who became an advocate on behalf of returning Japanese Americans, 
were silent as the Army rounded up Japanese Americans and placed them in 
incarceration camps in 1942. Other former members of the OCF, like Pierce and 
Oregon Grange officials, actively pursued the exclusion of Japanese Americans 
following Pearl Harbor.  
Chapter 2 examines the shift in power between pro- and anti-Japanese groups 
in Portland. Interpretations of Oregon progressivism have rendered previous local-
level examinations of the Japanese American return problematic, especially in their 
interpretation of anti-Japanese movements. Labeling Oregon’s anti-Japanese 
movement before, during, and after the Pacific War as a reactionary rural movement 
represents an unconscious attempt to divorce racially exclusive progressivism from 
postwar civil rights progressivism.  
However, Portland was as much a center of public anti-Japanese activity as 
anywhere else in Oregon before and during World War II, until the press turned 
against the movement in late 1944. Although Portland business interests argued 
against anti-Japanese measures consistently until World War II out of fear of losing                                                         
 
10 Harry H. Stein, Gus J. Solomon: Liberal Politics, Jews, and the Federal Courts, (Portland, OR: 
Oregon Historical Society Press, 2006), 71. 
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the lucrative shipping trade with Japan,11 they did little to aid Japanese Americans. 
Portland’s business leaders made their attitudes toward Japanese Americans plain in 
the wake of Pearl Harbor. Free from the necessity of maintaining good relations with 
Japan, the Chamber of Commerce aligned Portland City Council revoked Japanese 
business licenses and called for the internment of Japanese Americans.12  
Although confrontational public displays of anti-Japanese behavior in Portland 
subsided by mid-1945, anti-Japanese discrimination did not cease. During the Pacific 
War, an alliance of pro-Japanese groups sprung up in Portland in opposition to calls 
for permanent Japanese exclusion. Especially after the Hood River controversy in late 
1944 and early 1945, Portland progressives and church groups sought to quell anti-
Japanese sentiment as a way to demonstrate Portland’s fair-mindedness. Due to their 
opposition of perceived racist fascism and out of guilt for their failure to stand up for 
Nikkei civil rights in 1942, progressive Gus J. Solomon, former Governor Charles 
Sprague, and others engaged in a series of public battles with anti-Japanese organizers 
over the loyalty and legitimacy of Japanese American claims to the full rights of 
American citizenship. Groups like the Portland Council of Churches were chiefly 
interested in eliminating the spectacle of anti-Japanese discrimination.13 The 
importance of the narrative of Nisei military service to the pro-Japanese argument can 
hardly be overstated.  
                                                        
11Arthur H. Bone, Oregon Cattleman/Governor, Congressman: Memoirs and Times of Walter M. Pierce, 
(Portland, OR: Oregon Historical Society Press, 1981), p. 191. 
12 Eisenberg, p. 544. 
13 For an in depth study of anti-Japanese rhetoric in the media as spectacle see: Emily Roxworthy, The 
Spectacle of Japanese American Trauma: Racial Performivity and World War II, (Honolulu: University 
of Hawaii Press, 2008). 
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In 1945, the Portland Citizen’s Committee to Aid Relocation, an ad-hoc 
committee of Portland civic, religious, and progressive leaders formed in February 
1942, made public anti-Japanese rallies in Portland impossible. They then spoke out 
against anti-Japanese organizers, like Pierce and the Japanese Exclusion League, in 
rural meetings, creating an illusion that opponents of the Japanese American return to 
Oregon were backwoods racists. Emerging postwar civil rights progressives sought to 
define themselves in opposition to this rural, reactionary other. Thus racially exclusive 
progressivism was reimagined with rural origins. In the majority of scholarship on 
Japanese Americans in Oregon, the rural towns of Hood River and Gresham emerge as 
centers of anti-Japanese activism. Alternately, Portland was portrayed as a place 
uniquely friendly to returning Japanese Americans because of the work of church 
groups and civic leaders to combat “race baiting.”14  
The debate over the return of Japanese Americans in Oregon formed along the 
lines of Gary Gerstle’s conception of civic versus racial nationalism. Racially 
exclusive progressives of the anti-Japanese alignment harbored a conception of 
America as “held together by common blood and skin color and by an inherent fitness 
for self-government.” Civic nationalists, that is, War Relocation Administration 
officials, civic leaders, progressives, and church leaders, instead espoused a 
“democratic universalism” based on concepts of equality and inalienable rights to 
                                                        
14 For Two examples see Beatrice Stevens, Free and Equal: The Japanese Americans in Oregon, 
(Portland, OR, 1945), and Marvin Gavin Pursinger, Oregon’s Japanese in World War II: A History of 
Compulsory Relocation, Dissertation, University of Southern California, 1961.  
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liberty.15 The movement to intern Japanese Americans was a spasm of racial 
nationalism, as expedited by the Pearl Harbor Incident, or as Eiichiro Azuma 
described the movement, “an amalgamation of nationalism and racism which 
culminated in a complete polarization between things Japanese and things American in 
each warring state.”16 Alternately, the public reaction against anti-Japanese racism in 
1945 was a surge of civic nationalism.  
Chapter Three examines Japanese American attempts to establish their claims 
to the legal and social benefits of American citizenship in the postwar era. As 
Tetsuden Kashima observed, the decade after wartime incarceration was a time of 
crisis, not a period of smooth transition into a model minority status.17 In Portland, this 
crisis took the form of continuing discrimination by the Portland City Council and 
other Portland officials who maintained earlier perceptions of them as the Japanese 
“other” along wartime lines.18 Although Daiichi Takeoka, Ted Hachiya and other 
Japanese American community leaders waged successful campaigns against legal 
barriers to the economic livelihood of Japanese Americans in Oregon, Portland 
realtors continued to bar them from living in white neighborhoods. Japanese 
Americans also continued to face discrimination in hiring, and vandals continued to 
desecrate the Portland Japanese cemetery.                                                          
15 Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century, (Princeton: Princeton 
UP, 2001), p. 4. 
16 Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japanese America, 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005), p. 209. 
17 Tetsuden Kashima, “Japanese American Internees Return, 1945 to 1955: Readjustment and Social 
Amnesia,” Phylon, Vol 41, No. 2, (2nd Qtr., 1980), p. 108. 
18 As John W. Dower has explained, the Pacific War was quite nearly a race war between Japan and the 
United States, at least in terms of the two countries’ propaganda. See, John W. Dower, War Without 
Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War, (New York: Pantheon, 1986).  
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 Japanese Americans returning to Portland employed several strategies to gain 
acceptance. According to the papers of the Portland Japanese American Citizen’s 
League (JACL), the chief strategy employed by Portland Issei and Nisei was a 
connection to the 442nd Army Regimental Combat Team’s narrative of valorous 
service during World War II.  In an environment of continuing discrimination, the 
Portland JACL and Japanese Ancestral Society publicly connected to the 442nd’s story 
to legitimize claims of loyalty and to support arguments that they deserved the full 
benefits of American citizenship, in campaigns such as the 1947 court challenge to the 
1945 updating of the Oregon Alien Land Law.  
Portland JACL leaders Toshi Kuge and George Azumano used this tactic, 
referred to here as the Nisei Patriotism argument, to avoid a more direct confrontation 
with the American public over their civil rights while attempting to distance 
themselves from their Japanese identity. The Nisei Patriotism argument was an 
attempt to engage civic nationalists without inflaming racial nationalists. On a 
symbolic level, JACL leaders used this argument to portray Nisei combat troops in the 
guise of a patriotic, white American soldier. During World War II, anti-Japanese 
arguments in the press often idealized soldiers and military leaders such as Douglas 
MacArthur as the chief line of defense against a monstrous racially-monolithic 
Japanese other.19 Both civic leaders, such as E. B. Macnaughton, and many U. S. 
soldiers themselves resented portrayals of American military forces as “missionaries 
                                                        
19 Roxworthy, p. 109. 
   10 
for Jap hating.”20 Both JACL leaders and War Relocation Authority officials, the 
administrative authorities in charge of Japanese internment camps, reclaimed the 
image of the American soldier as fighting for democracy despite race, religion, or 
creed through descriptions of Japanese Americans fighting the forces of fascism.21  
Chapter 4 describes the successes and limitations of the Portland JACL as a 
community group and political movement between 1947 and 1948. Postwar national 
JACL policy directives, as implemented in Portland, sought to rely on white civil 
rights progressives as public advocates for Japanese American civil rights. The JACL 
attempted to regularize this process through local-level and national Anti-
Discrimination Committees. These committees created Caucasian advisory boards, 
essentially groups of white civic leaders that supported them during the early return 
period, that could be counted on to write to their congressman on behalf of laws 
favoring Japanese Americans. The JACL literally sought to make whites the authors of 
full citizenship for Japanese Americans.22 This JACL tactic allowed civic nationalists 
to argue for the civil rights of Japanese Americans without exorcising concepts of 
cultural and racial difference, thus laying the ground work for the model minority 
conception of Japanese American identity.23                                                          
20 Eleanor N. Forden.“Stands by Local Japanese,” Oregon Journal, 12 March 1945 and “Service Men 
Tolerant,” Oregonian, undated March 1945, Mizuta Scrapbook, George Mizuta, Microfilm 154, Oregon 
Historical Society Research Library. 
21 Examples of this argument are abundant in newspapers written by the Nisei in incarceration camps 
such as the Minidoka Irrigator and Heart Mountain Sentinel. For an example dealing with Oregon, see: 
Kimi Tambara, “An Appeal to Courage,” Minidoka Irrigator, 24 March 1945, p. 4. The WRA also 
produced numerous public information pamphlets like “Nisei in the War Against Japan” and others.  
22 There is an interesting correlation here between Japan’s postwar constitution, written by members of 
U.S. Occupation staffers, and postwar JACL dependence on white allies in legislative campaigns that 
may be fruitful for further explanation. 
23 The Model Minority conception of Asian American history sought to explain the success of Asian 
Americans in the American, capitalist economic system through cultural differences, such as a tradition 
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Throughout the internment period, the national JACL had sought to enforce 
submission to military authority, at times denouncing Japanese Americans bold 
enough to challenge curfew orders, and at other times failing to support court cases 
testing anti-Japanese statutes.24 Because public perceptions of loyalty were the 
currency of campaigns for legal redress, the national JACL wanted firm control of 
Japanese American requests for recognition of their constitutional rights. After the war, 
JACL leaders in Portland were given a narrow path on which to challenge racial 
discrimination, limiting their ability to make common cause with other minorities. 
The JACL emphasis on the Nisei patriotism argument dovetailed with the 
needs of the white community, but alienated large portions of the Japanese American 
community, especially, when they returned home to find that embracing the American 
national identity did not prevent continuing discrimination in employment and 
housing.25 Furthermore, many Japanese Americans, such as the Voice of the Nisei 
movement, active during internment and the National Council for Japanese American 
Redress, active in the 1970s, continued to view the JACL as collaborators in the 
Nikkei incarceration.26 This alienation survives in numerous Portland JACL accounts 
of widespread disinterest in chapter activities. Only a fraction of the Portland Nisei                                                         
of Confucianism.  This conception allowed scholars to continue seeing Asians as the “other” while 
maintaining a belief that American society had reached a stage of racial equality. Essentially cultural 
difference replaced taboo concepts of racial difference. Chih-Chieh Chou, “Critique on the Notion of 
Model Minority: An Alternative Racism to Asian American?” Asian Ethnicity, Vol. 9, No. 3, October 
2008, p. 219. 
24 Stephanie Bangarth, Voices Raised in Protest: Defending North American Citizens of Japanese 
Ancestry, 1942-1949, (Vancouver, UBC Press, 2008), 156-174. 
25 Caroline Chung Simpson, An Absent Presence: Japanese Americans in Postwar American Culture, 
1945-1960, (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2001), 73. 
26 Brian Masaru Hayashi, Democratizing the Enemy: The Japanese American Internment,(Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton UP, 2004), p. 186. Alice Yang Murray, Historical Memories of Japanese American 
Internment and the Struggle for Redress,  (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2008), p. 2.  
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community joined the JACL in the early post-internment era. Of that fraction, few 
were willing to participate in leadership roles. Therefore, only a handful of Portland 
Japanese Americans shouldered the burden of implementing the JACL program in 
Portland. 
Activities and causes that garnered the most support and participation on the 
part of the Portland Japanese American community were those that dealt with local 
economic and social problems. In 1946, Portland Issei leaders sought legal acceptance 
through support of the Oregon Alien Land Law Test Case Committee.27 At the height 
of the debate over Japanese American return in 1945, the legislature had passed a 
measure strengthening the 1923 Alien Land Law along the lines of the California 
model.28 Unlike Japanese Americans in California, landowners in Oregon had not 
previously faced an effort by the state to seize Issei farms with deeds under their 
children’s names.29 Despite the lack of a direct threat, the Portland-based Community 
Affairs Council, a joint Issei-Nisei community group, formed the test case committee 
to avoid future loss of property.  
 The Alien Land Law Test Case Committee enjoyed broad-based financial 
support, especially among Issei, because their program would aid all Japanese 
Americans. Such economic efforts more fully represented the desires of the Japanese 
American community than did the JACL, who rankled many because of perceptions 
that the organization collaborated in internment and that it was only interested in                                                         
27 Eiichiro Azuma, “A History of Oregon’s Issei, 1880-1952,” Oregon Historical Quarterly, Winter 
1993-1994, 356. 
28 Amy K. Buck, “Alien Land Laws: The Curtailing of Japanese Agricultural Pursuits in Oregon,” 
Masters Thesis, Portland State University, 1999, p. 73. 
29 Charlotte Brooks, Alien Neighbors, Foreign Friends: Asian Americans, housing, and the 
Transformation of Urban California, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), p. 181. 
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aiding the Issei in a bid to position themselves as leaders of the Japanese American 
community.  
Despite the distinct challenges facing the Portland JACL, it served as the main 
organizational contact between the Japanese American community and the white 
community. Because of this contact, the JACL was able to garner larger Japanese 
American community participation in economic issues such as during efforts to 
document personal losses as part of 1948 Evacuation claims legislation and to aid 
victims of the 1948 Vanport flood. Portland JACL leaders were the chief agents 
working with the emerging civic nationalist consensus in Portland in the postwar era.  
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Chapter 2: Progressivism and Class Conflict in the 1930s 
 
Oregon as a whole and Portland in particular has existed since its founding in 
the midst of local, national, and international discussions about progressivism. In the 
nineteenth century, citizens of British Commonwealth countries, along with those in 
California and other West Coast American states, sought to create more democratic, 
but also homogeneously white, societies because they believed whiteness was a 
prerequisite for democratic civilization.  
Transnational conversations on Asian immigration by British writers like 
Charles Pearson, ‘trust-busting” U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, and Oregon 
Governor Walter M. Pierce tied reforms to aid the white working and middle classes 
to arguments for nonwhite exclusion, forming an ideological movement, termed here 
as racially exclusive progressivism, by the turn of the century. This impulse found its 
form partially through exclusion laws, such as California’s 1913 Alien Land Law and 
Oregon’s 1923 Alien Land Law, which were designed to shore up white economic 
status in the face of perceived racial threats. The Democratic Parties of California and 
Oregon embraced the same impulse, eventually fueling calls for Japanese internment 
in 1942. Because of Oregon’s history of racially exclusive progressivism preceding 
World War II, anti-Asian sentiment was often a major force in Portland and wider 
Oregon politics. Understanding Pierce’s role in various anti-Japanese movements, 
during his years as Oregon State Senator in 1902-1906, as Oregon Governor from 
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1923 to 1927, and U. S. Representative from 1932 to 1942, helps explain how pre-
1930 Oregon progressivism fits into this racially exclusive progressive model. 
The majority of scholarship dealing with anti-Japanese movements in Oregon 
has ignored progressivism’s role in Japanese exclusion. Oregon historians instead tend 
to focus on rural organizations like the Grange, the Hood River American Legion, or 
the Gresham-based Japanese Exclusion League. Meanwhile, calls for exclusion by 
Portland’s progressive leaders enter at the margins, if at all. In both popular histories, 
like the story of the Hood River Yasui Family told in Stubborn Twig and in more 
academic histories such as Linda Tamura’s Hood River Issei, anti-Japanese activism in 
Oregon is portrayed with solely rural origins.30  
 Likewise, scholarship on Oregon progressivism deals with racially exclusive 
progressivism through bifurcation. Pierce provides a useful example in this regard as 
well. Discussions of Pierce often juxtapose his advocacy of the Oregon System of 
referendum and initiative near the turn of the century and his full-fledged support for 
the New Deal against his ideological commitment to eugenics and Japanese exclusion. 
The contradiction is a product of historiography. In the 1970s, historians tried to make 
sense of the progressives by dividing them into to groups, “urban liberals” and “old 
stock, patrician farmers,” leading to the conclusion that one group represented 
                                                        
30 Lauren Kessler, Stubborn Twig: Three Generations in the Life of a Japanese American Family, 
(Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University Press, 2005). Linda Tamura, The Hood River Issei: An Oral 
History of Japanese Settlers in Oregon’s Hood River Valley, (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 
1993). See also: Marvin G. Pursinger, “Oregon’s Japanese in World War II: A History of Compulsory 
Education,” Dissertation, University of Southern California, 1979. Amy K. Buck, “Alien Land Laws,” 
Master’s Thesis, Portland State University, 1999. Anne Francis Galiskey, “Repressive Populsim and the 
Internment of Japanese Americans of the Pacific Northwest,” Master’s Thesis, Portland State 
University, 2003. 
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“genuine progressivism” and the other a “false progressivism.”31 Following this trend, 
a recent study of Pierce describes his ideology as deeply contradictory and goes so far 
as to divide his history into two conflicting legacies: one section focuses on Pierce’s 
democratic reforms, the other section focus purely on his discrimination.32 Pierce’s 
ideology was not schizophrenic; it merely has previously unrecognized transnational 
ideological origins. 
The Portland City Council was also distinctive in its belligerence towards the 
Nikkei after the Pearl Harbor incident, being the only city on the West Coast to revoke 
Issei municipal business licenses. Furthermore, Portland was notable for the lack of 
white public outcry against the policy of internment at a series of Congressional 
hearings held in February of 1942. Known as the Tolan Committee hearings, these 
hearings intended to poll public sentiment about President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
Executive Order 9066, the directive responsible for the internment of West Coast 
Nikkei during World War II.33 Historical understandings of Portland as a place of civil 
rights progressivism before Japanese American incarceration thus cannot be borne out 
by the historical record. That view both disinherits the legacy of racially exclusive 
progressivism in Portland, and paints rural Oregon as the source of reactionary racial 
politics. 
                                                        
31 Daniel T. Rodgers, “In Search of Progressivism,” Reviews in American History 10, (1982), pp 151, 
122. 
32 Robert M. McCoy, “The Paradox of Oregon’s Progressive Politics: The Political Career of Walter 
Marcus Pierce,” Oregon Historical Quarterly, Vol. 110, No. 3 (2009), pp. 390-419. 
33 Eisenberg maintains this lack of dissent stemmed from both Portland’s lack of a major public 
university and the lack of contact between the Nikkei and white communities. Ellen Eisenberg, “’As 
Truly American as Your Son’: Voicing Opposition to Internment in Three West Coast Cities,” Oregon 
Historical Quarterly, Winter 2003, 564. 
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Civil rights progressives in 1930s Oregon, such as the lawyer and later federal 
judge Gus J. Solomon and labor activist Monroe Sweetland, failed to speak out against 
Japanese incarceration because of their close ties to Pierce and other racially exclusive 
progressives. Both groups worked together during the 1930s through the Oregon 
Commonwealth Federation (OCF), which brought together labor, farm, and civil rights 
progressives to support New Deal policies, especially the construction of hydroelectric 
dams on the Columbia River. In the 1930s, public power absorbed the majority of the 
combined energy of Oregon progressives.  
The subsequent collapse of the OCF in 1940, due to the failure of a series of 
public power ballot initiatives, imploded the meager networks of civil rights 
progressive advocacy.34 This collapse left the Nikkei without white allies in the face of 
hostility from the Portland City Council, anti-Japanese progressives advocating for 
exclusion, and business leaders who saw internment as a financial opportunity. This 
study seeks to include transnational, national, and local-level focuses to understand the 
belligerence of the 1942 Portland anti-Japanese political alignment while exploring the 
silence of white advocates for the constitutional rights for Japanese Americans. 
Transnational Origins 
 In 1850s Victoria, Australia, there was a gold rush in which “hundreds of 
thousands of people arrived from all over the world.”35 By 1854, 10,000 of these 
immigrants were Chinese farmers and traders from Canton seeking their fortunes 
abroad. According to historians Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, “European miners                                                         
34 Harry H. Stein, Gus J. Solomon: Liberal Politics, Jews, and the Federal Courts, (Portland: OHS 
Press, 2006), p. 71. 
35 Marylin Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the 
International Challenge of Racial Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2008), 17. 
   18 
criticized the Chinese because of their alien customs, clannishness, lack of women, 
labour competition, and fast increasing numbers.”36 In response to the idea of being 
overrun by a possible deluge of Chinese immigrants, the people of Victoria called 
upon parliament to pass the Immigration Restriction Act of 1855. This act defined the 
Chinese in racial terms, placed a tax on incoming Chinese, and limited their 
immigration to one Chinese per every ten tons of cargo shipped to the colony. Labor 
unions and other colonists argued for Chinese exclusion based on a belief that “the 
ideal colonist was European, civilized, and a family man.”37 
 The intent for this and subsequent immigration restriction was homegrown, but 
the legal model of exclusion used by the Victorian parliament originated in California. 
In 1850, responding to fears that individuals unable to obtain citizenship were also 
reaping benefits of the post-1848 gold rush, the new California legislature passed a 
head tax of twenty dollars on all “foreign” miners, including French and Australian 
miners. The law was intended to remove Mexican and Chinese miners from claims in 
the state. In 1852, the Foreign Miners Law was revamped charging only $3, but 
required all Chinese men to pay the tax before they could mine their claim. Enforced 
by an army of independent tax collectors, the 1850 and 1852 Foreign Miners Laws led 
to the expulsion of tens of thousands of Mexicans and Chinese.38 Head tax laws were 
only the first of many laws Australia based on the Californian example.  
                                                        
36 Lake and Reynolds, 18-19.  
37 Lake and Reynolds, 20. 
38 Jean Pfaelzer, Encyclopedia of U. S. Labor and Working-Class History, Vol. 1, Eric Arnesen Ed., 
(New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 468-469. The Foreign Miner Tax in California was especially 
insidious in its practice. The 1852 tax depended on independent tax collectors empowered to sell the 
possessions of Chinese miners. Half of the tax money went to county treasuries, half to state treasuries, 
and a fee went to the tax collector. This created a financial incentive for the state, counties, and 
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Ideological support for exclusion measures in both states was similar as well. 
In California and Victoria, some advocates for the working class believed that the 
“white worker was the bearer of civilization.”39 White laborers in the post-bellum 
period moving to California defined themselves in opposition to the nearly fifty 
thousand Chinese laborers who represented one quarter of the labor force in the 1870s. 
White laborers occupied nearly all jobs of skill and prestige and sought further 
benefits from their white employers like the eight-hour day and safer working 
conditions. When unions struck to obtain these benefits, labor contractors from the Six 
Companies of San Francisco often sent in Chinese laborers to replace them, 
reinforcing the belief among white laborers that “their Asiatic fellow workers…were 
too docile, too slave-like, to be able to ever to stand on their own feet in a free 
society.”40 Chinese laborers were, in their view, unworthy as possible citizens and a 
threat to their fight for better wages and conditions. This is just one example of the 
intersection between progressivism and fears of a racial other.  
In the 1880s, Victorian liberal legislator Charles Pearson framed these fears 
around a number. Arguing in support of an exclusion bill, Pearson stressed that the 
Chinese presented a profound threat to white civilization because the “natural increase” 
of their 400 million citizens would swamp the small populations of the white settler 
colonies surrounding the Pacific.41 Increasingly, the white working class of both states 
                                                        
individuals to fleece Chinese miners of what little profits their mining ventures brought them. Pfaelzer 
notes that Chinese miners provided between one fourth to one half of State tax revenue in the 1850s, 
roughly $58 million. 
39 Lake and Reynolds, 32. 
40 Alexander Saxton, The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in 
California,(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 7-10. 
41 Lake and Reynolds, 36. 
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claimed that the capacity for self-government was the preserve of the Anglo-Saxon 
race. This racially exclusive progressivism was highly transportable among territories 
and states with British heritage, including Oregon. 
Unlike the belief of some Oregon legal scholars, racism in Oregon was not 
“particular to its time and place.”42 Rather, it was heavily influenced by a transnational, 
racially exclusive progressivism. Debates around the first Oregon constitution shows 
that exclusion of nonwhite groups had broad-based support. In 1857, the Oregon 
territorial legislature formed a constitutional convention. Key figures on the 
commission such as Chief Justice George Henry William “urged his colleagues to 
‘consecrate Oregon to the use of the white man, and exclude the Negro, Chinaman, 
and every race of that character.’”43 William was overruled on the Chinese issue, 
likely because key figures were interested in them as a source of cheap labor, but other 
measures of exclusion made their way on to the ballot in November of 1857. Oregon 
voters chose not only to ban slavery (7,727 to 2,645) but also to bar free blacks and 
“mulattoes” from entering Oregon (8,640 to 1,081).44 In 1860, the Oregon legislature 
followed a more explicit California-Australia model by increasing the tax against 
Chinese miners in Oregon.45  
Opposition to slavery in Oregon stemmed from a desire to make Oregon an 
ideal place for white settlers. Banning slavery, as proposed by the Free Soil party in 
Oregon territory, was much more about keeping African Americans out of the territory                                                         
42 Cheryl A. Brooks, “Politics of Forgetting: How Oregon Forgot to Ratify the Fourteenth Amendment,” 
Journal of Oregon Humanities Fall/Winter 2006, 46. 
43 Brooks, 47. 
44 Brooks, 47. 
45 Brooks, 48. 
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than it was about the moral opposition to slavery. Free Soilers claimed that, “Slavery 
degraded white labor. It reduced white farmers, mechanics, artisans, and 
workingmen—indeed, everyone except the slave owner—to the debased status of the 
slave.”46 The anti-slavery consensus was highly successful in keeping African 
Americans out of Oregon until World War II demands for labor sparked the first large 
influx of black migrants.47 
Chinese were the only “visible minority” in Oregon until the 1880s, at roughly 
ten thousand members. Portland had a particularly high percentage, as high as twenty 
to twenty five percent in the mid-1880s, when white workers in Portland took to the 
street to demand the eviction of the Chinese from Portland.48 Like Australian miners 
and California laborers, white workers in Oregon “considered themselves robbed” of 
their livelihood by the Chinese.49 The complaints of Oregonians echoed a chorus of 
calls around the Pacific for the exclusion of the Asians in the interest of the 
preservation of the white race.  
                                                         
46 David A. Johnson, Founding the Far West: California, Oregon, and Nevada, 1840-1890, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1992), p. 64.  
47 The African American population in Portland, for instance, was fewer than 2,000 in 1940, but grew to 
over 23,000 by 1945 because of demand for labor in the Kaiser Shipyards. Rudy Pearson, “A Menace to 
the Neighborhood: Housing and African Americans in Portland, 1941-1945,” Oregon Historical 
Quarterly, Vol. 102, No. 2, (Summer 2001), pp. 161, 163. 
48 Johnson, p. 277. 
49 Lake and Reynolds, 34. Unlike the California experience, white workers in Oregon were largely 
nonviolent in their protests against Asian laborers. One of the few examples was the forced removal of 
twenty-seven Issei, four Filipinos, and one Korean laborer from Toledo, Oregon in 1925. In an attempt 
to improve the efficiency of more labor-intensive portions of their mill there, the Pacific Spruce 
Corporation hired the immigrant laborers. The Japanese laborers provoked a fierce backlash among 
Toledo residents who feared that the Japanese would “reap the benefits” of the efforts of early settlers in 
the Toledo area. Shortly after, a mob of fifty townsmen, both Scandanavian immigrants and native 
Oregonians, rounded up the Asian workers and drove them out of town enforced by threat of violence. 
See, Ted W. Cox, The Toledo Incident of 1925: Three Days That Made History in Toledo, Oregon, (Old 
World Publications: Corvallis, Oregon, 2005). 
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Racially Exclusive Progressivism at the National Level 
Around the turn of the century President Theodore Roosevelt’s political ideas 
and practices illustrated this larger definition of progressivism. Roosevelt stood for a 
variety of progressive causes, ranging from support for diminishing concentrations of 
wealth to supporting the creation of national parks, but he also supported the 
transpacific conversation about the protection of white men’s countries. These theories 
led white race proponents to think of Asians in international or transnational racial 
categories. In this framework, Anglo-Saxons and other transatlantic whites represented 
races fit for democracy.  
Roosevelt became enamored of the idea of Anglo-Saxon civilization theories 
in his college years, leading him to maintain beliefs in the progress and superiority of 
white civilization. In 1894, he read a book that gave him a great cause for concern 
about the future of that civilization.50 Australian Charles Pearson’s book National Life 
and Character confronted Roosevelt with a number of realities about racial 
demographics. Pearson argued that “black and yellow” races would eclipse white 
civilization because whites had both a much smaller population and a lower birth 
rate.51 Part of this ideology was based on a theory that white men were only suited to 
inhabit temperate regions. This led Roosevelt to applaud Australia and North 
American “commonwealths [for] their democratic insistence on race purity,” which 
                                                        
50 Lake and Reynolds, 95. 
51 Lake and Reynolds, 74. 
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secured for the white race vast sections of the temperate zones surrounding the 
Pacific.52  
 The anxiety that Pearson’s book engendered was also a factor in Roosevelt’s 
turn towards jingoism in the 1890s. His growing penchant for militarism was 
particularly represented in his response both to Japan’s victory in the 1905 Russo-
Japanese war and his response to the Pacific Coast race riots of 1907. According to 
historian Erika Lee, white men’s countries around the Pacific Rim responded to 
Japanese military prowess by embracing a cooperative and coordinated policy of 
shoring up the “White Pacific.”53 In San Francisco in 1907, as an offshoot of previous 
anti-Chinese campaigning, anti-Japanese groups took to the streets after being 
emboldened by a school board order to segregate Japanese students.54 At one point a 
mob turned violent, damaging a number of Japanese businesses. Similar riots occurred 
that year in Bellingham, Washington and Vancouver, Canada.55  
These events only served to heighten concerns in the United States, Canada, 
and Australia about the “Asiatic issue.”56 The San Francisco Chronicle captured 
popular sentiment of the time. It warned, “The brown stream of Japanese would 
become a raging torrent.”57 In order to shore up perceptions of a “White Pacific,” in 
the wake of Japan’s victory and popular protest against immigration, Roosevelt called 
for a “unity of action.” He wanted all white men’s countries of the pacific slope to halt 
                                                        
52 Lake and Reynolds, 100, 102. 
53 Erika Lee, “The ‘Yellow Peril’ and Asian Exclusion in the Americas,” The Pacific Historical Review 
Vol. 76, Issue 4, p. 550.  
54 Lee, p. 551. Lake and Reynolds, p.170. 
55 Lee, p. 552.  
56 Lee, p. 553. 
57 Lake and Reynolds, p. 172. 
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immigration from Asian countries to “the countries where the English-speaking 
peoples now form and will form the population of the future.” 58 In 1907, Roosevelt 
ordered a U.S. naval procession dubbed the “great white fleet” to tour the Pacific in 
support of the effort.  
 Another result of San Francisco’s anti-Japanese agitation was a renewed 
embrace of Asian exclusion by progressive politicians like William Jennings Bryan 
and California Senator James D. Phelan. In an attempt to win the votes of Californians, 
the Democratic Party added an anti-Japanese plank to its party platform. Phelan in 
particular was known for his embrace of transnational yellow peril rhetoric.59 During 
Bryan’s 1908 campaign for president, Phelan often tried to persuade voters that they 
should vote for Bryan because “only the Great Commoner [Bryan] could prevent the 
Pacific slope from being overrun by hordes of Japanese.”60  
 The California legislature crafted a number of anti-Japanese bills in 1909. 
Among the measures introduced was a school segregation bill targeting Japanese 
students and a bill barring Japanese nationals from land ownership designed to halt the 
movement of Japanese from San Francisco to inland farming communities. Because 
the school bill would directly contravene the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” with Japan, 
Roosevelt urged the Republican California governor to step in and veto all anti-
Japanese bills.  
                                                        
58 Lee, p. 554 
59 Phelan had strong ties to the labor movement in San Francisco including to the Building Trades 
Council’s Japanese and Korean Exclusion League. For instance, in 1900 during his term as mayor he 
was a key speaker at the first convention among labor leaders to exclude Japanese immigrant workers 
from the Pacific Coast. Alexander Saxton, The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese 
Movement in California,(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), p. 248. 
60 Daniels, 47. 
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 Californian plans to pass the Alien Land law were much more successful under 
the Woodrow Wilson administration in 1913. In an exchange with Senator Phelan 
during his presidential campaign provides an indication of Wilson’s unwillingness to 
defend Japanese rights:   
In the matter of Chinese and Japanese coolie immigration, I stand for the 
national policy of exclusion. We cannot make a homogeneous population out 
of a people who do not blend with the Caucasian race. Their lower standard of 
living as laborers will crowd out the white agriculturist, and is in other fields, a 
most serious industrial menace. The success of our free democratic institutions 
demands of our people education, intelligence, and patriotism and the state 
should protect them against unjust and impossible competition. Remunerative 
labor is the basis of contentment. Democracy rests on the equality of the 
citizen. Oriental coolieism will give us another race problem to solve and 
surely we have had our lesson.61 
 
Despite the diplomatic problems it would cause, Wilson would not stand in the way of 
California’s Alien Land Law of 1913. He decided instead to go on the record 
embracing the full gamut of anti-Asian rhetoric. 
Walter M. Pierce: Champion of the Common (White) Man 
 Walter M. Pierce’s political stance also fit into the model of racially exclusive 
progressivism, which illuminates the Oregon story of anti-Japanese agitation. Pierce 
was a self-identified liberal democrat who got his start in politics as the school 
superintendent of rural Umatilla County, Oregon in 1886. He then rose through the 
state legislature to governor in 1922. From 1896 to 1902, Pierce was, at his core, a 
racially exclusive progressive reformer. In 1880 and 1886 Pierce supported Sylvester 
Pannier’s campaigns for governor because of his support for anti-corruption measures 
and the exclusion of Chinese immigrants.  
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From 1896 to 1902, Pierce also supported the measures known now as the 
Oregon System, spearheaded by William S. Uren, designed to undermine the influence 
of business in the Oregon state house.62 Inherent to this opposition movement was a 
reaction to the power of large financial interests to buy off legislators and move public 
resources into the hands of speculators. Pierce was concerned that such corruption 
disenfranchised those of little means such as farmers. Pierce by this time also 
supported Asian exclusion shown in his support for Sylvester Pennoyer’s campaigns 
for Oregon governor in 1886 and 1880, which emphasized both reform and opposition 
to the Chinese.63  
 After Pierce was elected governor in 1922, he immediately went to work trying 
to alleviate the woes of white Oregon farmers, seeking to underline his image as the 
people’s champion. Pierce sought a progressive taxation scheme that shifted property 
tax burdens from farmers to urban landholders. He also sought to eliminate un-
American (a popular euphemism for nonwhites at the time) influences on Oregon. A 
key component of this push was a set of “Americanism bills” including a California-
style Alien Land Law.64 Bills seeking to bar alien land ownership had been introduced 
into the Oregon legislature in both 1911 and 1917 at the behest of the American 
                                                        
62 Bone, 37. 
63 McCoy, 407. 
64 The California Alien Land Law was the product of a labor-progressive alliance in the California 
legislature following the 1910 election. Saxton argues that the main product of this alliance was an 
increased belligerence towards the Japanese, expressed through Alien Land Law. The law was easily 
circumvented but laid an important precedent in legal language targeting Japanese Americans. See 
Saxton, pp. 256-257. 
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Legion and the Grange, but had been tabled by request of the State Department due to 
international negotiations.65   
 The arrival of the Oregon Ku Klux Klan onto the political scene in the early 
1920s strengthened the cause of Japanese exclusion. The Klan in Oregon was a 
product of the larger racially exclusive progressive movement, which was Anti-Asian, 
opposed to financial corruption in state government, and was not confined to the 
countryside.66 Japanese immigrants in Oregon were essentially caught up in the 
conflict between middle class Oregonians and Portland business interests.  
While Klan proponents advocated for “oriental exclusion,” the Oregon 
Chamber of Commerce opposed the alien land bill because they believed that business 
would move to Vancouver, British Columbia if the Japanese were no longer welcome 
in Oregon. W. D. B. Dobson of the Portland Chamber of Commerce “acknowledged 
that it was important to keep Oregon white and American,” but it was necessary for 
economic recovery from the Post-World War I depression not to block the growth of 
business.67 The Chamber of Commerce’s real concern here was the $69 million per 
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year in trade with Japan.68 Farm groups and the American Legion favored the bill, 
seeing the Japanese land ownership as a further threat.  
Similar to the earlier Australian parliament’s borrowing from the California 
model, the Oregon Alien Land Law of 1923 did not explicitly name Japanese 
immigrants in the bill, but they were certainly the implied targets. In this sense, 
drafters of the bill followed the model of California’s 1913 Alien Land Law. Roger 
Daniels explains that the phrase “aliens ineligible for citizenship” is the key wording 
used by California lawmakers to target Japanese immigrants. Because U.S. 
naturalization law only allowed free whites to be citizens, and African American 
citizenship had already been provided by the Fourteenth amendment, the only 
significant racial category left was Asians.69 By 1922, the U. S. Supreme Court had 
spoken on the issue of Japanese citizenship in Ozawa v. US, claiming that it did not 
matter that Takao Ozawa had assimilated into American culture and had white skin; he 
was not Caucasian and thus ineligible for citizenship.70 Although citizenship for Issei 
would invalidate the Alien Land Laws, that avenue lay far out of reach. 
Oregon Progressivism in the 1930s: The Oregon Commonwealth Federation 
 During the 1930s, progressives in Oregon continued to battle against business 
interests in Oregon, shifting their focus away from Asian exclusion. Instead,  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70 Ozawa’s attorneys argued that the Japanese are a free people, “most are white, speaking an Aryan 
tongue and having Caucasian root stocks, a superior class, [sic]they are assimilable.” Ozawa’s case thus 
used the framework of scientific racism to include people of Japanese descent in the category of 
acceptable whiteness, that is, both white and Caucasian. The Justices disagreed in a decision based on 
the common-sense notion that “white persons” referred to in the U. S. Immigration act of 1875 included 
only those deemed by the writers to be white. This group included immigrants from Europe, but 
excluded minorities that are visibly nonwhite. See: Matthew Jacobsen, Whiteness of a Different Color: 
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progressives became consumed by attempts to ensure that the material benefits of the 
abundant electricity produced by dams on the Columbia River went to average 
ratepayers, rather than corporations. Oregon conservatives, like Democratic Governor 
Charles H. Martin and the Portland Chamber of Commerce, instead believed that 
projects like the Bonneville dam were designed to build up industries such as 
aluminum production that required cheap and abundant energy.71 
 In the 1930s the progressives of Oregon aligned around New Deal policies 
meant to renovate the middle class, forming the Oregon Commonwealth Federation 
(OCF) in 1932. In practice the OCF included local unions, the Oregon State Grange, 
and civil rights progressives in support of middle and working class issues. In one of 
their pamphlets, the OCF justified its creation by saying:  
For years the well-organized forces of greed and exploitation held sway. We 
common people, numerically stronger, were helpless because we were 
divided—and KEPT divided. The justice of our cause was no match for the 
shrewdness and might of MONEY—at the polls, in the legislative halls, in 
business.72 
 
Each year in the spring and fall the OCF would gather together member organizations 
to endorse political candidates and issue resolutions. 
The key goal for progressives, racially exclusive progressives and civil rights 
progressives alike, was to require public ownership of electricity distribution. They 
felt that private utility companies overcharged for electricity and were uninterested in 
providing rural service. For instance, in 1934, only thirty-one percent of Oregon farms                                                         
71 E. Kimbark MacColl, The Growth of a City: Power and Politics in Portland, Oregon, 1915 to 1950, 
(Portland, OR: The Georgian Press, 1979), p. 444.  
72 Oregon Commonwealth Federation pamphlet, “And Now—the Truth About the Oregon 
Commonwealth Federation,” Pierce Collection, University of Oregon Archives, Collection 68, Box 20, 
Folder 1. 
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had access to electricity because private utilities were largely uninterested in the 
capital outlays required to spread service.73 This severely hampered the property 
values of farmers and limited their operations, leading them to oppose the monied 
interests prevalent in Oregon politics and stand shoulder-to-shoulder with labor groups 
in the fight for public power under the Oregon Commonwealth Federation. 
Pierce gained the support of the OCF because he had long been an advocate for 
public power, calling for expanded service and cheaper electric rates. In a 1938 speech 
he said: “Throughout my legislative career, I have recognized the principle of public 
benefit, and have advocated the utilization of water power for the benefit of all 
people.”74 During Pierce’s term as United States Congressman from 1932 to 1942, he 
introduced a number of bills in support of fair distribution of power. One of his most 
ambitious was HR 6387 in 1937, designed to require half of the electricity produced 
by Columbia River dams to go to public utilities and cooperatives. The Franklin D. 
Roosevelt administration supported the bill, but Governor Martin and Oregon business 
interests denounced both Pierce and the bill, claiming it “smacked of socialism and 
illegal regulation of private property by the government.”75 In this fight Pierce used 
the traditional progressive rhetoric of creating a system that favored the average man 
over the “interests” and was successful in passing the bill, which was the first step in 
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creating a public regional power authority along the lines of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority.76 
 The key Portland leaders of this grass-roots movement were lawyer Gus J. 
Solomon and Monroe Sweetland, both notable for their social justice advocacy in the 
postwar period. Solomon, a highly idealistic young Jewish attorney, was one of the 
few attorneys in the business friendly Portland legal establishment willing to give up 
other business to support the creation of rural cooperatives. In some cases he even lost 
money. For instance, starting in 1935, Solomon represented the Northwest Public 
Power Association for three years in their attempt to set up rural public utility districts 
netting him only $840. This amount averaged about a dollars worth of pay for every 
hour he worked for them when his office costs averaged three dollars an hour.77 
Beginning in 1932, Solomon also began offering free legal advice to the Oregon State 
Grange, leading journalist Richard Neuberger to dub him “Mr. Public Power.” 
Business interests, meanwhile, smeared Solomon as a communist on the radio and in 
the press.78 Sweetland, a young socialist and former student organizer, moved to 
Portland for a job with the National Labor Relations Board in 1936.79 He was 
considerably more radical than Solomon, advocating the “public ownership of all 
natural resources, utilities, banks, and monopolies.”80  
Sweetland had long been a member of the socialist party. But by 1938, like 
many other socialist progressives, he had come to support Roosevelt’s New Deal  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policies after they came under attack by conservatives on the national level and 
Governor Martin at home. For Sweetland and Solomon, participation in the OCF 
allowed them political power to aid downtrodden white Oregonians, but they focused 
little on aiding minorities like Japanese Americans because it would strain the OCF 
alliance. 
 The OCF and other progressive groups faced a showdown in terms of public 
power in 1940. Buoyed by heavy union backing, the OCF redoubled its efforts to 
ensure public ownership. The OCF organized a series of ballot measure campaigns to 
establish Public Utility Districts all over Oregon, making 1940 “the high-water mark 
for public ownership.”81 Unfortunately, all of these measures were defeated by the 
opposition campaigns headed up by the private utility companies. This resounding 
defeat sounded a death knell for the public power argument. Though the PUD issue 
remained in rural areas because of the preference clause in the Bonneville Power Act, 
the public power argument was never a galvanizing force in Oregon progressive 
politics again. Because, as Robert D. Johnston noted, progressive politics in Oregon 
have always been “fragmented, fluid, and issue focused,”82 progressive groups began 
to fray and lose political clout. Sweetland and Solomon’s avenue to political influence 
had reached a dead end. 
 Solomon tried to remain active in progressive causes like the protection of civil 
rights, but found little support from the broader community. As Harry H. Stein notes, 
in these two years “Oregon’s liberal organizations shrank, functioned poorly, or  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disappeared, and no significant replacements appeared until a group was formed to aid 
returning Japanese Americans in 1944.”83 Organizations like the Portland chapter of 
the American Civil Liberties Union, for instance, had practically disappeared by 1942. 
Portland was a place practically devoid of civil rights activism on the eve of World 
War II. 
Pearl Harbor as Opportunity 
 After Pearl Harbor, in an atmosphere of wartime hysteria, the Nikkei faced a 
mounting challenge to their civil and economic rights by the Portland City Council. 
December 7th was traumatic for all Nikkei in Oregon, but particularly the Issei. 
Citizenship quickly became Japanese Americans’ only commodity in proclamations to 
a Portland public long primed to defend white society from racial others. The run up to 
the war sapped the strength of groups like the American Civil Liberties Union within 
Oregon that had called for the fair treatment of ethnic minorities.  
The lack of political leadership on the issue may not have been so catastrophic 
if the Nikkei would have had a legitimate political voice with which to protest the 
policy of internment. Eiichiro Azuma argued that following Pearl Harbor what 
resulted was “an amalgamation of nationalism and racism which culminated in a 
complete polarization between things Japanese and things American in each warring 
state.”84 This meant the Nikkei bore a burden of proving their Americanism to the 
larger public, who largely coded all Japanese as disloyal in racial terms. This 
polarization especially marginalized the voices of the Issei. Because they were still  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citizens of Japan, when the Issei publicly professed their loyalty, the public coded it as 
“unqualified Americanism” or pro-Japanese propaganda.85  
 Besides the challenge of an increasingly hostile public, the Issei also faced the 
indignity of watching the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), an all-Nisei 
patriotic organization, distance themselves politically from them in 1941. The Nisei 
sought to prove their “Americaness” by espousing their support for the Roosevelt 
administration’s policy of F.B.I sweeps. In a newspaper interview on December 7th, 
former JACL president Howard Nomura seemed to disown his heritage saying, “at 
best our position is not good—we look like Japanese and nothing can be done about it.” 
They failed to defend the loyalty of their parents, choosing instead to report any 
“suspicious activities of Japanese” to the F.B.I. in order to protect the second 
generation’s reputation. They called for fair play saying, “We can only rely on the 
fairness of Caucasian Americans to help us through. We’re hoping they will see our 
status.”86  
 It must be noted that Portland JACL leaders viewed the Issei as a public 
relations liability even before Pearl Harbor. In early 1941, the Portland JACL held a 
series of town meetings where they debated problems of employment, conduct of 
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various Portland Nisei groups, and increasing tensions between the “hakujin”(white) 
community and the Japanese community. Nomura told assembled JACL members: 
As you notice in the American paper, the JACL is coming out once in a while 
with Nisei loyalty as to the United States. We are doing this primarily for one 
purpose. You, as Japanese, regardless of whether you are Issei, Nisei, or Kibei, 
are grouped as one race, and whatever the Issei do, the Nisei also will profit or 
suffer. Now in the newspapers we are trying to say that second generation are 
as loyal Americans as any other Caucasian race. Rumors have reached the 
office that some first generation, probably under the influence of liquor, are 
denouncing the United States; some Kibei have said that they would not bear 
arms for the United States, but would bear arms for Japan.87 
 
Nomura and other JACL leaders concluded the best chance of presenting Nisei as 
loyal Americans was to distance themselves publicly from the Issei. JACL leaders 
suggested that Nisei could prove their loyalty in a number of ways: Nisei with dual 
citizenship could officially renounce their Japanese citizenship; individuals could also 
cooperate with the FBI investigations that were gathering information on the various 
Nikkei community organizations by informing on individuals espousing anti-
American rhetoric. National JACL treasurer Hito Okada concurred claiming, “Loyalty 
is something you can wear like a badge.”88 Conversely, JACL readily dismissed Nisei 
uninterested in military or other public service due to their unequal social status in 
America. When one Nisei asked if it did not make sense to repatriate to Japan to live 
where they could be treated equally, Okada told him he did “not appreciate his 
American citizenship” and told him he was welcome to repatriate.89   
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 Pearl Harbor provided a perfect opportunity for anti-Japanese progressives like 
Pierce and the Oregon Grange to break ranks with civil rights minded progressives by 
speaking out against the Japanese. Public officials in Portland used the occasion to 
note what they saw as the inevitability of war with Japan. For instance, former mayor 
and local commander of the American Legion Joseph K. Carson claimed in a 
statement in the Oregonian: “we have known for some days that this action that has 
occurred was almost certain to happen…this is an all out war against America, and 
victory depends on the extent to which every citizen does his or her part.” Pierce 
concurred saying, “I have always believed we would have to fight Japan ultimately. I 
believe now that this attack on Honolulu and Guam will unify the nation like nothing 
else possibly could have done.”90 Unity, for them, was to be built on the destiny of 
conflict between the Japanese race and America.  
 The few voices that spoke up for the Nikkei before internment belonged to 
church groups like the Portland Chapter of the Young Women’s Christian Association 
(YWCA). The day after Pearl Harbor, Betty Britton, Mildred Bartholomew, and 
Lazelle Alway of the YWCA sent Oregon governor Charles Sprague a letter praising 
him for his statement that he believed in the loyalty of the Nisei to the United States. 
They pledged aid to “these frightened young people” as they face a climate of palpable 
anti-Japanese sentiment and the economic difficulties of having their parents swept up 
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by FBI raids.91 According to Ellen Eisenberg, a key factor in the advocacy of church 
and other groups was contact with the Nikkei community.92 The Nikkei had little 
contact with the white community because they were ghettoized in two downtown 
neighborhoods by groups like the Association of Oregon Apartment House Owners 
who claimed the commingling of different races could only lead to trouble, and could 
lower home values.93 The YWCA had formed a group called the girl reserves, which 
included Nisei girls. This was one of the few contacts between the Nikkei and white 
community before the war. 
 Soon after the Pearl Harbor incident, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
conducted raids that removed nearly every Issei community leader in Portland. The 
FBI abducted all of the board members of the Oregon Japanese Association, religious 
leaders like the reverend of the Japanese Methodist Church, and key Issei business 
leaders like Masuo Yasui and Umata Matsuhsima. Fifty-nine Issei, out of about 300 
families in Portland, were incarcerated due to varying levels of assumed disloyalty.94  
The negative effects of such raids were particularly pronounced in Portland because 
Portland had a high percentage of Issei within the overall Nikkei population, at 43.2 
percent, greater than any other West Coast City.95  
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Arrests by the FBI spread quickly from 17 Issei on December 7th in Portland, 
to 3,849 alien enemies in the United States overall by February 16, 1942.96 2,192 of 
these were Issei, 1,266 of which were from the West Coast. These arrests clearly 
targeted Japanese above other groups with much larger total populations in the United 
States, such as Germans with 1,393 total arrests and Italians with only 264 arrests 
nationwide. 97  In the end, the FBI arrested 59 Issei from Oregon.98 The only slightly 
mitigating factor in the F.B.I. sweeps was the fact that U.S. Attorney General Francis 
Biddle ordered local law enforcement groups to leave the detention of “enemy aliens” 
to the F.B.I. preventing the spread of what he called in a 1940 speech the 
transformation of the local cop into the “petty tyrant.”99  
Theft as Official Portland City Council Policy  
 Although the general air of anti-Japanese sentiment in Portland following Pearl 
Harbor was not unique among West Coast cities, actions by the Portland City Council 
were. While the Portland Police may have been under orders to play only a supporting 
role in persecution of the Issei, the Portland City Council felt more action against the 
Japanese was necessary. On 2 January1942, Portland Chief License Inspector Joe 
Hutchinson brought up the issue of what to do with the liquor license applications 
submitted by Issei. He was inclined to reject the licenses of all applicants that listed 
Japan as their birthplace. He first asked the F.B.I., who declined to comment on the  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issue, so Hutchison declined to accept any more Issei applications. Hutchison also 
forced Nisei applicants like George I. Azumano to walk down to the police bureau to 
be fingerprinted before receiving their license, despite the fact that they had all already 
passed a criminal background check.100  
 Mayor Earl Riley, who was closely allied with Portland business interests, 
welcomed the chance to go on the record in opposition to the Japanese: “Let us find 
out what the policy of the council is to be right now. Let us not confuse Japanese with 
other aliens.” Councilman Fred Peterson responded, “they are on the same basis as the 
Germans and Italians right now.”101 According to a message from U.S. Attorney 
General Biddle, legally they were. Under the Federal Alien Registration Act of 1940, 
all groups should have been treated the same.102 Also, as Chief Deputy City Attorney 
Alexander Brown reminded the councilmen, the Department of Justice had already 
gone on record stating Japanese nationals should not be denied business licenses.103  
 Riley and his allies on the council were not daunted by such restrictions. He 
claimed the Japanese were different from Germans and Italians because they were not 
eligible for citizenship. He considered Issei alone to be alien enemies. Commissioner 
William Bowes concurred, proposing a motion to revoke all of the licenses belonging 
to Issei on the grounds that being from Japan they were still “more or less loyal” to 
Japan and likely to be recruited as spies. Riley’s testimony that night described the 
Issei’s marginalized position as an opportunity: 
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What does the council want to do? What is the reaction of our people? I see 
some of them have changed their names. The goods are bought and paid for 
and they use American names. If not sold and used it [the goods in Japanese 
stores] is going to require other American money to pay for it. It is wasted. 
That is the attitude of the government. If we refuse to license any of them, I am 
speaking of the Japanese only now, and the merchandise has been freed by the 
government, they will have to dispose of them at sacrifice, which doesn’t mean 
anything as far as the government or the City is concerned, to somebody that 
can sell it at an American store, if they can sell it.104 
 
What Riley’s suggestion amounted to was the robbing of Portland Issei, so that their 
merchandise could benefit white, American businessmen. Riley was not only drawing 
a line of naturalization that excluded Issei from civil rights, but also from access to 
economic resources that he saw as rightfully belonging to white Americans. 
According to estimates based on a postwar survey by the Portland JACL, the average 
Oregon Nikkei family lost $9361 (about $124,000 in 2010 dollars) due to their 
incarceration.105 In the end, the Portland City Council revoked the business licenses of 
54 Issei businessmen.106  
 The press also legitimized calls for Japanese exclusion in 1942. However, the 
degree to which anti-Japanese hysteria was a product of a campaign by the press to 
demonize the Japanese, or an organic outgrowth, is unclear. According to War 
Relocation Authority reports, towards the end of January 1942 a convention of 
California newspapers met and determined that they would stand together to call for 
the exclusion of the Japanese from the West Coast. This decision also swayed key 
                                                        
104 Council Minutes, 2 January 1942. 
105 Kimi Tambara, Chairman Portland Anti-Discrimination Committee, letter to Oregon Congressional 
Representative John W. Owynne, 21 May 1947, Anti-Discrimination Committee, PDX JACL Collection. 
106 War Relocation Authority, “Pearl Harbor and the Witch Hunt,” 10. 
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Portland newspapermen like Oregon Journal editor Marshall Dana to advocate for 
exclusion and speak publicly in favor of internment.107 
 The increased public outcry led Biddle on 29 January 1942 to call for the 
evacuation of the Japanese from industrial areas on the West Coast thought of as 
vulnerable to sabotage.108 His public statement and a flood of correspondence from 
groups like the American Legion and the Grange led the West Coast Congressional 
delegation, including Pierce, to meet on 2 February in the office of California Senator 
Hiram Johnson, a long-time leader in the California progressive movement, to 
formulate a plan of action regarding the Japanese living on the West Coast.109 On 13 
February 1942, the impromptu commission issued a statement to President Roosevelt 
calling for the following: 
The immediate evacuation of all persons of Japanese lineage and all others, 
aliens and citizens alike whose presence shall be deemed dangerous or inimical 
to the defense of the United States…we make these recommendations in order 
that no citizen, located in a strategic area, may cloak his disloyal or subversive 
activity under the mantle of his citizenship alone.110 
 
Individual members of the commission, like Pierce, had long been opposed to the 
Japanese, but this statement signaled a new level of belligerence.  
A series of congratulatory letters between West Coast congressmen suggests 
that their anti-Japanese sentiment needed little reinforcement by constituents. On 
February 14th, Pierce wrote Republican Congressman Homer D. Angell to                                                         
107 War Relocation Authority, “Pearl Harbor and the Witch Hunt,” 11. 
108 U.S. Congress. House. 77th Congress, 2nd Sess. “Preliminary Report and Recommendations on 
Problems of Evacuation of Citizens and Aliens from Military Areas” Select Committee Investigating 
National Defense Migration, March 19, 1942, House Report No 1911, 2. 
109The degree to which Senator Johnson was a progressive along the lines of Representative Pierce lies 
somewhat beyond the scope of this study, but his anti-Japanese stance seems suggestive of a correlation.  
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congratulate him on the stand he took against the Nisei during the commission’s 
deliberations. In response, Angell thanked him and again urged the importance of 
internment to prevent “a repetition of Pearl Harbor…we cannot stand on ceremony 
and allow Japs professing to be citizens and maintaining dual citizenship to hide 
behind our Constitution and stab us in the back while we sit idly by twiddling our 
thumbs.”111 These letters signal an alliance based on wartime concerns and anti-
Japanese sentiment, or as Azuma termed the sentiment, “super-American nationalism” 
that functioned in tandem with racism.112 This alliance conspicuously excluded civil 
rights minded progressives of the OCF, such as Solomon. 
 The West Coast congressmen’s statement urging internment signaled an 
official turn of the U.S. legislative branch against the Nikkei. Roosevelt must have 
found this message persuasive because he signed Executive Order 9066 calling for the 
internment of all Nikkei six days later, on February 19th. This also happened to be the 
same day the Portland City Council passed a resolution calling for removal of the 
Nikkei “irrespective of their citizenship…for the duration of the war,” a stand that 
Pierce praised.113 In terms of Azuma’s division between all things American and 
Japanese, the Nikkei were in the judgment of all three branches of the federal 
government marginalized as one-dimensionally Japanese: a dangerous, disloyal group 
in need of exclusion. 
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 Before Army officials implemented internment orders in May 1942, the 
growing consensus for Japanese exclusion in wartime caused trepidation amongst 
groups sympathetic towards Japanese Americans. The effect of political pressure for 
exclusion in Portland was evident in the statements of Governor Charles Sprague and 
testimony at the Tolan Committee hearings. Sprague, like Sweetland and Solomon, is 
notable for his relative silence on Nikkei civil rights until after internment.114 In 
response to a letter from Portland high school teacher Clarence E. Oliver who called 
for the protection of the Nikkei, Sprague claimed he saw the Issei mainly as farmers 
interested in continuing work and the Nisei of the JACL had sent expressions of 
loyalty he found to be sincere.115  Also, in a letter to Mike Masaoka, the national 
director of the JACL on 19 January 1942, Sprague vowed “to do my utmost to protect 
loyal Japanese Americans from molestation.”116 
 Other correspondence indicates that Sprague was not, however, willing to 
translate his friendliness towards the Nikkei into condemnation of anti-Japanese 
rhetoric. For instance, on January 19th, in response to a letter from Anna M. Hunsaker 
calling for the complete removal of all Japanese from America, written the day before 
Pearl Harbor, he claimed it would be against the Constitution to interfere with 
Japanese Americans, but called for alertness for acts of disloyalty.117  
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imperial decoration from the emperor of Japan in 1969. McKay, 355.  
115 Letter from Charles Spargue to Clarence E. Oliver, 8 January 1942, Sprague Papers, 76A-68. Also 
cited in McKay,348. 
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Sprague failed, furthermore, to condemn Hunsaker for her overt racist rhetoric 
or proclaim the loyalty of the Nisei as he did in letters to individuals friendly to the 
Japanese. By mid February, due to increased anti-Japanese sentiment in 
correspondence to him and in the press, and the anti-Japanese political action of the 
Coast Congressional Delegation, Sprague felt it necessary to write a telegram to U.S. 
Attorney General Biddle: 
I am convinced that our people on this coast demand more thorough action for 
protection against possible alien activity particularly by Japanese residing on 
coast. I do not believe measures now being taken are adequate and urge further 
and prompt action to remove this menace and recommend internment. We 
want no repetition of the Honolulu experience here. Recommend your agents 
confer with military and police authorities to plan positive protection for 
Americans, with decent treatment of Japanese.”118 
 
The statement was also published in the Oregonian.119 One reason for 
Sprague’s statement was a new challenge to his re-election by conservative 
Republican Earl Snell. Reading the political winds, Sprague chose not to advocate for 
the Nikkei civil rights question in his second gubernatorial campaign, a choice he 
would later come to deeply regret.120 
 Following Executive Order 9066, Roosevelt charged a U. S. House committee 
investigating migration caused by war industries, with polling West Coast 
communities before the internment order went into effect. Congressman John H. Tolan 
headed the committee; the hearings beginning on 21 February in San Francisco and                                                         
118 The “Honolulu experience” referred to here is the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Charles A. Sprague, 
telegram to United States Attorney General Francis Biddle, Feb 17, 1942, Oregon Historical Society 
Archives, Portland, Oregon. Gov. Selected Files of Governors Relating to Japanese in Oregon, 
Microfilm No. 9, Reel 1. 
119 Oregonian, 18 Feb 1942, 1. 
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arriving in Portland on 26 February were generally referred to as the Tolan 
hearings.121 The Tolan Committee hearings served legitimize of Executive Order 9066. 
While the Committee called for decent treatment of the Japanese and protection of 
their property, Tolan claimed, “This is secondary to the safety of the nation.”122 
Although elsewhere the Tolan Committee supported progressive issues such as labor 
rights, the committee did not consider the civil rights of Japanese important enough to 
interfere with national security efforts. 
 Leaders in the 1945 debate over the return of Japanese Americans were 
notably absent at the Portland Tolan hearing. McKay notes that the Tolan hearings in 
Portland would have been an ideal venue for Sprague to come out in support of 
Japanese Americans as he eventually did strongly in 1944.123 For Pierce, it could have 
been an ideal venue for him to espouse his call for Japanese exclusion, a cause he was 
avidly involved in by 1944. He was in Oregon at the time, but according to his wife 
Cornelia, it was because his only son had died.124 Solomon was one of the few 
Portland leaders of the defunct OCF who wanted to stand up for Japanese Americans. 
His problem was a lack of allies. Solomon spoke out at a Portland meeting of the 
American Jewish Congress with the argument that Jews would be next if they did not 
speak out against the internment of the Japanese Americans, but he found no support 
because his Jewish audience did not want to appear unpatriotic.125 
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 The only figure to speak out publicly against the policy of internment of the 
Nikkei was a former missionary to Japan, Azalea Emma Peet, daughter of Portland’s 
infamous purity crusader Lola Baldwin. She spoke not as a representative of any 
particular organization, but as an individual.126 She claimed the Nikkei were law 
abiding and upstanding members of the community, making no distinctions between 
Japanese with or without citizenship. Because of her extensive contact with Nikkei, 
she was willing to stand alone in opposition to Roosevelt administration policy, anti-
Japanese progressives such as Pierce and the Oregon Grange, Portland businessmen 
leaders, the Portland City Council, the governor, and patriotic groups like the 
American Legion. 
 The Tolan Hearings were a missed opportunity for civil rights progressives 
Sweetland and Solomon, YWCA leaders, and Sprague to protest Nikkei incarceration. 
 Japanese American testimony was severely marginalized, leaving them with little 
power to protest their internment in the face of prevalent racial nationalism. The 
public power issue in the prewar progressive alliance is key to understanding why, as 
Eisenberg notes, only an unaffiliated missionary stood up for Portland Nikkei. In the 
1930s two strands of progressives--racially exclusive progressives, such as Pierce, 
representing the old guard and civil rights progressives, such as Sweetland and 
Solomon, representing the new guard--with widely divergent views on civil rights for 
the Nikkei, came together in the Oregon Commonwealth Federation to fight for the 
public distribution of electricity and Roosevelt’s New Deal policies. OCF progressives 
such as Sweetland and Solomon served as organizers of a progressive block of voters                                                         
126 Eisenberg, 542. 
   47 
until a series of ballot measure defeats in 1940 spelled the end of the statewide public 
power movement in Oregon. Without the driving force of public power, progressive 
groups largely went dormant or extinct by 1942. 
 After Pearl Harbor, due to both public hysteria and his long-term anti-Japanese 
agenda, Pierce broke ranks with civil rights progressives. He joined with the West 
Coast congressional delegation in recommending internment of all West Coast Nikkei 
for the duration of the war. Roosevelt then gave racial exclusion his stamp of approval 
on 19 February 1942 when he published executive order 9066. Internment in one 
sense was a heightening of the persecution of Issei as alien enemies by the F.B.I at the 
behest of Roosevelt’s attorney general Francis Biddle. The role of alien enemies had 
been under serious debate in U.S. Congress since at least 1938, and the frame for the 
debate had long been the accepted difference between citizens and non-citizens. This 
division was key because it affected the views of even pro-Nikkei leaders like Sprague, 
who acquiesced to federal authorities who targeted the Issei above other alien groups, 
but spoke to the loyalty of the Nisei until internment seemed inevitable. The 
designation of alien enemy also allowed the Portland City Council to single out the 
Issei when Mayor Riley called for revoking Issei business licenses. 
 By the February 1942 Tolan hearings in Portland, Roosevelt administration 
policy largely aligned with calls from racially exclusive progressives like Pierce and 
the Oregon Grange. Due both to a lack of institutional support and palpable anti-
Japanese sentiment in Oregon, potential advocates for Nikkei constitutional rights 
were marginalized. Solomon, a key supporter of the Japanese by 1944, found no allies 
in his calls for prevention of internment. The lack of progressive civil rights advocacy 
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for the Nikkei due to the absence of the organizing force of the public power debate 
was a main reason why no groups and only Peet spoke out against internment in 
Portland. 
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Chapter 3: “Despite Race, Color, or Creed” 
 
 On 9 January 1944, more than eight months before the end of the Pacific War, 
Ted Hachiya was one of the first Japanese Americans to return to Portland. For 
Hachiya, coming back to his family business, a hotel in downtown Portland, involved 
more than a reevaluation of accounts and tenants. Returning to Portland meant 
renegotiating an identity acceptable to the majority white community. The Japanese 
community had vanished from Portland in 1942 and it was not certain if their return, 
in practice, would be allowed, despite U.S. Supreme Court and Army decisions in 
December to bring internment to a close.127 
Not long after his return, Hachiya spoke to a reporter from the local newspaper, 
the Oregonian. Hachiya said the return of Japanese Americans to the West Coast 
would be difficult, especially for those without homes or businesses to which to return. 
However, he largely portrayed relocation in a positive light. He claimed that wartime 
relocation programs had been beneficial to the Nisei because the “opportunity” had 
offered training in new trades and a chance to travel around the United States. 
Continuing with his affirmative story of the Japanese American incarceration, Hachiya  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during Roosevelt’s 1944 run for reelection. By October 1944, it became increasingly clear that that the 
U.S. Supreme Court cases like Exparte Endo would overturn Executive order 9066, Roosevelt’s order 
authorizing Japanese incarceration. The day defore the decision came down on 18 December 1944, 
General Henry Pratt issued Public Proclamation No. 21, signaling the end of Japanese incarceration. 
Specific orders of exclusion were lifted on 2 January 1945, beginning the slow process of West Coast 
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shared an anecdote about his return to Portland that reflects Nisei strategies for 
acceptance during the return period.  
On the way to Portland on a bus I met several servicemen…I told them I was 
an American-born Japanese and they were most friendly with me. At one small 
town between Pendleton and Hood River, a soldier and I got out when the bus 
stopped and a fellow came up to me [sic] if I was a Jap. I told him I was an 
American of Japanese ancestry. The soldier took my side and asked the fellow 
what difference it made. The soldier said I was an American just the same as 
he was.128 
 
Hachiya used the testimony of American soldiers to legitimize his claim to full-
fledged American citizenship. For Hachiya, and other returning Japanese Americans, 
association with the Army, in large part through the story of the Nisei 442nd 
Regimental Army Combat Team, became a gateway to establishing acceptance within 
the larger community.  
 In the return period, Japanese Americans embraced the Nisei patriotism 
argument because Portland had changed in their absence. During the war, class 
politics between progressives and business interests gave way to a fierce public debate 
over the boundaries of American citizenship. More specifically, two alignments 
emerged in wartime Portland over whether to aid returning Japanese Americans, or to 
exclude them entirely. These two groups correspond ideologically to Gary Gerstle’s 
conception of racial versus civic nationalism. Gerstle argued that American history 
during the twentieth century was defined by a conflict between civic nationalism, 
defined as democratic universalism embracing rights of equality and liberty despite 
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heritage, and a racial nationalism that saw Americans as “held together by common 
blood and skin color and by an inherent fitness for self-government.”129  
During World War II, racially exclusive progressives, like Congressman 
Walter M. Pierce, turned away from issues of class conflict in order to create a broader 
coalition supporting Japanese exclusion, fronted publicly by the American Legion and 
the Japanese Exclusion League. These anti-Japanese groups embraced a racial 
definition of citizenship that excluded Japanese Americans and attempted to publicly 
brand Japanese Americans as a racial, financial, and physical danger to the United 
States. When compared to the earlier racially exclusive progressivism, Japanese 
exclusion during World War II was no longer legitimized by attempts to improve the 
status of working class white Americans, but rather by the need to exclude Japanese 
understood as a racially monolithic group who were inherently subversive to the 
American way of life. 
By 1943, however, prominent civic leaders, church councils, and news editors 
in Portland began to abandon their silence because of increasing anti-Japanese rhetoric, 
congressional memorials, and threats of violence. The choice by the YWCA, the 
Portland Council of Churches, and other civic leaders to protest anti-Japanese Oregon 
House memorials 8 and 9 in 1943, vandalism of the Japanese Cemetery in Portland, 
and attempts by the Hood River American Legion to brand Nisei soldiers as un-
American in 1944, caused a resurgence of civic nationalism in Portland that lasted 
well into the postwar period. By 1945, this pro-Japanese alignment, a loose coalition  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of civic nationalists, formed the Portland Citizen’s Committee to Aid Relocation, 
which worked in tandem with War Relocation Authority (WRA) to quell anti-Japanese 
activism in Portland and the surrounding areas. They were successful because they 
echoed the press’ embrace of the Nisei Patriotism argument, which juxtaposed Nisei 
sacrifices to save white American soldiers in Europe with the reactionary racist anti-
Japanese organizers of the American Legion.  
Therefore, returnees sought the aid of church groups, friendly newspapermen 
and lawyers, and civilian and military government officials to counteract anti-Japanese 
organizing efforts, rather than initiating public confrontations about the 
unconstitutionality of their wartime incarceration as a method of reestablishing their 
civil rights. These groups, referred to by Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) 
members as “white angels,” were instrumental in easing Japanese Americans’ 
transition back to Portland.130 At times, alliances with these groups involved the 
deliberate avoidance of more confrontational campaigns for civil rights. In 1945 war 
tensions were still high and Japanese Americans had yet to return to Portland in large 
numbers.131 Japanese American returnees saw a relatively smooth transition in 
Portland, compared to anti-Japanese intimidation in Hood River, Oregon, because 
Portland-based church groups won early battles in the arena of public opinion, 
establishing public perception of Nisei as loyal Americans.   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Anti-Japanese Organizing by the American Legion 
 The larger Oregon American Legion organization played a key role in efforts 
to permanently exclude the Nikkei from Oregon. In the press and through lobbying the 
Oregon Legislature, the American Legion pursued its ideal of aiding “one hundred 
percent Americans” at the expense of Japanese Americans Former Portland Mayor 
Joseph K. Carson Jr. was a chief advocate for the American Legion in Portland. 
Before the internment of Japanese Americans in May of 1942, Carson spoke before 
Portland City Council and at the Tolan Committee Hearings in his capacity as 
Commander of the Oregon Department of the American Legion to call for the removal 
of all Japanese inland past the Cascade Mountains.132  
Within the Legion itself, Carson led a campaign amongst other Oregon 
American Legion leaders to pass resolutions to the U. S Congress proposing the 
internment of the Nikkei until the end of the war with Japan due to the presence of 
enemy alien Issei in their community. He gave three reasons for this: internment 
would make sabotage against the war effort impossible; innocent Japanese would be 
shielded from vigilante violence; and, if such violence were to happen, it could “be 
used as a basis for reprisals against our unfortunate nationals who are in the hands of 
the Japanese.”133 This stance on the Japanese, treating them as a racially monolithic 
group, was not unique, but his lobbying of other posts in Oregon was key to uniting 
the Oregon Department behind the banner of Japanese exclusion. 
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 Carson’s successor, Hugh Bowman, took an even harder line on the issue of 
the return of the Japanese Americans to Oregon. Speaking at an Oregon Department 
convention in Portland in 1943, Bowman unequivocally stated his support of 
removing the Nikkei permanently. He said, “If I were to have my way, all Japs, native 
born or otherwise, would be disposed of entirely in the quickest way possible. It must 
be proven to me that there is such a thing as a Jap who is loyal to this country.”134 His 
remarks also profoundly racialized of Japanese Americans. For instance, he attributed 
the birth of the Nisei in America as a plot:  
It is my studied opinion that any Jap who was or is native born, was so born for 
but one reason; to be able to own property for the benefit of the citizens of his 
or her fatherland and in the end for the final benefit of that fatherland when the 
showdown which was bound to come, finally did come.135  
 
Bowman subscribed to the idea that one’s race and sense of nation were both linked 
and immovable. To him the Japanese, at home and abroad, would stop at nothing to 
aid their racial brothers in the Japanese Imperial Army. 
 Under Bowman’s leadership, the Oregon Department of the American Legion 
pursued a legislative and ideological agenda dedicated to a postwar Oregon free of the 
Nikkei. At its 1943 convention, the Oregon department passed four resolutions 
introduced by their Americanization committee.136 These called for the deportation of 
“all persons of Japanese ancestry,” for the U.S. Congress to limit citizenship to those  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born to U.S. citizen parents, to revoke the citizenship of Japanese Americans because 
they carried dual citizenship with Japan, and to support any groups that further these 
aims. These resolutions were designed to prevent what they saw as “further insidious 
infiltration, through accident of birth, of a race whose purpose is to possess, dominate, 
and destroy.”137  
 The Legion’s anti-Japanese agenda was particularly powerful in the Oregon 
State Legislature thanks to the efforts of the Legion’s Judge Advocate and Oregon 
State Senator from Portland, Thomas R. Mahoney. Mahoney had long represented 
Oregon Legionnaires in cases to secure preferential fishing rights on the Columbia for 
American citizens as opposed to foreign nationals like the Issei.138 In the 1942 debate 
over revoking Issei business licenses in Portland, Mahoney supported the City 
Council’s decision because he believed Portlanders should be able to shop without 
worrying they could be “contributing to the coffers of enemy aliens.” Furthermore, he 
was an outspoken proponent of putting all of Portland’s Issei “behind barbed wire,” 
following the Pearl Harbor incident.139 
 In 1943, Mahoney brought the American Legion resolutions to the Oregon 
Legislature through a pair of controversial memorials, Senate Joint Memorials 8 and 9. 
According to the Oregon Voter, No. 8 was a memorial petitioning the U.S. Congress  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renounce it. Surprisingly, these efforts were supported by the Japanese Consulate in San Francisco, who 
told Portland JACL leaders that they saw the Nisei as a bridge between the two countries. If the Nisei 
were deemed disloyal due to their dual citizenship, the bridge would have no good footing in America. 
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to rescind orders allowing “American-born Japs” to serve in the military. No. 9 was a 
memorial calling on the U. S. Congress to cancel the citizenship of all people of 
Japanese ancestry and deport them immediately after the war.140  
 Reaction by state senators to these memorials is a telling indicator of the high 
level of anti-Japanese sentiment in the Oregon legislature in 1943, but also reflects 
their cautiousness at questioning military authority. Both memorials passed votes to be 
considered in the legislature, but Oregon senators found the military service memorial, 
passed 16-14, more controversial than the deportation memorial, passed 21-9.141 Some 
senators argued that the military was fully capable of determining whether or not Nisei 
were loyal enough to serve. Fewer senators had qualms with answering the Japanese 
question with deportation.  
Compared to representatives of other West Coast states, the Oregon 
Legislature was both more opposed to the return of Japanese Americans and more 
willing to question the wisdom of military orders. According to a Gallup pole of the 
coastal states, while only 31% of respondents opposed the return of Japanese 
Americans, 97% of respondents approved of the Army’s actions so far in reference to 
internment.142 Much to Mahoney’s dismay, both measures later died in committee.143 
Heeding these results, Mahoney pursued anti-Japanese organizing from 1943 on with 
a much lower public profile.  
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 Ideologically, Mahoney and Pierce were close allies. One of Pierce’s final acts 
in Congress was a profoundly anti-Japanese diatribe given in November 1942 titled 
“Civilization Must Win Another Contest: The Japanese Onslaught.” In this speech, 
Pierce portrayed all Japanese through the “yellow peril” rhetoric, depicting the 
aggression of the Japanese as a threat to Western civilization similar to the threats of 
Hannibal’s armies to Rome and Genghis Kahn’s horde of marauders to Europe.144 He 
described the Japanese as “highly trained savage killers” uninterested in peace, whose 
untrustworthiness was finally proved by the “stab” of Pearl Harbor.145 Pierce 
recognized no difference between the Japanese on the Eastern and Western sides of 
the Pacific. He described the immigration of the Issei to America as an “invasion” 
representing a clear threat because of an imagined high Japanese birthrate compared to 
Caucasians. He said of the Nikkei, “They multiply so much more rapidly and ask so 
little of life...one way or another they have forced themselves into North America. 
They believe that the [sic] world control will ultimately pass into the hands of the 
yellow races, with Japan leading and making the terms.”146 Pierce’s answer to this 
perceived threat was the deportation of all Japanese following the war.  
In February of 1943, Pierce came home and began to give similar speeches all 
over Oregon, including a speech on 15 May to the Progressive Business Men’s Club, a 
key business association in Portland.147 Following Pearl Harbor, the Portland Business 
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Men’s Club had been one of the few civic business groups in Portland to pass 
resolutions calling for internment.148 Pierce spoke before the Club in 1943 in the hopes 
that the influential business group would continue their opposition to the presence of 
Japanese Americans in Oregon, which they by means of resolution in June.149 Pierce’s 
appearance at the meeting is an indication that his anti-Japanese sentiment was strong 
enough for him to put aside his anti-corporate views. Pierce consistently framed his 
politics around anti-corporate populist rhetoric of the “people” versus the 
“monopolies,” and his appearance showed his desire to form a broader alliance for 
Japanese exclusion.150 Furthermore, his appearance demonstrated the great effect war-
inspired hatred of the Japanese and the American Legion’s anti-Japanese organizing 
had on Portland businessmen.  
 This anti-Japanese victory was tainted, however, by the first significant public 
challenge to anti-Japanese efforts in Portland. E. B MacNaughton, president of First 
National Bank and later good friend to the Nikkei community, took this opportunity to 
protest “racial scapegoating” by the club, though he was unsuccessful in preventing 
the anti-Japanese resolution.151 
  The Portland Chamber of Commerce, on the other hand, needed little 
prodding to oppose the return of Japanese Americans. Around May 1943, the  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Chamber’s executive council sent out questionnaires to other Chambers of Commerce 
and American Legion posts on the Pacific Coast to make sure Portland’s Chamber 
came out on the right side of the issue of Japanese return. On 3 June, the executive 
committee learned “it was pretty much the consensus that Japanese should not be 
allowed to return to this area.”152 Following suit, the executive council voted to adopt 
the same position. This signaled a departure from the Chamber’s previous pro-
Japanese stance.153 The Chamber’s embrace of Japanese exclusion showed the 
influence of anti-Japanese rhetoric and organizing, but was not a reflection of the 
development of a growing, more general anti-Asian prejudice in Portland business 
circles. Only a month later the executive council voted to support the addition of 
Chinese people to the 1924 Johnson-Reed act’s naturalization quota system that had 
previously barred them from citizenship.154 
Desecration and Conflict in the Portland Japanese Cemetery 
Although the American Legion in 1943 sought permanent exclusion of the 
Nikkei mainly through lobbying efforts, on at least one occasion they also resorted to 
threats of violence. Sometime during the summer of 1943, vandals tipped over or 
destroyed about 250 grave markers in the Rose City Japanese Cemetery, then set the 
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cemetery on fire.155 On 14 August 1943, the Oregonian published an article 
publicizing an effort led by Reverend J. W. Reed, president of a pacifist group called 
the Portland Fellowship of Reconciliation, to repair damage to the cemetery, perform 
bonmatsuri rites, and have a pot luck at the site to discuss Portland’s racial problem 
the following day. In the article, Reed asked Portlanders for help in cleaning up the 
cemetery as a way of showing their solidarity with Japanese Americans. Reed 
conceived of the event after receiving $30 from Japanese Americans in Minidoka for 
the purpose of buying wreaths to be placed on their families’ graves.156   
 On Saturday, Reed and others went to the cemetery and found the entrance 
blocked by a contingent of Legionnaires, Sheriff Martin T. Pratt, and Multnomah 
County District Attorney James R. Bain, who came together to stop the pacifist group 
because they considered it “an insult to American war dead.” When Pratt threatened to 
arrest the pacifist group claiming fear of a riot, Reed called off the program for 
Sunday.157 The secretary for the national YMCA, Howard Willits, and other members 
of the Portland religious community returned the next day despite warnings from 
Sheriff Pratt.158 The police presence on Sunday escalated to twenty officers, local 
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American Legion post commanders, and Portland city Commissioner Fred L. Peterson. 
Pratt himself opted not to show claiming that the Japanese cemetery was officially 
closed for the duration of the war.159 One source suggests that the Legionnaires 
themselves were armed, but the Oregonian does not mention this.160 However, the 
article mentions law enforcement on hand were friendly to the Legionnaires, making 
no attempt to stop their heckling.161 Willits managed to barge his way in, but once 
more Fellowship members showed up, heated arguments escalated to shoving and 
threats of bloodshed.  
 The deputy on the scene attempted to diffuse the situation by reiterating Pratt’s 
ban, after which Willits demanded to speak to him. Because the deputy would not 
allow him to use the police radio, Willits was forced to seek a telephone elsewhere. A 
farcical scene ensued, with hecklers following Willits for ten blocks to prevent him 
from using phones in nearby businesses.162 Willits and others were ultimately unable 
to repair the damage to the cemetery or prevent further desecration of the cemetery by 
vandals in August 1944.163 The incident ended without violence or arrest, but served 
as a serious point of friction between Portland religious groups and the anti-Japanese, 
American Legion-aligned Portland leadership. This friction was surely heightened by 
a speech given the following week by American Legion National Commander Roane 
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Waring calling for the complete annihilation of the Japanese, a call that did not make a 
special exception for Japanese Americans.164  
The Coalition Against Anti-Return Groups 
 No Portland religious, business, or academic group staged significant 
opposition to Nikkei incarceration in 1942. In 1943, Portland religious groups, such as 
the Council of Churches and the YWCA, were the first to fill that void publicly in a 
way that could provide real benefits for Japanese Americans. Through a series of 
public statements in response to anti-Japanese organizing, members of the Portland 
community inclined to support Japanese Americans’ right to return began to organize, 
beginning with the previously mentioned Portland cemetery incident. 
 The Portland chapter of the YWCA was perhaps the first to address publicly 
the injustice of internment. In early May 1943, Ruth W. Kingman of Berkeley, 
California, spoke to a group of civic leaders at the YWCA in the hopes of forming a 
Portland chapter of the Committee on American Principles and Fair Play. Kingman 
did not call for the release of Japanese Americans, but rather sought to influence 
public opinion on “the Japanese problem.” Whereas anti-Japanese groups saw the 
“Japanese problem” as the threat people of Japanese descent posed to the livelihood of 
the white majority, the Fair Play Committee viewed anti-Japanese legislative 
campaigns as the true “Japanese problem.” Kingman claimed:  
Legislation to deprive Americans of Japanese descent of any of their legal 
rights would set a precedent for depriving other racial groups of their rights 
and would weaken the confidence of our allies, particularly those in Asia and 
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Latin America, in the sincerity of our professions to be fighting for the rights 
of all people.165 
 
In short, Kingman was the first to state openly in Portland’s press that the 
incarceration of Japanese Americans undermined American principles and the war 
effort. 
 It must be mentioned here that the Portland YWCA’s efforts on behalf of 
Japanese Americans began well before World War II. As historian Mary K. Gayne 
observed, the Portland YWCA had several Japanese American groups, such as the 
Japanese Girl’s Reserves. These groups were meant to instill Christian values and to 
integrate Japanese women into larger society as part of “efforts to achieve the 
interracial goals set by the national YWCA in 1919.”166 Mildred Bartholomew, 
Department of Religion and Membership Secretary, and Betty Britton, Secretary of the 
Young Women’s Department supervised these efforts in Portland. In 1942, they 
continued their work during the incarceration period by establishing the clubs in the 
Minidoka internment camp,167 as well as by aiding Nikkei families through the storage 
of some of their personal possessions.168 Barholomew visited Minidoka in October 
1942 to meet with War Relocation Officials and JACL leaders, under the auspices of 
visiting members of the Girls Reserve.169 
 Despite a long-term commitment to Japanese Americans, the Portland YWCA 
refrained from taking a public stance against anti-Japanese campaigning by Pierce and                                                         
165 “Racial Bias To Be Fought,” Oregonian, 9 May 1943, Section 3, p 8.  
166 Mary K. Gayne. “Japanese Americans at the Portland YWCA,” Journal of Women’s History 15, No 
3, 197-198. 
167 Minutes: Board of Director’s Meeting, Young Women’s Christian Association, Portland, OR, May 
12, 1942, p 2. Box 9A, Folder 1, Lewis & Clark College Special Collections and Archives. 
168 Gayne, 199. 
169 “Portlanders Here for Y-Tea,” Minidoka Irrigator, 10 October 1942, 3. 
   64 
the American Legion. Minutes from the YWCA Board of Directors show the board 
was deeply concerned about Mahoney’s anti-Japanese memorials in March of 1943. In 
response, the board chose to issue a resolution in opposition to these memorials. The 
resolution was sent to other YWCA branches, but not to the Portland press.170 Other 
Portland church groups were much more vocal in the press. The Portland Council of 
Churches, the Oregon Christian Youth Council, the Oregon Council of Women, and 
the Portland Chapter of the International League for Peace and Freedom publicly 
claimed the Nisei were a “truly American” group because of their “hard work, thrift, 
purchase of land and education.”171 While the precise reason for the YWCA’s restraint 
is unclear, it seems likely that the board was reluctant to speak because they were 
waiting for word from the national organization. 
 National YWCA representatives wished to remain neutral on the issue in the 
interest of preserving their relationship with the War Relocation Authority (WRA), the 
wartime agency within the Department of the Interior that supervised the internment 
camps. The YWCA was one of the few groups allowed to operate in the WRA camps 
along with the Red Cross, the USO, and handful of others.172 In the press, the YWCA 
maintained a low profile so as not to give fuel to American Legion calls to return the 
camps to Army control, which both groups believed would have dealt more harshly  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with Japanese Americans. Thus any organization aiding Japanese Americans in the 
camps had to mute its advocacy in the press. 
 There is also evidence that the YWCA’s diplomatic approach was strategic in 
that it allowed them to seek favors for certain Nisei. For instance, two weeks after 
Bartholemew’s visit to Minidoka in October 1942, Frances Maeda became one of the 
first two internees to be released for employment outside of the exclusion zone.173 
Maeda had served under Bartholomew’s committee at the YWCA in a vital role as 
liaison with the Japanese Methodist Church.174 Such favoritism was more the 
exception than the rule because such releases engendered significant resentment on the 
part of Nisei eager to seek opportunities in business and education outside of the 
internment camps.175  
By avoiding controversy, the National YWCA was able to seek a broader 
effort to aid Nisei through the creation of a committee of West Coast college 
presidents, educators, students, and clergy to arrange transfers to colleges in the East 
in March and April of 1943. In May 1942, the program of school relocation run by the 
National Japanese American Student Relocation Council became the first program 
designed to mitigate the effects of internment on the Nisei.176 The program found 
colleges willing to accept Nisei students and helped support their studies financially.  
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Other Silences 
 The pressure to remain silent in the face of anti-Japanese sentiment could be 
even stronger for Japanese Americans loudly demanding recognition of their 
constitutional rights. Portland’s most outspoken Nisei challenger to orders of 
internment was a lawyer, the only Japanese American to have been admitted to the bar 
before World War II, Minoru Yasui.177 Yasui was the son of a prominent Hood River 
Issei businessman Masuo Yasui, who like Daiichi Takeoka and other influential Issei, 
had been arrested by the FBI in early 1942 prior to internment orders. When General 
John L. DeWitt placed a curfew on all people of Japanese descent in zones including 
Portland, Yasui challenged the order in court based on his conviction that no “military 
authority has the right to subject any United States citizen to any requirement that does 
not apply equally to all other citizens.”178 The day the orders went into effect, he 
walked up to a police officer and insisted on being arrested. In connection with his test 
case, Yasui was escorted from the Minidoka internment camp to the Multnomah 
County jail in downtown Portland in November 1942.179 Yasui spent nearly a year in 
solitary confinement awaiting the determination of his appeals, with almost no visitors.  
Despite limited contact, Yasui was aware of anti-Japanese organizing in 
Portland. Writing to the editor of the Minidoka Irrigator, Yasui was the only Oregon 
Nisei willing to engage Pierce’s racially exclusive rhetoric publicly. He called Pierce’s 
spurious public warnings about supposedly high Japanese birth rates merely “an echo 
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of previous cries of yellow peril.” Yasui denounced Pierce for his racial definition of 
Americans writing: 
His concluding statements mark him as a race hater, and as an un-American 
demagogue. The issue ought not to be whether the Pacific Coast should remain 
“white” or “yellow.” The issue ought to be whether the Pacific Coast will 
remain American or degenerate into a land of “superior whites.” I believe 
Pierce would be willing to destroy Americanism for sake of “white man’s” 
superiority. 180 
 
This statement is the most direct refutation of Oregon racism in the press at the time, 
even when compared to the Minidoka Irrigator’s own coverage of Pierce.181 
 Fearing a backlash, the national Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), 
which had its own beneficial relationship with the WRA, condemned Yasui’s protests 
as part of its policy of saving civil rights advocacy for the postwar period. In 1943, the 
National JACL public relations spokesman Mike Masaoka condemned Yasui and 
other “self-styled martyrs” who sought to test army curfew orders. His statement 
included ten reasons to condemn Yasui’s actions, including the belief that the first 
duty of all Americans was to obey Army orders, the argument that such test cases 
would be better pursued after the war, the conclusion that cooperation with evacuation 
orders did not compromise civil rights, and the insistence that such cases provided a 
focus point for anti-Japanese editorialists seeking to brand all Japanese as “treacherous 
and dangerous.”182  
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Paul Spickard and other historians have noted that JACL aims during the war 
era included attempts to establish its leadership in the Japanese American community 
and to foster positive relations with government agencies, an effort that predated Pearl 
Harbor.183 The 1943 JACL memo supports that view: Masaoka avoided confronting 
anti-Japanese sentiment so as not to endanger a beneficial subordinate role vis-a-vis 
Army and WRA authorities. 
 This memo was also part of a larger effort to maintain legitimacy for the JACL 
among the larger Japanese American community. As Spickard wrote, strikes by Nisei 
at Poston and other WRA camps condemned JACL leaders for their collaboration with 
government authorities, leading to a series of beatings of JACL leaders such as 
National President Saburo Kido.184 In the wake of such violence, new groups became 
more influential in many internment camps. In Minidoka, one such group was the 
Civil Liberties League (CLL). Nisei interested in challenging military orders, such as 
Portlander George Tani, formed CLL after Minoru Yasui was taken from Minidoka to 
stand trial in Multnomah County Court. Their stated purpose was supporting Yasui in 
any way possible, while spreading word of his civil rights efforts.185 Thus, when 
Masaoka warned in the opposition memo “should we challenge…travel restrictions we 
might be damned as fifth columnists,” he sought to undermine the legitimacy of rival 
Nisei groups. In response, the Civil Liberties League maintained their support for 
Yasui, but divided donations between a fund for general activities and the Min Yasui’s  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Case Fund, giving supporters the option to donate money to CLL efforts without 
directly supporting Yasui.186  
 Civic Leaders Speak Out 
  Outside of Minidoka, Yasui found little public support for his case, but was 
joined in his condemnation of Pierce by two other Oregon figures, Portland banker E. 
B. MacNaughton and former Governor and newspaper editor Charles Sprague. Their 
willingness to denounce anti-Japanese sentiment in Portland helped to rally church 
groups and made them natural spokesmen for the emerging pro-Japanese alliance. As 
mentioned above, MacNaughton’s protest of the Portland Business Men’s Club’s 1943 
anti-Japanese resolution was unsuccessful in preventing the resolution from passing. 
However, his opposition gained the approval of church groups in Portland such as the 
committee on International Justice and Good Will of the Council of Churches, which 
was interested in repealing anti-Asian laws like the Oriental Exclusion Act of 1882.187  
 Sprague, having lost a gubernatorial primary against Earl Snell in 1942, 
returned to his editorial position at the Oregon Statesman. Between 1943 and 1945, 
this editorial page became the public voice of the clash between anti-Japanese and pro-
Japanese groups. In 1943, in one of what would become many articles on the right of 
Nikkei to return to Oregon, Sprague claimed internment was not “creditable to 
American standards” and that Mahoney’s proposed memorial in the Oregon legislature, 
to deport Japanese Americans whom Sprague considered loyal to the United States, 
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was an affront to American considerations of fair play.188 Soon after, Pierce began 
writing editorials in response that reveled in the “rabble-rouser” status with which 
Sprague had labeled him. The resulting battle of articles won sympathy for both 
sides,189 most importantly causing the Portland Council of Churches to see Sprague as 
an important advocate for the Nikkei community.190 
The Hood River Effect 
 By late fall 1944, Supreme Court cases challenging the constitutionality of the 
Japanese incarceration appeared more and more destined for victory with the likely 
result of a lifting of exclusion orders before the end of hostilities with Japan. 
Frustrated by legislative defeats, and interested in keeping Japanese American 
farmland, the Hood River American Legion redoubled its efforts to portray Japanese 
Americans as racially ineligible for citizenship. On 29 November 1944, the Hood 
River post removed the names of sixteen Nisei soldiers from a plaque honoring Hood 
River servicemen, a public demonstration of the post’s belief that Nisei soldiers fought 
for reasons other than loyalty to the United States. Post officials claimed Nisei soldiers 
had dual citizenship with Japan, and thus were loyal to Japan.191  
To explain the removal, Hood River Post commander Jess Edington produced 
a ten-page pamphlet, a manifesto for the anti-return movement in Oregon. The 
pamphlet described Japanese immigrants as covetous of the “Pacific slope with all its 
wealth.” They were part of a conspiracy  “to take up the old sure game of infiltration  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by reproduction, looking forward to the time that they will again bid for domination of 
the Pacific Area.”192 Using little in the way of evidence, the pamphlet claimed that 
Japanese diminished property values and that, to avoid the “Japanization” of Hood 
River Valley, the Oregon 1923 Alien Land Law should be enforced, codicils on all 
Hood River real estate should ban the sale of property to Japanese, and a corporation 
should be set up to buy up all remaining Japanese owned property.193 Striking out 
against defenders of Japanese Americans, the pamphlet also blamed the Pearl Harbor 
incident and U.S. casualties in the Pacific on the “ministerial associations, pacifists, 
and enemy agents” who defeated the 1920s American Legion effort towards universal 
military service.194  
The Hood River post’s actions provoked an almost immediate response among 
civic nationalists in Portland, and brought a storm of negative press on Oregon and the 
American Legion. Coincidentally, Roger Baldwin, national director of the American 
Civil Liberties Union, happened to be speaking to the Portland City Club on 1 
December, two days after the name removal.195 Baldwin had been less than supportive 
of Japanese American civil liberties skirmishes and was coming to give a speech 
claiming civil rights had fared much better in World War II than it had in World War 
I.196  
Conversation following Baldwin’s speech turned to the Hood River removal. 
Under a withering barrage of questions, Edington announced that Hood River did not  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want the return of any Japanese Americans.197 Baldwin condemned the post saying, “I 
should presume that the American Legion, as a great patriotic organization should be 
the first to accept all veterans—regardless of race. It is a matter of great regret when 
race prejudice of any sort takes precedence over patriotism.”198 Reverend H. J. 
Maulbestch, president of the Portland Council of Churches, echoed Baldwin’s 
criticism, warning of “serious consequences in Asia if we permit race prejudice to 
govern our actions.”199 Shortly after the City Club meeting, Baldwin sent Gus 
Solomon, the Oregon ACLU representative, a letter urging him to file a case testing 
the constitutionality of a quadriplegic Nisei veteran returning to Hood River.200 The 
news in Hood River provoked both public condemnation and a renewed legal effort to 
aid Japanese Americans in Portland. 
The City Club meeting also indicated to some American Legion officials that 
anti-Japanese rhetoric could have political consequences. Mahoney, present as a 
representative of the Oregon Department of the American Legion, was suddenly 
backed into a corner. Church groups in Portland had vocally opposed anti-Japanese 
memorials he introduced in 1943, but saved the majority of their criticism for the 
memorials themselves, rather than for Mahoney personally.201 Forced to make a 
statement that was certain to be published in Portland newspapers, Mahoney 
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equivocated. He refused to condemn the Hood River post publicly, but claimed that 
“such action was up to individual posts,” and more removals could follow.202  
The name removal soon became a nationwide issue leading to an embrace of 
civic nationalism and demonization of racial exclusion in Portland. Articles in 
newspapers across the country reported outrage at the Hood River post’s honor roll 
removal, placing increased pressure on the national American Legion to disavow the 
removal. Secretary of War Henry Stimson called the removal “Not consistent with 
democratic ideals,” reinforcing the notion that Nisei soldiers had proven their loyalty 
and valor in combat in Italy.203 Assistant Director for the WRA and American Legion 
member Robert D. Cozzens claimed “I know that your disgraceful act cannot be 
condoned by a vast majority of American Legionnaires…nor by the lost battalion 
rescued in the war by Nisei…you have betrayed the Legion.”204  
Soldiers writing from the front joined Cozzens and Stimson in response to a 
Stars and Stripes article on the removal.205 Many bristled at the possibility of being 
described as “missionaries for Jap hating.” One Captain from Hood River claimed that 
if the Nisei names were not restored, he wanted his removed.206 Oregonian Sgt. J. B. 
Jones wrote from France “people back home ought to know that if it wasn’t for the 
Nisei, a lot of their sons would be dead now.”207 Jones refers here to the 442nd combat 
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unit’s push to save the “lost battalion,” in which Nisei soldiers suffered heavy 
casualties to save a white unit that was trapped behind German lines.208 U.S. Marine 
and University of Oregon History professor Harold J. Noble also told the City Club 
that, “the Japanese government realizes full well that these Japanese American 
soldiers of America are their most implacable enemies.”209 A number of other 
American Legion posts also condemned the action; in fact one New York Post 
offering to put the sixteen removed names up on their honor roll.210 Such articles 
created a dialectic between racial antagonists at home and the valor of Japanese 
Americans abroad that became a powerful argument for the loyalty of Japanese 
Americans. The public was willing to accept anti-Japanese sentiment to a point, but 
questioning the loyalty of American soldiers was beyond the pale.    
 The confrontation at the City Club and later negative press curtailed some of 
Mahoney’s less-public anti-Japanese organizing. In 1944, Mahoney became involved 
with the American League of California, a newly formed anti-Japanese organization of 
produce dealers and flower merchants based in Los Angeles. The League created a 
Council on Alien Relations, whose articles of incorporation benignly describe itself as 
a corporation interested in the buying and selling of various forms of property by U.S. 
citizens “who are interested in aliens.” The Council’s list of objectives however, 
shows that it called for standard anti-return aims. For instance, the Council called for 
preventing the return of Japanese Americans and the deportation of disloyal Japanese 
Americans “under special treaty arrangements.” Mahoney sat on the board of  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governors of that council and had suggested that Pierce serve as well. W.W. Gray, 
writing for the council, assured Pierce that all activities would “be along dignified 
lines” so as not to bring condemnation on members.211   
 In November 1944, Mahoney was also involved in the formation of Oregon 
Anti-Japanese Incorporated in Gresham, a rural suburb of Portland. A grocer named 
Ralph Hannan, the mayor of Gresham, H. H. Hughes, and attorney C.G. Schneider, 
founded Oregon Anti-Japanese Incorporated with the purpose of promoting an 
amendment to the state constitution to bar the return of Japanese Americans to 
Oregon.212 This group had the backing of Mahoney, who formed a sister group in 
Portland with the intention of making Oregon Anti-Japanese Incorporated a statewide 
organization.213  
Oregon Anti-Japanese Inc was distinctive for its incendiary rhetoric. Speaking 
to an Oregon Journal reporter, an organizer for Oregon Anti-Japanese Incorporated 
warned of violence towards Japanese Americans in Oregon if they were allowed to 
return. Telling a tale of narrowly averted violence, Price said a Japanese American, 
out on permit from Tule Lake, had visited a farm belonging to a World War II veteran. 
As Price told it, “the infuriated veteran immediately chased after the Japanese” with a 
knife he had been using to cut cauliflower.214 This implicit threat betrayed the 
meaning behind Oregon Anti-Japanese Inc.’s stated purpose to “get this job [Japanese 
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exclusion] done before the boys come back, because if we don’t do it, the returning 
servicemen will.”215  
 The articles provoked a response by the Oregonian’s editorial board. The 
board called the reasons for organizing Oregon Anti-Japanese Inc. “economic, not 
patriotic” in that they sought to prevent future competition in agriculture.216 
Furthermore, they took the group to task for its “unwarranted assumption” that 
soldiers would attack returning Japanese Americans. Gresham businessmen and 
farmers, the board said, had no right to speak for soldiers fighting abroad, some 
alongside Nisei soldiers in Italy and France.217 This marked a turning point for the 
Oregonian editorial board, which had previously racially denigrated all Japanese 
without distinguishing between citizens of Japan and Japanese Americans.218 The 
Oregonian strengthened their stance two weeks later proclaiming, “the great law 
abiding majority of Oregon citizens will not tolerate persecution of the Japanese 
minority. They will not countenance the return of the Ku Klux Klan.”219  
Portland’s Pro-Nisei Alignment 
 Once the settlement era began in earnest after 17 December 1944, plans by 
Portland church groups, civic leaders, and War Relocation Authority officials for the 
return of Japanese Americans began to take form. On 30 November 1944, the Portland 
YWCA received a letter from the Chairman of the YWCA’s Western Regional 
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Council, Bartlett B. Heard, urging the Portland chapter to form a local committee to 
aid the relocation efforts of Japanese Americans to the Portland area, citing the lack of 
any local association focused on the issue. Heard cited the many YWCA efforts to aid 
relocation, such as the Student Relocation Council, which helped Japanese Americans 
find housing, employment, and good will in their new communities. In Heard’s 
opinion, the Japanese Americans’ return to Portland deserved the same support as 
Nisei relocating East of the exclusion zones.220 At a meeting on 12 December 1944, 
the Portland YWCA Board of Directors decided it was time the Portland chapter 
declared publicly that it was ready to aid returning Japanese Americans. On 16 
January 1945, the Board approved this statement: 
The purpose of the YWCA has always been to serve women and girls without 
regard to race, color, or creed. Many young women and girls of Japanese 
descent were members of the Portland Association prior to their evacuation, 
and have continued their affiliation and YWCA activities in the relocation 
centers. We now affirm the historic attitude of the YWCA toward all persons, 
and stand ready again to be of service to persons of Japanese ancestry, and to 
receive them into our Association, whenever the government of our country, 
with its unique facilities for complete investigation of loyalty, permits their 
return to this area.221 
 
Although the YWCA did not create a specific committee to aid returning Japanese 
Americans, they finally went on record as supporting them, an act the YWCA had 
largely refrained from in the internment era.  
 Local WRA officials Henry Fistere and Clyde W Linnville were much more 
focused in their efforts to aid Japanese Americans returning to Portland. The Portland  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Citizen’s Committee to Aid Relocation was first formed when WRA Northwest Area 
supervisor Henry Fistere spoke at a meeting in Portland. Fistere, Reed college 
professor Blair Stewart, and Lorene Rickert formed the group in the hopes of helping 
returning Japanese Americans find both housing and employment. 222 Linville, as the 
Portland representative for the WRA, made it a point to respond to public acts of anti-
Japanese discrimination whenever they came to his attention. 
A number of local lawyers also came to the aid of Japanese Americans through 
public statements and investigations.  Gus Solomon, the Portland representative of the 
ACLU had urged, although unsuccessfully, that the national organization to support 
the Minoru Yasui test case in 1942. He had also urged the Portland chapter of the 
American Jewish Congress to oppose internment in 1942, even though he ended up as 
the only Jewish leader to stand up for the issue.223 Thus when a reporter from the 
Oregonian called him for a comment in response to the lifting of exclusion orders, 
Solomon claimed: “I’m glad to see the exclusion order rescinded. We were thinking 
seriously of filing several suits along the coast to test the constitutionality of the order. 
I hope the Japanese are brought back gradually and established in communities where 
they will be well received.”224 Supporting returning Japanese Americans was a way 
for Solomon to assuage his personal guilt at not supporting Japanese Americans 
previously.225 
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This turned out to be a bold statement. In response to the article, Solomon 
received numerous angry phone calls, some of which threatened to blow up his house. 
His statement also gained the attention of Betty Sale of the National Conference of 
Christians and Jews, who had been working with the Portland Council of Churches at 
the YWCA. She also called Solomon to ask him to start attending meetings planning 
aid to Japanese Americans.226 Solomon soon became a key figure in the group, 
speaking in churches about the desirability of the return of Japanese Americans, and 
helping returning Japanese Americans regain their land in Gresham and Hood River. 
Exclusionists Face Increasing Pressure 
Anti-Japanese organizing in Portland in the return era faced significant 
challenges. The Japanese Exclusion League had serious difficulty finding a meeting 
place in Portland due to the opposition of MacNaughton and church groups.227 
Reverend Maulbestch of the Portland Council of Churches had signed a public 
resolution calling for the “constitutional treatment of Japanese Americans.” He 
received a storm of angry phone calls, confirming the presence of a number of 
Portlanders who believed Japanese Americans did not deserve constitutional rights 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, but Portland leaders willing to publicly 
condemn Rev. Maulbestch were in short supply.228 Other than random editorials, 
arguments for tolerance towards Japanese Americans went uncontested in the press. 
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Faced with a lack of support in Portland and open opposition from church 
groups, and an Oregon Anti-Japanese Inc. more interested in defending local claims to 
property rather than the statewide campaign he had in mind, American Legion 
attorney Thomas Mahoney withdrew from anti-Japanese organizing. He claimed his 
Portland group was opposed to racial discrimination and had no “sympathy with the 
movement.”229 He also later refused to sponsor a second series of anti-Japanese 
memorials in 1945.230  
Correspondence between Pierce and other anti-return organizers shows their 
increasing marginalization. Richard G. Scott, an organizer for the Japanese Exclusion 
League (JEL), lamented the silence that followed his letters to Oregon state 
representatives. I “have had no reply yet [to requests for anti-Japanese legislation in 
the Oregon statehouse],” Scott observed, “perhaps he has been struck with the same 
disease of silence that hit Morton Tompkins [head of the Oregon State Grange] and 
the Legion heads, and Tom Mahoney.” Scott especially blamed “easy to dupe” church 
groups and their “big mission interests in Japan” for the anti-Japanese movement’s 
inability to get a fair airing of grievances in the press.231 Later, in writing the 
California Council on Alien Relations, Pierce told the group Mahoney reversed his 
opposition to the Japanese and that he was having a hard time finding a state 
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representative “who would brave the displeasure of the Portland papers by fathering” 
an anti-Japanese resolution.232  
C. G. Schneider, attorney for the JEL, wrote Pierce looking for an explanation 
for Mahoney’s change of heart as well as to set up a public JEL meeting in Portland.233 
Pierce had no explanation about Mahoney, adding that a meeting in Portland was 
probably out of the question. He claimed to have received a number of “invitations to 
speak on the Japanese issue,” but since November 1943 all had been canceled due to 
the efforts of business leaders in Portland interested in cheap labor and church groups 
interested in converts.234 Public organization in Portland would be futile because of 
opposition from the press, church groups, and business leaders like E. B. 
MacNaughton. By early 1945 in Portland at least, the movement to oppose the return 
of Japanese Americans lost all possibility of receiving favorable press.  
Seeking support outside of Portland, Pierce and JEL officials sponsored a 
series of public meetings to collect funds for their organization. They held their first 
public meeting 8 February 1945 in Gresham. The meeting featured Edington of the 
American Legion, Pierce, and Schneider of the Gresham-based JEL. The speakers 
continued calls for deportation of all Japanese after the war due to a race-based loyalty 
to Japan and enforcement of the 1923 Alien Land Law. More than one thousand 
people from all over Multnomah County, including a large delegation from Portland, 
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attended. Scott asked attendees to join JEL, paying $10 in initial membership and one 
dollar per month after.235  
Most consequentially, Pierce demanded that Governor Snell and the state 
legislature take action on the issue of evasion of the Alien Land Law.236 On 26 
February, the same groups brought their argument to legislative hearings, at which 
only one representative questioned calls for Japanese deportation.237 The very next day, 
Snell introduced an update to the 1923 Oregon Alien Land Law designed to bring it in 
line with similar measures in California.238 Perhaps in memory of the political power 
of the 1920s Oregon Klan, all state senators and all but two state representatives 
supported the bill for fear of a political backlash.239  
The same day the Oregon Alien Land Law of 1945 passed the legislature, 
Sprague, MacNaughton, Harold Fistere of the WRA, and Norman Coleman of the 
Portland Citizen’s committee spoke to a crowd of five-to-six hundred in Gresham to 
counteract the growing power of the JEL in rural parts of Multnomah county. Sprague 
and Fistere both argued that the return of Japanese Americans was completely up to 
the U.S. Army, and it was their duty to comply. Coleman went further, arguing against 
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the charge that Japanese labor depressed wages, but MacNaughton truly captured the 
idealism of the growing civic nationalism in Oregon. He said:  
We are at a crossroads…the great evil of the war is not physical but spiritual; 
not the ruin of cities and killing of bodies but the perversion of all that is best 
in men’s spirit to serve the purposes of destruction, hate, cruelty, avarice, 
deceit, and revenge…In the confused and dreadfully anxious postwar days 
ahead of us our state and nation may face other appeals to prejudice. We know 
that happened in Europe. That can happen here. 240 
 
MacNaughton’s comparison of anti-Japanese activism to fascism represents an 
important shift in public discourse on racial issues. Whereas the Oregon Voter viewed 
anti-Japanese racism as a valid viewpoint, MacNaughton made a deliberate 
comparison between Nazi ideology and the exclusion of Japanese Americans.241  
Given the racial basis for many of Schneider and Pierce’s arguments, such a portrayal 
was impossible to counter in the press. Subsequently, the JEL quickly lost support in 
rural areas, despite the fact that Japanese exclusion aided many farmers seeking to 
hold on to Japanese land leased to them by the Farm Security Administration during 
internment.242  
Over the course of the Spring, the Citizen’s Committee gained ground in these 
public meetings, JEL audiences dwindled, and pro-Japanese groups became more 
bolder in their calls for tolerance. For instance, when students at Sherwood High 
School discovered that their auditorium was to be used for a JEL meeting, they 
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distributed cards disputing JEL claims and denounced speakers’ remarks during the 
meeting.243 In June 1945, the Portland Citizen’s Committee also used local 
connections to block a boycott of Japanese American grown produce.244 
 Accounts of gains by the Portland Citizen’s committee filtered into Minidoka 
by way of the Minidoka Irrigator. Editorials in the Irrigator portrayed MacNaughton 
and Fistere’s efforts as similar to the efforts of white soldiers working with Nisei 
soldiers on the battlefields in Europe. Nisei editors used the Portland Citizen’s 
Committee meetings to spur returning Nisei to erase the public space between their 
Japanese and American identities. They claimed that, in the “fight for America’s 
principles, we owe it to them [Caucasian allies] to show by our attitude that we are 
standing with them in the front lines.” The alternative was to show bitterness about the 
loss caused by incarceration, which would undermine solidarity with whites.245  
Hachiya, an early returnee businessman, embraced connections to the military 
because those connections were key to the pro-Japanese argument in Oregon at the 
time. Portland in 1945 had experienced a dramatic shift towards civic nationalism. 
Japanese Americans interested in carving out a space for the Nikkei community had 
discovered that an embrace of the U.S. Army as a force fighting for freedom and 
democracy fostered public acceptance. The connection allowed both Japanese 
Americans and white Americans in Portland to embrace civic nationalism together. 
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This vision of Nikkei-Caucasian solidarity had little to do with the realities that 
returning Japanese Americans faced, but was nonetheless a powerful argument for 
Nikkei acceptance in postwar Portland.  
   86 
 
Chapter 4: Experiments in Acceptance 
 
Focusing on the resettlement period allows the historian to step from behind 
the traumatic veil of internment. It allows a focus not on the abusive agency of Federal 
authorities in curtailing civil rights but also on Nikkei strategies of gaining acceptance, 
both through court cases against discriminatory laws and through alliances with the 
white community. The fact that many Japanese Americans proclaimed their loyalty 
based on an image of the patriotic service of the 442nd Combat Team of the US Army 
must not be allowed to overwhelm all other narratives of acceptance. One must be 
careful when investigating this period not to simplify campaigns to aid the Japanese 
American community only within the context of civil rights. For a majority of 
Portland’s Japanese Americans, economic concerns took precedence over the more 
lofty goals of gaining the full rights, privileges, and duties of American citizenship. 
The situation in Portland was unique compared to other West Coast Japanese 
American communities in that key Issei continued community leadership roles after 
internment. The Issei, who constituted the majority of returnees to Portland in early 
1946 (there were 463 Issei and 396 Nisei),246 played a key role in overturning legal 
statutes that challenged their ability to seek a livelihood in Portland. Portland Issei 
leaders, working with Nisei associates, initiated a test case of the Oregon Alien Land 
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Law in 1946, finding significant support in the larger community through a very 
successful funding raising drive. 
During 1946, associated members of the national organization also reorganized 
the Portland chapter of the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL). Although the 
Portland chapter was fairly active between 1946-1948, leadership constantly 
complained of a lack of participation in their activities and a lack of interest in the 
JACL’s civil rights program. Furthermore, fund raising activities by the Portland 
chapter were often much less successful than Issei ventures. The correspondence 
between National JACL leaders reveals conflicts over finances and directives that 
sought to subordinate local efforts to the cause of a national civil rights campaign. The 
archives of the Portland Chapter JACL and the Oregon Nikkei Legacy Center 
Archives tell the story of this fledgling chapter and bring to light the choices made by 
Japanese Americans in the face of continuing economic discrimination.  
White Progressives Shift Focus 
In 1946, proponents of civil rights for the Nikkei were ready to declare victory. 
The same press that had decried the injustice of internment began to describe the 
decline of public anti-Japanese bigotry as a victory of the spirit of “true Americanism” 
over intolerance. Writing for the Associated Press, journalist Ann Reed Burns used the 
state of Caucasian-Nikkei public relations as a barometer of tolerance in Oregon as a 
whole. She pointed to the restoration of Nisei soldier names to the American Legion’s 
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public honor role, the disappearance of “no Jap trade” signs, and the lack of violent 
incidents as proof of the transient nature of anti-Japanese sentiment in Oregon.247  
In the Saturday Evening Post, William L. Worden attributed former anti-
Japanese organizations as the product of a few agitators, now sullen in their failure to 
prevent the return of Japanese Americans to the West Coast. He described them as  
“unrepentant, and still disgruntled about tactics of the WRA, but…prepared to get 
along with their Japanese neighbors.”248 Leading figures of the anti-Japanese 
movement in Oregon were certainly unapologetic. For instance, until his death in 1954, 
former governor Walter M. Pierce remained avidly anti-Japanese because of his belief 
in Anglo-Saxon supremacy.249 Like the Oregon Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s, the 
Japanese Exclusion League was reviled by the press and then forgotten.  
 Between January 1945 until the summer of 1946, Portland religious leaders, 
the Citizen’s Committee to Aid Relocation, and officials from the War Relocation 
Authority (WRA), spearheaded relief efforts in employment, housing, and public 
image issues. The shuttering of the concentration camps in late 1945 led to the 
winding down of aid work conducted by the War Relocation Authority (WRA). 
Northwest officials of the WRA, especially Northwest Area director Harold S. Fistere 
and Oregon relocation officer Clyde W. Linville, worked closely with the Portland 
Citizen’s Committee to Aid Relocation to help relocatees find work and shelter in 
Portland. The Northwest section of the WRA worked with other federal agencies to                                                         
247 Ann Reed Burns, “Japanese Coast Return ‘Better Than Expected’,” Oregonian, 10 February 1946, p. 
14. 
248 William L. Worden, “The Hate That Failed,” Saturday Evening Post, 4 May 1946. 
249 Arthur H. Bone, Oregon Cattleman/Governor: Memoirs and Times of Walter Marcus Pierce, 
(Portland, OR: OHS Press, 1981), p. 410. 
   89 
aid Japanese Americans. In June 1945, the Federal Housing Authority opened federal 
public housing to Japanese Americans in Portland, Seattle, and several other cities to 
meet a sever housing shortage.250 Furthermore, during the height of the public return 
debate in early 1945, these WRA officials countered each public anti-Japanese 
meeting with one urging equal treatment of all citizens. Although Fistere and Linville 
tried their best to remain out of the public eye, they were passionate advocates for 
returning Japanese Americans. They were especially helpful in overcoming anti-
Japanese boycotts in Portland and Hood River.251  
Linville and Fistere also published a number of pamphlets to aid Japanese 
Americans returning to the Northwest.252 One of these guides took the form of an 
extended letter to relocatees, in which Linville detailed the various Federal agencies, 
lawyers, and community organizations available to them. He also expressed 
confidence that “the situation in Oregon is well in hand and that your various needs 
are being and will continue to be met.” The Portland WRA office was slated to close 
on 31 May 1946.253  
Days before the office closed, a group of 200 Issei and Nise,i led by Issei 
community leader Daiichi Takeoka and Nisei veterans Bill Oda and Charles 
Shimomura, held a testimonial dinner to thank the WRA, the Portland Citizens 
Committee to Aid Relocation, and local church groups. At the dinner, Linville 
                                                        
250 Harold S. Fistere, “Analysis of the Final Report,” Northwest Area, WRA, 2 May 1946, Microfilm 9, 
Reel 2, Oregon Historical Society Research Library. 
251 “Relocation Authorities Amazed By Splendid Reception Given Evacuees Returning to Oregon,” 
Pacific Citizen, 16 February 1946, p. 2.  
252 For instance: “Resettlement Bulletin: Northwest Area,” Coll 15, 2009.15, Oregon Nikkei Legacy 
Archives. 
253 Clyde W. Linville, “To all Relocatees,” 31 January 1946, PDX Collection, cover page. 
   90 
described the continuing racial problems the Nikkei would face in the postwar era. 
Locally, the Portland City Council’s continuing ban on municipal business licenses for 
Issei posed a bar to reestablishing businesses lost in 1942. Also, Issei were still barred 
from land ownership in Washington, California, and Oregon. Linville challenged the 
Issei to overturn the laws, hoping “someone will find occasion to make a real test of 
them.” Irvin Lechliter, the Seattle Regional Attorney for the WRA, went further, 
claiming, “[I] would like to see alien land laws in the three western states knocked out 
entirely” and “the group of aliens in the United States who are progenitors of the 442nd 
Combat Team certainly are entitled to citizenship.” 254 Thus, this dinner represents a 
passing of the torch in the effort to secure rights of the Issei to the Oregon Nikkei 
community with the long-term goal of full citizenship. 
White liberals in Portland still had plenty of work to do in the name of racial 
justice. Speaking to a reporter in 1946, Fannie K. Friedman of the WRA stressed, “as a 
result of exclusion, many persons of goodwill have become interested for the first time, 
in racial problems and in helping minority groups.”255 The “White Trade Only” signs 
prevalent in downtown business windows of the time affected more than just Japanese 
Americans. The growing African American population in Portland faced many of the 
same barriers to social and economic equality. The Portland populations of Japanese 
Americans and African Americans had been roughly similar in the prewar period, 
roughly 2000 individuals each.256 The Japanese population diminished by thirty 
percent while the African American population grew to approximately 20,000 due to  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an influx of workers coming to the Kaiser Shipyards.257 Accordingly, civil rights 
advocacy in Portland shifted largely to African American issues. For instance, key 
members of the Portland Citizen’s Committee to Aid Relocation, such as Lansing E, 
Kempton and George Thomas, both from the Portland Council of Church’s 
Commission on Race Relations, helped organize a Race Relations Clinic on 20 
September 1945 designed to discus problems faced by minorities in housing and 
employment.258 The workshops focused almost exclusively on challenges African 
American economic and political rights.259  
The first Nikkei community leadership group to emerge was a joint Issei-Nisei 
group called the Community Affairs Committee (CAC). This group was an even 
mixture of pre-war Issei community leaders, such as Daiichi Takeoka, former 
president of the Japanese Ancestral Society, Iwao Oyama, owner of the Portland paper 
Oshu Nippo, Ted Hachiya, Nisei hotelier, and Kimi Tambara, former editor of the 
Minidoka Irrigator. The CAC held regular meetings at the Nichiren Buddhist Church 
and served as the sole community organization available to help Issei unable to speak 
English. This group was also the only all-Japanese American group Linville 
recommended as a source of aid to Japanese Americans returning to the Portland 
area.260 The Nisei on the committee were largely new to community leadership.  They 
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assumed the place of previous JACL leaders such as Hito Okada and Minoru Yasui 
who moved on to National JACL leadership during the internment period. 
The CAC provided general aid to returnees, but also sought to eliminate local 
anti-Japanese statutes that continued to bar their participation in the Oregon economy. 
Takeoka recognized that the Issei faced significant hurdles to reestablishment in 
Oregon. The WRA had been unable to address issues such as the Portland City 
Council’s ban on municipal business licenses for Issei and the Oregon Alien Land 
Law.261  
Takeoka had long sought to repeal the Oregon Alien Land Law.  When the law 
first appeared in the Oregon Legislature, passing in 1923, he hired white lawyers from 
Portland to lobby the Oregon Legislature on behalf of the Japanese Association.262 
Takeoka, a graduate of the University of Oregon Law School in 1912, was well 
respected in Portland’s white legal community. However, he was not admitted to the 
Oregon Bar because he could not obtain United States citizenship. Because he could 
not practice law in Oregon, he, like many other educated Issei in Portland, went into 
business working with Japanese American farmers as a fertilizer salesman.263 Through 
these duties and through his capacity as a member of the Japanese Association, he 
served as a legal advisor for much of the Oregon Nikkei community. Thus, shortly 
after the act became law, Takeoka helped Issei all over the state evade the law by 
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placing land titles in the names of their children.264 Up until the beginning of World 
War II, he served as the chief Issei advocate for the legal avenues of redress to statutes 
targeting Japanese Americans in Oregon.  
Many historians have noted how Issei community leaders ceded authority to 
the Nisei during internment. Paul Spickard has written that Issei heads of families in 
WRA camps saw their role as providers and decision makers undermined. This 
facilitated a shift in community leadership to the Nisei, through the JACL and other 
groups, during and after incarceration.265 Azuma, however, amends Spickard’s general 
argument, claiming that the legal challenge to the Oregon Alien Land Law was largely 
an Issei venture in which the Portland JACL played a support role.266 Azuma does not 
make clear, however, that the Portland JACL had yet to re-form in April 1946 when 
the project was initiated. The effort to overturn the Oregon Alien Land Law was an 
Issei-led venture, demonstrating a transwar continuity of Issei leadership in the 
Portland Nikkei community.  
Given that Spickard’s assessment was true of the West Coast Nikkei 
Community in general, Portland can be said to have had unusually active Issei.  The 
reason may be the nature of their incarceration. Takeoka, Oyama, Masuo Yasui, and 
four other Issei were board members of the Japanese Association of Oregon, who 
received commendations from the Japanese Foreign ministry in 1940 at the 2600th 
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Anniversary Celebrations of the Japanese Empire.267 Awardees were named 
“civilian[s] of merit” and received an ornamental wooden cup for their personal 
achievements and services rendered to the Japanese government. Presumably, these 
awards were the reason these Issei were arrested and held by the FBI as dangerous 
alien enemies during World War II.  
Unlike other Issei detained in this manner, cup recipients were generally not 
allowed to join their families in WRA camps. Oyama’s son Albert speculated after 
reviewing his father’s Department of Justice (DOJ) dossier that, because his father had 
received the wooden cup, he had been held in DOJ camp until as late as January 1946, 
even though he had been eligible for parole as early as November 1944.268 Unlike Issei 
who were moved to WRA camps, the Issei in DOJ camps did not abdicate leadership 
to the Nisei. When Takeoka returned to Portland in July 1945,269 and Oyama returned 
in January 1946, they quickly resumed leadership roles in the Portland Nikkei 
community. 
In April 1946, the CAC formed the Oregon Alien Land Law Test Case 
Committee. Chaired by Takeoka, the Test Case Committee initially focused on a fund-
raising campaign.270 According to Portland Nisei Ted Hachiya, who donated $500 and 
led the drive, Issei and Nisei fund-raisers collected $17,000 in three to four months 
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from Japanese Americans across Oregon to pay legal fees.271 The committee then 
secured representation by Verne Dusenbery, who had published a report refuting anti-
Japanese arguments and claiming the Alien Land Law violated the 14th amendment the 
previous year.272 The committee’s civil rights approach was a strategy depending on 
legal redress. Considered as a movement, this legal campaign was virtually an all-
Nikkei endeavor with little participation by the white community.  
The joint Issei-Nisei CAC represents a lost opportunity for the Portland Nikkei 
community. The split that characterized the prewar Portland Nikkei community could 
have been avoided in the postwar period. The CAC had the unique opportunity to 
reunite the Nikkei community; including former draft resisters, Issei targeted by the 
FBI in 1942 for connections to the Japanese Consulate, and fervent supporters of the 
Nisei veterans. Although the CAC was concerned about the place of Japanese 
Americans in Portland, economic rights took precedence over civil rights. They were 
chiefly concerned with clearing the legal hurdles facing Issei farmers and businessmen. 
Overcoming these barriers spoke to the entire Japanese American community. 
Subsequently, the CAC was able to raise significant funding to combat the Oregon 
Alien Land Law. Portland Nisei, however, had their own vision for the postwar Nikkei 
community. 
Echoes of Camp Life 
The closure of WRA offices in Portland coincided with the reorganization of 
the Portland chapter of the JACL. Nisei who were members of the national JACL  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sought a connection to political debates affecting Japanese American rights at the 
federal level through the reformation of the Portland chapter. Mary Minamoto 
spearheaded this campaign, becoming a strong advocate in Portland for ideological 
orientation surrounding the National legislative campaign. According to a letter sent to 
all associated members in April 1946, the National JACL had two goals in improving 
Japanese American civil rights: “compensation for losses sustained by the evacuees” 
and the removal of the racial bar to naturalization that would nullify anti-Japanese 
laws that depended on the phrase “ineligible to citizenship.” The letter also asked 
members to urge friends to join the JACL and to support the continuing struggle for 
civil rights by paying dues of $5.00 per year. Reflecting common justifications by the 
JACL, the letter referenced the efforts of the 442nd. “We believe these dues are not 
unreasonable—especially in light of the work that lies ahead. Considered in terms of 
the sacrifices which our Nisei soldiers made, they are insignificant.”273 Efforts to 
reorganize the Portland JACL chapter maintained the story of 442nd sacrifices as its 
central theme. 
The Portland Chapter of the JACL was reactivated officially on 11 May 1946 
when Hito Okada, former Portlander and National President of the JACL, paid a visit 
to Portland’s associated JACL members.274 At the meeting, it was decided that a 
movie about the 442nd should be shown to commemorate Memorial Day. However, 
none was available, so Minamoto wrote National headquarters to request a record of a 
speech by Ben Kuroki, often referred to by the JACL as the first Nisei war hero, along  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with receipt books to record memberships.275 Minamoto’s desire to play a speech by 
Kuroki reveals her commitment to a narrative of redemption for Nisei brought about 
by military service, even though this would have alienated some Portland returnees.  
Mass incarceration between 1942 and 1945 not only erased the physical and 
cultural center of the Japanese American community in Portland that had been 
Japantown, it also led to political debates in WRA camps that fractured the Nisei of 
Portland.  At both Minidoka and Heart Mountain WRA camps, Nisei groups found 
themselves at odds with the JACL after organizing their own civil rights-oriented 
groups. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Civil Liberties League (CLL) 
formed in Minidoka in December 1942 to financially support Minoru Yasui’s 
unsuccessful challenge to military curfew orders targeting Japanese Americans. The 
Seattle JACL members at Minidoka argued against Yasui’s case contending, in the 
words of the National JACL spokesman Mike Masaoka, “that to help Yasui would be 
un-American.”276 The leader of the Seattle JACL, Jimmie Sakamoto, publicly 
denounced the mostly Portlander CLL leading the group to disband though they 
continued to raise money for Yasui’s legal fund.277  
The national JACL responded to the emergence of the CLL and other civil 
rights-oriented Nisei organizations in 1943 by intensifying their own organization 
efforts. A month later, JACL members at Minidoka merged the Portland, Seattle, and 
Puyallup chapters, forming a Minidoka chapter of the JACL. The meeting was  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finalized the same day that Mike Masaoka and Hito Okada visited the camp to speak 
in favor of Nisei unity.278 Presumably, this allowed the national JACL to influence the 
aims of the reforming chapter along the lines of accommodation to the war effort. The 
resulting Minidoka chapter was an almost immediate failure, reflecting the low 
standing of the JACL among at Minidoka. After only three months, the chapter held 
its final meeting in order to liquidate its assets.279 Although no record exists of the 
reactions of Portland Nisei to the takeover, Portland Nisei were almost certainly 
alienated by high-handed JACL policies.  
A somewhat similar situation arose at the Heart Mountain internment camp. At 
the end of January 1943, WRA camp newspapers announced plans by Secretary of 
War Henry Stimson to create an all Nisei combat unit made up of Hawaiians and 
WRA camp Nisei.280 This news was accompanied by talk of the need for a loyalty 
questionnaire as well as a draft including incarcerated Nisei. As historian Arthur 
Hansen discussed elsewhere, Frank Emi of the Heart Mountain Fair Play Committee 
opposed both on constitutional grounds. The group’s printed materials claimed, “if 
democracy and freedom is to exist in this country, then we must uphold the ideals and 
principles of the constitution and right the wrongs committed to a minority group.”281 
The Nisei of Heart Mountain found Emi’s argument persuasive. Of the 2000 
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volunteers for military service the Army expected from Heart Mountain, only 38 
enlisted.282  
In a public meeting at Heart Mountain in March 1944, JACL leader Nobu 
Kawai condemned the movement, claiming, “Let us remember that the majority can 
change the constitution and make this a dictatorship if they so desire.”283 The implicit 
argument was that draft resisters not only opposed the war effort, but risked provoking 
white Americans into even harsher treatment of Japanese Americans. The speech only 
served to encourage more Nisei to oppose the draft.284 Kawai then asked Ben Kuroki 
to make a speech in favor of volunteering for the Army. Perhaps because he was from 
Nebraska and had never been interned, Kuroki’s appearance only served to make him 
the public face of what resisters considered government collaborators.285 Later, 800 
Nisei became so demoralized by the affair that they renounced their American 
citizenship.286 
Again, the specific impact of these events on Portland returnees is unclear. 
Family members of renunciants would certainly have had mixed feelings about a 
continuation of wartime narratives of the 442nd securing freedom for all Nisei in the 
postwar period. The Portland JACL papers hold little on the issue of draft resisters or 
renunciants, other than mentioning it as a topic of discussion among members of the  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Portland Citizen’s Committee to Aid Relocation in mid-1946.287 Unlike the JACL, the 
Citizen’s Committee had no qualms about aiding Japanese Americans trying to reverse 
orders of deportation. The issue would have weighed on the mind of any Japanese 
American in the area because Portland was the departure point for all Japanese 
Americans that had renounced their citizenship.  
Starting in December 1945, groups of repatriates, both Issei and Nisei, began 
their journeys to Japan. These ships would have been impossible to miss in the 
Portland harbor. At 609 feet long, they were the largest ships ever to dock there.288 For 
those standing at docks watching their loved ones sail away to war-torn Japan, the 
redemptive story of the 442nd would have rung hollow. Although few accounts of 
attitudes towards the draft resisters exist, the JACL used the concept of embittered 
Japanese Americans as a means of identifying themselves as patriotic Americans.  
 An All-Nisei Group Emerges 
            The reformation of the Portland Chapter of the JACL largely followed the 
ideological orientation that helped Japanese Americans find allies within the white 
liberal community. It must be recognized that the continuation of the 442nd argument 
was itself a choice; it was their chosen strategy of acceptance. The first meeting of the 
Portland JACL took place at the Nichiren Buddhist church following a service 
organized by the CAC to honor eleven of Oregon’s Nisei soldiers killed in combat.289 
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This memorial fit quite well within the wartime, pro-Nisei narrative by emphasizing 
the valor of the all-Japanese American 442nd Combat Team that was adopted by the 
white reporters seeking to discredit anti-Japanese agitators.  These reporters used the 
stories of individual Nisei soldiers to shame West Coast racists, whom they saw as a 
challenge to the principles of freedom and democracy that legitimized the war effort. 
Frank Hachiya, who was honored at the Portland memorial, was a key figure in 
putting forward this argument. His story was one of distilled patriotism. The New York 
Times said of Hachiya, “Japanese treachery reacted upon Hachiya as upon other 
patriotic Americans. To be sure his eyes were slanted, his skin was yellow, his name 
different. But Hachiya was an American. He enlisted at once.”290 The article then went 
on to describe how Hachiya, who had been serving as an interpreter for a unit in the 
Philippines, volunteered to scout a Japanese position after a firefight to gather 
information. While doing so, Hachiya was shot by a Japanese sniper. Despite his 
wounds, he crawled back to his unit and died shortly after reporting to his commander.  
This article transposed the image of Hachiya’s actions with the actions of the Hood 
River American Legion, who removed his name from a public honor role a month 
before he died.291 The implicit argument was that it was absurd to argue Japanese 
Americans held a racial loyalty to the Emperor. The Nisei patriotism argument hoped 
to underline the distinction between Japanese subjects and Japanese Americans with 
the argument that blood was no bar to patriotic service.    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The memorial service was an attempt by the Issei and Nisei of the CAC to 
bring the Nisei patriotism argument into the postwar period. The memorial 
emphasized the 442nd unit’s sacrifices during the rescue of the “Lost Battalion” in Italy 
in November 1944 and Frank Hachiya’s death in the Philippines. Consecration of the 
Portland Nikkei community’s contribution to the war effort represented an effort not 
only to establish a connection to an emerging postwar civic nationalism, but also to 
reiterate claims of loyalty based on service that had been key to undermining anti-
Japanese organizing in Portland during 1945. Following the WRA line that attributed 
the “6061 decorations” earned by the 442nd as the main reason for improved attitudes 
towards Japanese Americans, Portland JACL members made commemorating Nisei 
combat efforts the key goal of their organization.292  This event also served as the first 
public post-internment meeting of the Portland chapter of the JACL. At the meeting, 
group of about thirty Nisei pledged interest in joining a new Portland JACL chapter if 
it were to be formed. 
Organizational Challenges 
The reestablishment of the Portland chapter of the JACL was a difficult 
process for local Nisei due to financial hurdles and the National JACL’s lack of 
support. After returning to Portland in early 1945, Nisei hotelier Ted Hachiya 
attempted to reactivate the local chapter of the Japanese American Citizens League.293 
This process was not complete until May 1946.294  The chapter’s records do not 
explain the reason for this delay, but an important factor must have been lack of funds.  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Due to the rapid disbanding of the Portland JACL in the Spring of 1942 and the fact 
that leaders like Hito Okada had joined the national JACL leaders in Salt Lake City, 
their treasury and other assets had either been donated to the national JACL or had 
gone missing.295  
The lack of sufficient funds was a constant concern for the Portland JACL 
early on, and led to conflict with the National JACL. At a meeting of the Portland 
Citizen’s Committee in early June 1946, an upcoming Purple Heart Convention was 
mentioned.296 The convention was held in August with the purpose of “acquaint[ing] 
the public with what every racial group contributed to Victory.”297 Participation in this 
event, which demonstrated the Nisei contributions to the war effort, became the 
nascent chapter’s first major project. In the words of Minamoto, “since we have had to 
face evacuation and many Caucasians are very concerned about our attitude of the 
experiences we had to face, I feel that it would be advisable to have a [Nisei] 
representative.”298 So as not to be upstaged by other racial groups, the Portland chapter 
sought a Distinguished Service Cross holder among the Nisei community. Their 
search led them to George Sakato of Glendale, Arizona, who was to attend the 
convention on behalf of the JACL and speak at an associated testimonial dinner to 
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honor veterans and gold star mothers. The chapter estimated the costs at around 
$500.299 
Coincidentally, former Portland JACL member Howard Nomura held a bond 
belonging to the chapter worth $500. Unfortunately, the bond was not discovered until 
October.300 Attempts at canvassing the Nikkei community met with little success 
because Hachiya’s fund drive for the Alien Land Law committee was still in full 
swing.301 Because the chapter believed that the convention was a national-effort to aid 
Japanese Americans, they sent out requests for funding to other chapters, and an 
ultimatum to national headquarters. In their letter to the national organization, the 
chapter asked the national organization for a loan of $500 until local funds could be 
found. Above all, the Portland JACL sought to become more than the mere social club 
it was before World War II. If the loan was not forthcoming, they suggested they 
would “not accept JACL for our title.”302  
Responses to these solicitations indicate the relationship between the Portland 
JACL and national leadership. Money was to flow up not down. Most chapters 
solicited by the Portland chapter declined with varying levels of annoyance, though 
some donated small amounts.303 Hito Okada, JACL national president, responded with 
an ultimatum of his own:                                                         
299 Mary Minamoto, letter to Hito Okada, 24 July 1946, PDX JACL Collection. A Gold Star Mother was 
a common way to refer to mothers who lost sons to combat in the World War II era. 
300 Howard Nomura, letter to Hito Okada, 7 October 1946, Personal Correspondence of Mary 
Minamoto, PDX JACL Collection. 
301 Mary Minamoto, Letter to Bessie Watanabe, Mid-Columbia JACL, 31 July 1946, PDX JACL 
Collection. 
302 Author uncertain, but likely Kenzo Nakagawa, Portland Chapter President, letter to Hito Okada, 20 
July 1946, PDX JACL Collection. 
303 The Snake River JACL sent $25, while other chapters disagreed with Portland JACL’s contention 
that the undertaking was a national affair. See Mack Kaneko, Denver JACL, letter to Kenzo Nakagawa, 
   105 
I personally believe that $500.00 can be easily raised by the Japanese people in 
Portland. I am sure if the Issei are approached on this particular matter and 
they are advised of the tremendous Public Relations agenda for them, that they 
would be willing to raise this money for the project. I personally do not think 
that enough energy has been expended in Portland to raise the money…I 
further believe that if the reactivation of the Portland chapter depends upon 
whether or not National will loan them $500.00 at this time, the National 
Headquarters too will have to further consider the matter of whether or not we 
wish to continue with the reactivation of the Portland chapter. In other words 
National Headquarters will not be intimidated into accepting the Portland 
Chapter.304 
 
Okada’s message was clear. If you wish to contribute to our cause we welcome you, 
but local issues are your own affair. He also sent a memo to all chapters prohibiting 
chapters from soliciting money from each other “in order that chapter treasuries shall 
not be raided constantly by requests for contributions.” 305  Furthermore, Okada 
designated the Issei as the proper source of funding for JACL causes. This assertion 
contradicts previous narratives that nearly all Issei were demoralized and destitute 
upon their return to the Pacific Coast.306 Some Issei must have still had considerable 
resources, which the success of the Alien Land Law Test Case Committee, a drive 
designed specifically to aid Issei, also attests to.  
Okada’s letter also helped catalyze the dissolution of the CAC. Following 
Okada’s terse reply, the Portland Chapter apologized and redoubled their canvassing,  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this time with the aid of Hachiya’s group.307 They eventually raised $837.50 for events 
surrounding the Purple Hearts Convention.308 With the receipts for dinner tickets and 
other methods of fundraising, their campaign was a financial success because they 
turned to Issei donors. Speaking to a donor, Minamoto called the campaign a success, 
claiming, “many Caucasian friends were made at the convention.”309 Her sentiments 
reflect the belief among Portland JACL leaders that making friends among the white 
community was a sure rout to improving their social standing. 
In the months following the convention, the Portland JACL solidified this 
funding relationship. Hachiya, along with fellow CAC member Kimi Tambara, gained 
a seat on the JACL board as co-chair of the political action committee.310 In January 
1947, the chapter convinced Issei leaders in Portland, presumably Oyama, Takeoka, 
and Yasui, to form a koenkai (mutual support association). Despite reservations of a 
“lack of cooperation” exhibited by the JACL to the Japan Society in the prewar period, 
the Issei agreed that the two generations needed to work together. Subsequently the 
Issei of the CAC agreed to provide funds for a full-time secretary and office for the 
Portland JACL.311 By March 1947, Hachiya reported that $1566.50 had been raised by 
the Issei who by 1952 came to refer to themselves as the Nikkeijinkai (Japanese 
Ancestral Society).312  
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Had the JACL at the time accepted Issei members, and had there not been such 
a language barrier between the Issei and Nisei, the political leadership of the Portland 
Nikkei community might have coalesced in the Portland JACL. Instead, the two 
groups, along with other myriad social and religious groups, became a coalition of 
leaders similar to what existed at the Portland Council of Churches. Rather than being 
separated by denomination, the Nikkei were divided by generation, among other 
factors. 
The coalition of community leadership of Portland Nikkei and their 
relationship to the National JACL guided a very specific strategy of acceptance. 
Because the majority of funding came from Portland-area Issei, the Portland chapter 
had to tend issues important to the Issei such as the continuing ban in Portland on 
business licenses and ongoing instances of discrimination. To ensure continued 
funding, they would also need to match their previous advocacy for the 442nd as the 
chief narrative of acceptance while also focusing on economic concerns that made the 
Alien Land Law fundraising campaign so successful. They would also have to find a 
way to participate in National’s legislative campaign to gain naturalization. All of this 
would have to be done within the strict parameters of National JACL leadership’s 
directives. As war-era experiences with rival Nisei groups and postwar conflicts over 
funding attest, the National JACL had a specific vision for the way Japanese 
Americans would establish themselves as full-fledged members of American society. 
They would tolerate no rivals. 
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Chapter 5: Successes, Failures, and Regular Minority Status 
 
 For Japanese Americans, returning to Portland following internment meant 
integration into an environment of continuing discrimination. Unlike the more 
confrontational tactics of sit ins and public protests employed during the civil rights 
era, leaders of the Portland JACL almost always worked with white progressives as 
well as with the national JACL when trying to improve their social and economic 
standing. By working with “Caucasian advisory boards,” the Portland JACL sought 
the influence and support of Oregon’s elected officials. Such boards gave a white face 
to the cause of Japanese American civil rights. Through their support and through 
legal cases, the Nikkei community overcame codified discrimination at the local and 
state level only to face discrimination of a more shadowy variety in the form of 
employment, housing, and other forms of prejudice that targeted non-whites.  
 The choice by Portland’s Nisei leaders to work with the national JACL had its 
advantages and disadvantages. Association with the national JACL provided Portland 
Nisei with a chance to participate in the national campaign for Issei citizenship, efforts 
to aid Issei mostly met with apathy from Portland Nisei, and Issei were largely 
uninterested in JACL events.313 Furthermore, the national organization was generally 
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unsupportive of local social justice efforts unless they were first coordinated with 
national headquarters. The result was a chronic lack of participation. The Nisei of 
Portland did not help lead a mass movement for civil rights. Instead JACL efforts in 
Portland were confined to relatively few people, so few that these individuals often 
became burned out by the demands of their positions within the JACL. Conversely, 
the Portland Nikkei community could be quick to respond to local crises as shown by 
a well-organized relief effort to aid the 900 Nikkei made homeless by the flooding of 
the Vanport housing project in 1948.  
More Opposition by the Portland City Council 
 The largest hurdle facing Portland’s Japanese Americans at the local level was 
the Portland City Council’s 1942ban on municipal business licenses for Issei. After 
Portland license inspector Joe Hutchinson informed the City Council that nearly 200 
Issei held licenses with the city, the council voted to cancel those licenses based on the 
belief that Issei property would be sold off at a dramatic discount during or after 
internment. In the following weeks Mike Masaoka and a number of attorneys 
representing Issei businessmen argued that such bans deprived Nisei children of 
sustenance and violated Issei human rights.314 
 Despite Masaoka’s protest of the license ban before the Nikkei incarceration, the 
national JACL urged Portland JACL leader Abe Oyamada to avoid picking a fight 
                                                        
themselves after internment. Otherwise, community organizations consisted of groups related to the 
Nitiren Buddhist Church and Oregon Buddhist Church, Epworth United Methodist Church (formerly 
called the Japanese Methodist Church), a variety of sports organizations, and of course the more-
political JACL, Nisei Veterans Committee, and the largely Issei Japanese Ancestral Society. See Deena 
Kei Nakata, The Gift: The Oregon Nikkei Story…Retold, (Oregon: D.K. Nakata, 1995), p. 142. Portland 
JACL, “Clubs,” 1940-1941, Clubs File, PDX JACL Collection. 
314 Minutes of the Portland City Council, 29 January 1942, Portland City Archives. 
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with the Portland City Council. The Portland Council of Churches’ Race Relations 
Commission, sought to press the issue using the Nisei Patriotism argument.315 In late 
May, the commission sent representatives to petition Portland’s City Council to 
rescind the Issei license ban, but they were denied a chance to plead their case. In 
response, the commission invited Abe Oyamada, board member of the Portland JACL, 
to a committee meeting to gain more information. Specifically, the commission 
wanted to know if it was true that the Minidoka incarceration camp had garnered the 
most military volunteers. Their plan was to provoke a public confrontation with the 
City Council over the license ban, which they thought unfairly targeted both Japanese 
nationals and “refugee Jewish emigrants” fleeing the holocaust316 The Race Relations 
Commission seemed interested in recreating the Citizen’s Committee meetings held in 
rural areas the year before, which effectively used the Nisei Patriotism argument to 
counter the Japanese Exclusion League calls for permanent exclusion. 
 After consulting with Oyamada and Ted Hachiya of the Portland JACL, the 
Race Relations Commission decided to forgo their planned confrontational approach, 
concurring with the national JACL’s assessment. Hito Okada wrote to Oyamada on 
the issue confirming that Minidoka had indeed had the highest number of Army 
volunteers. He also recommended a hands-off approach that would avoid negative 
                                                        
315 This work represented an extension of earlier efforts to protect the rights of Nisei businessmen. 
George Rundquist, the executive secretary of the Federal Council of Churches, after he visited Portland 
in July 1945, joined local WRA officials in condemning the Portland City Council for their requirement 
that Nisei be fingerprinted before being issued a business license. “Officials Rap City On Nisei Policy,” 
Oregonian, 21 July 1945, p. 4. 
316 Abe Oyamada, Letter to National Headquarters, JACL, 3 June 1946, Issei Business License, PDX 
JACL Collection. 
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publicity for city commissioners in the months before the 1946 elections.317 The Race 
Relations Commission came to the same conclusion when they realized that pushing 
the City Council on the issue would likely result in a court case.  
 Despite widespread support for the campaign to overturn the Alien Land Law, 
Issei volunteers willing to press the issue in court were not forthcoming. At a meeting 
of the Citizen’s Committee attended by George Thomas of the Race Relations 
Commission and members of the Japanese American community, Elizabeth 
Dusenberry, Portland YWCA board member, gave a presentation on the state of 
Japanese businesses in Portland. Following the presentation, Thomas asked Hachiya 
and the other Nisei present if any Issei would be willing to press the issue in court. 
Hachiya said he doubted it. Thereafter, the whole license ban issue was left to United 
States Department of Justice, which had been in contact with Dusenberry and had 
implied that they were ready to act on the matter. So the commission let the matter 
drop in the hopes that the City Council would secretly kill the license ban.318 
 Decisive action was apparently not immediately forthcoming from the 
Department of Justice. The Portland City Council did not reverse their position until 
January 1947. Special conditions within the City Council motion to grant Issei 
business licenses again reflect continuing animosity towards Japanese immigration. 
The City Council voted unanimously to rescind the ban, but only for aliens ineligible 
for citizenship that had been residents of the United States for ten years or more.319 
Uncertain whether Japanese immigration would continue in the postwar, the Portland                                                         
317 Hito Okada, Letter to Abe Oyamada, 8 June 1946, Issei Business License, PDX JACL Collection. 
318 George L. Thomas, Letter to Abe Oyamada, 12 June 1946, Issei Business License, PDX JACL 
Collection. 
319 Minutes of the Portland City Council, 9 January 1946 and 16 January 1946, Portland City Archives. 
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City Council sought to placate the Department of Justice, while also retaining the right 
to prevent future unwanted Japanese competition in business. Japanese immigrants 
with less than ten years residence were required to appear before the City Council to 
receive a business license.320 Concurrent with the character of the ban removal, the 
City Council decision came with no public apology.  
 Afterwards, the Department of Justice contacted National JACL president Hito 
Okada to notify him that the City Council had “secretly or otherwise drafted another 
[anti-Japanese business ordinance]…which couched in high sounding words is much 
worse and more discriminatory than the resolutions they repealed.”321 Although the 
new license ban never materialized, its rumored crafting is further evidence that 
striking the license ban was no act of contrition by the Portland City Council.  
 Many Portland Issei were understandably wary of the direction Portland officials 
would take in the future, so they did not rush to file new business licenses. According 
to 1947 Portland JACL president George Azumano, Issei were able to file new 
licenses, but only three applied for them in the first six weeks.322 Many evaded the 
municipal license system in much the same way Issei farmers had circumvented the 
Oregon Alien Land Law; they filed business licenses under the name of Nisei. For 
example, Umata Matsushima owned a thriving general store named Teikoku (Japanese 
for “Imperial”) before the Pacific War. He lost everything in the days after the Pearl 
Harbor incident when Federal officials closed his store and forced him to sell off his                                                         
320 Ibid. 
321 Hito Okada, Letter to Portland Chapter JACL, 15 January 1947, Correspondence of the President, 
PDX JACL Collection. 
322 George Azumano, Letter to Hito Okada, 11 March 1947, Issei Business License, PDX JACL 
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entire inventory, which was much larger than normal in expectation of holiday sales, 
at pennies on the dollar. They then confiscated the money along with the contents of 
his bank accounts and he was whisked off to a Department of Justice prison camp for 
the majority of the war.323  
 Matsushima was so demoralized by the affair that he applied for repatriation to 
Japan beginning a series of reversals by Federal officials that left his family’s fate in 
limbo until he returned to Portland in 1946.  In August 1943, Matsushima and his 
family were scheduled for departure from Ellis Island, federal officials decided that he 
would not sail. He experienced a similar wait in December 1943 at the Army camp in 
Crystal City, Texas and again was not allowed to depart. His family’s luggage, 
however, left without them, leaving the family with literally nothing but what they 
were wearing. He then decided to apply to reverse the repatriation request in 
December 1945, but was still scheduled to leave from the Portland along with 
renunciants from Tule Lake.324 After a hearing at Tule Lake in March 1946, 
Matsushima and his family were released. By June 1946, the Matushimas were living 
in the Vanport housing projects. Because his accounts were not returned to him until 
1956, Matsushima borrowed $500 dollars to restart his business, called Anzen                                                         
323 Oral History with Yoji Matsushima, transcript, Interviewed by Valerie Otani, 2009, Oregon Nikkei 
Legacy Center Research Library, pp. 1-2. 
324 Within the WRA camp system Tule Lake was a “Segregation Center,” meaning that Nikkei sent 
their refused to take an infamous loyalty questionnaire, answered the questionnaire in the negative on 
questions regarding loyalty to the Japanese Emperor and U.S. military service, or wanted to repatriate 
from Japan. For renunciants, Tule Lake was a midpoint in their journey from Department of Justice 
Camps and Japan, making Portland a logical departure point geographically for all renunciants. The 
overwhelming majority of renunciants came from the Tule Lake center in the first place, of 2,360 
renunciants shipped to Justice Detention camps, only 125 were from camps other than Tule Lake. 
Tetsuden Kashima, Judgement Without Trial: Japanese American Imprisionment During World War II, 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 278. “Umata Matsushima,” FBI Arrests, Subject 
Files, Oregon Nikkei Legacy Center Research Library. 
   114 
(Japanese for “safety”), which became perhaps the most important Japanese 
supermarket in Portland in the early postwar decades. When refounding his business, 
Matsushima placed the license under the name of a friend’s daughter, Harue Ninomiya. 
Family members later related that he was paranoid that the government would 
someday return to take his store and thus likely harbored a deep and well-placed 
distrust for the City Council.325 
“First Papers” 
 Members of the City Council were not the only local officials to express a 
continued belief that Issei were undesirable foreigners. In July 1946, the national 
JACL sent a memo to all its chapters suggesting a model for public meetings to push 
the naturalization campaign as a way to make laws targeting Japanese immigrants 
obsolete. One of the strategies of the program called for a young Issei to speak about 
his desire for citizenship, presenting their birth in Japan as a mere technicality. In the 
flyers words, “this person would point out that he represents several thousand such 
who would jump at the chance to become naturalized Americans.”326 Following 
typical tactics of the postwar JACL, the program also called for the testimony of a 
Nisei veteran and “prominent Caucasian.”  
 The white speaker had a particularly important role in placing the effort in a 
transnational context. That speaker was to convey the benefit in eliminating 
discriminatory naturalization laws for “America’s place of leadership in the world” 
while pointing out the “irony of our teaching democracy to Japan, at the same time                                                         
325 Matsushima Oral History, p. 2.  
326 Masao W. Satow, memo to all JACL chapters, “Suggested Program for Meeting on Naturalization,” 
9 July 1946, Immigration and Naturalization, PDX JACL Collection. 
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denying Japanese nationals here in America the right to become citizens.”327 To 
demonstrate this to the U.S. Congressional committees considering the naturalization 
legislation, the national JACL directed local chapters to urge Issei to file declaration of 
intent forms (Form A-2213) with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) as 
proof of their desire for U.S. citizenship. By August 1946, national JACL leaders 
secured an agreement with Ugo Carusi, U. S. Commisioner of the INS, that Issei 
would be allowed to file their “first papers” without the interference of local 
officials.328 Although the Portland JACL did not hold a public naturalization meeting 
according to the national JACL model, they dispelled misinformation about the forms 
like the need to file them in order to gain entrance to public housing in Vanport and 
publicized the effort.329 
 Despite the national JACL’s arrangement, Portland INS official Vernor W. 
Tomlinson challenged the legitimacy of “first papers” for people of Japanese descent.  
A number of Issei from Hood River went to the Portland INS offices in late 1946 to 
retrieve the necessary forms to file first papers, because the Hood River office did not 
have the necessary paper work. When Mrs. Max Moore, a member of the Mid-
Columbia JACL’s Caucasian advisory board, called Tomlinson to investigate the 
reason for these extra trips, he made his anti-Japanese stance clear. The following is a 
transcript of the conversation Moore sent to national JACL headquarters: 
Clerk Tomlinson: “You know they cannot become citizens.”                                                         
327 Satow, “Suggested Program for Meeting on Naturalization.”  
328 National Headquarters JACL, memo to all chapters, “Filing of First Papers for Naturalization by 
Issei,” 9 August 1946, Immigration and Naturalization, PDX JACL Collection. 
329 “Applicants for Citizenship,” 25 March 1947, Immigration and Naturalization, PDX JACL 
Collection. Mary Minamoto, “JACL Will Assist with Naturalization Papers,” Portland Hi-Lites, 23 
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Mrs. Moore: “Yes, we know that and they have been so informed, but they want  
 to make application for their first papers and they have been told that this  
 does not mean that they may certainly become citizens.”  
Tomlinson: “They will never become citizens. They belong to a race that is  
 ineligible to become citizens.” 
Mrs. Moore: “So did the Chinese and they are now eligible to citizenship and we  
 believe these people have their rights the same as any of us. There is a bill  
 now pending in Congress which will give them the right of citizenship and  
 these people are preparing themselves for that eventuality.” 
Tomlinson: “I had a boy in the South Pacific and I hope they never become  
 citizens.” 
Mrs Moore: “ I had a nephew wounded at Pearl Harbor and a boy the Germans  
 nearly killed but I still think these people have as much rights as any of the  
 rest of us.” 
Tomlinson: “Well, I’ll send the blanks up. How many are there? Do they know 
  they are committing perjury when they swear they want to become  
 citizens when they can’t? And I hope they will never be allowed to do so.” 
Mrs. Moore: “There are about forty of them. And thank you very much.”330 
  
This conversation does not represent the opinion of the majority of INS officials, but 
rather one form of resistance to Issei citizenship. His resistance echoes 1945 battles 
over the return of Japanese Americans in that both used their relatives’ military service 
as proxy-legitimacy for their stance on Issei citizenship. The real argument here 
swings on connection to the Allied victory in World War II, while Tomlinson’s 
argument of Japanese racial unassimilbility merits barely a response from Moore.  
 The episode also demonstrates a lack of institutional interest in punishing such 
comments. Despite a strongly worded letter from national JACL secretary Masao 
Satow to Carusi complaining about Tomlinson’s attitude towards the parents of Nisei 
veterans, the INS was unapologetic. Carusi’s assistant described the affair as a merely 
a case of a short supply of forms and makes no apology for either Tomlinson’s anti-
                                                        
330 Mrs. Max Moore, letter to Masao W. Satow, secretary of the national JACL, 24 January 1947, 
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Japanese sentiment or his misleading argument that Issei filing the forms would be 
committing perjury.331 
The Alien Land Law Test Case 
 The Alien Land Law test case campaign is the best example of success achieved 
by members of the Japanese American community working with white civic leaders in 
the early postwar era. Perhaps at the instigation of his wife, who was a board member 
for the YWCA and Citizen’s Committee, Portland lawyer Verne Dusenbery formed a 
committee within the Multnomah Bar Association to study challenges to the 
constitutional rights of Japanese Americans in Oregon.332 During their study, at the 
urging of Governor Earl Snell, Walter Pierce, and the Japaense Exclusion League, the 
Oregon Legislature updated the 1923 Alien Land Law so as to “bring about uniformity 
in such laws with the state of California.”333  
 The Japanese American rights committee study concluded that the 1945 Alien 
Land Law was the product of economically motivated, rural Anti-Japanese groups. 
Those groups manipulated the “patriotic fervor engendered by the war” to buy land 
from Japanese Americans at cut rates and that “paradoxically as it may seem, the men 
in the service form one of the strongest bulwarks supporting the constitutional rights 
of Americans of Japanese ancestry.” Furthermore, the committee claimed that the 
Alien Land Laws of both 1923 and 1945 were unconstitutional because even resident 
                                                        
331 A. C. Devany, Acting Assistant Commissioner INS, letter to Masao W. Satow, 3 February 1947, 
Immigration and Naturalization, PDX JACL Collection. 
332 “Jap Rights Win Defense,” Oregonian, 28 February 1945, p. 5. 
333  “Statement about Oregon Alien Land Law, February 1945,” Box 3, Folder 3, Snell Papers. 
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alien Japanese are entitled to protection under the 14th Amendment of the US 
Constitution.334   
 It remains unclear why, despite such strong conclusions in favor of defending 
Japanese rights, a case was not filed in the Multnomah County Court challenging the 
law until April 1947. Historian Amy K. Buck wrote that Dusenbery teamed up with 
Alan Hart to craft a case that would overturn both the 1923 and 1945 statutes. In early 
1947, Kenji Namba, a Nisei veteran, his father Etsuo Namba, and Florence Donald 
volunteered to create a lease that would draw charges from the Multnomah County 
district attorney.335  
 Two factors might explain the delay. First, the Alien Land Law Test committee 
did not form until April 1946 and did not collect ample funds for a test case until July 
1946. 336  Second, conflict between the Portland chapter and the national JACL 
discouraged the pursuit of individual legal attempts that might hinder legal 
proceedings sponsored by the national organization. According to WRA accounts, 
discussion among JACL leaders in 1946 largely concluded that chapters should take 
care not ask too much from white Americans. Quoting a meeting in Colorado in 1946: 
I think if we publicize the Nisei too much the Caucasian public is going to get 
tired of it, and will begin to hate us…I don’t think we ought to play up all the 
little discriminations the Japanese are experiencing. Some of them think we can 
simply forget…Sure we can press some cases into court, but we ought not to do 
it only once or so. Make it a big court fight, put a lot of money in the case, but 
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335 Amy K. Buck, “Alien Land Laws,” Master’s Thesis, Portland State University, 1999, p. 79. See 
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once it is over we ought to forget it and not continue to press cases into court 
over and over again.337 
 
By March 1945, the JACL had already begun to support that one big case. A. L. Wirin, 
the law partner of national JACL executive secretary Saburo Kido, sought to overturn 
of the California Alien Land Law after the state filed escheat proceedings against San 
Diego residents Kajiro and Fred Oyama.338 In California, county governments had 
begun to work with state officials to file escheat proceedings of Issei-owned land in a 
systematic process of removal that filled municipal coffers while “releasing” valuable 
farmland for white use. This was a process not present in Oregon.339  
 While the Oyama case was awaiting its hearing in the U.S. Supreme Court in 
April 1947, Wirin paid a visit to the Portland chapter as a part of a fund raising 
campaign that began in January 1947.340 Wirin was crestfallen when he learned that a 
case had already been filed in Multnomah County court, thus making use of the ample 
funds collected by the Alien Land Law Test Case Committee in 1946. He later wrote 
to the Portland chapter president that he thought the case was not advisable, but since 
it was filed already there was nothing to do but support it.341  Wirin’s support was tacit 
approval, not legal and financial support. Given earlier conflicts with the national 
JACL and the fact the Portland JACL did not advertise the case as one of its  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achievements, it seems likely that they had little to do with the Namba case.342 Instead, 
the ten members of the Test Case Committee, including Takeoka and Hachiya, were 
left to organize the case by themselves, drawing out the process considerably. In 1949, 
the case was successful, overturning both the 1923 and 1945 Alien Land Laws. 
  The Portland Anti-Discrimination Committee 
 JACL efforts in Portland continued to follow the national model in the 1947 
creation of the Portland Anti-Discrimination Committee (PDX-ADC). In December 
1946, the Portland JACL sent George Azumano and Kimi Tambara to the West Coast 
Action conference in San Francisco. At the conference, Mike Masaoka answered 
concerns that the JACL would just be another social organization with a renewed 
national civil rights campaign. He wanted to make JACL a stronger organization so it 
could “be strong enough to be able to meet any crisis which might arise.” He proposed 
the creation of a national network of Anti-Discrimination Committees with two 
purposes: local ADCs would allow Issei membership, creating a direct funding stream 
from Issei at the local level; and local ADCs would cultivate contacts among the white 
community and serve as a network mobilizing local Congressmen and government 
officials to support national legislative campaigns. The ADC was to be the direct 
action group, while the JACL would be a “fraternal and educational organization.” 
Masaoka called on JACL chapters to collect $67,000 to finance the project.343   
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 Masaoka’s funding campaign mirrored the relationship between the Portland 
JACL and the Issei members of the Koenkai, which established a direct funding link 
between the Portland Issei and Masaoka’s lobbying efforts. Shifting funding to 
national projects was a challenge to Portland JACL’s funding scheme, because Issei 
donations to the JACL dwarfed Nisei financial contributions in 1946 and 1947. For 
instance, the total membership dues in those two years amounted to $305 and various 
other fund-raising events netted $750. The Koenkai, on the other hand, donated $2940. 
This donation did not include the $17000 raised for the Alien Land Law Test Case 
Committee. Issei contributors followed through on their earlier pledge to support the 
Portland JACL financially by paying their operating costs, the $1000 levy asked for by 
the national JACL, and left them with about $1000 extra in their treasury.344 After 
Azumano founded the Portland ADC, concurrent with his election as Portland JACL 
president, in April 1947, there was little reason for Issei to continue donations to the 
JACL.345  
 Masaoka planned to make up for losses in JACL revenue with a national 
membership drive. Besides the need for additional funds, membership was a chronic 
problem for the JACL in the immediate postwar years. According to a membership  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campaign guide produced by the national JACL, before World War II the national 
JACL had twenty thousand members. In early 1947, despite the fact that many more 
Nisei, having turned eighteen, were eligible for membership, national membership 
dropped to less than three thousand.346 In Portland there were only thirty-two members 
before the membership drive.347  
 Small membership in the JACL in 1946 and 1947 was also a problem of 
legitimacy for a group that often claimed they were the only group fighting for 
Japanese American constitutional rights.348 Both the national and Portland JACL 
worried that low membership would undermine the national legislative program. In a 
national JACL bulletin on the 1947 membership drive, leaders complained: 
One of our major emphasis [sic] is to get some national legislation through 
Congress. 3000 people, or just a handful, have no business undertaking the job 
we are attempting to do. From the standpoint of congressmen, 3000 people 
aren’t worth the time and effort. As Mike Masaoka contacts national 
organizations, and government agencies, he is asked, ‘how many people do you 
represent?’ There are those Nisei among us who resent the JACL representing 
them without their permission, so to be honest, Mike must say that he represents 
the actual numbers who are signed up as JACL-ers. You can imagine the kind of 
rejection this response gets and how sick at the stomach Mike feels.349 
 
In 1947 Mike Masaoka spearheaded a lobbying campaign in Washington D. C. to pass 
legislation including HR 3149, Soldier Brides Amendment, HR 3555, naturalization                                                         
346 National JACL, “Membership Campaign Must Be Organized,” 3 January 1947, Correspondence of 
the Membership Chairman, PDX JACL Collection, p. 2. Here after called Membership Campaign 
347 Milton Maeda, “Portland JACL Membership,” January 1947, Correspondence of the Treasurer, PDX 
JACL Collection. 
348 Other groups who supported Oregon Nikkei took exception to such statements. For instance, in 
November 1947 George Azumano invited Phil Dreyer of the American Veteran’s Committee to a 
dinner in honor of Mike Masaoka in Portland. In the invitation, Azumano claimed the JACL was the 
only organization fighting for Japanese American civil rights, a claim Dreyer made the point of 
disputing in a response letter. There is some evidence, although not conclusive, that several returning 
Nisei had close ties with the Portland Council American Veterans Committee. Phil Dreyer, letter to 
George Azumano, 11 November 1947, PDX JACL Collection. 
349 Membership Campaign, p. 3. 
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for Issei, HR 3566, removing race factors from deportation laws, and HR 3999, the 
evacuation claims bill. The JACL knew that sympathy for the wrongs of internment as 
juxtaposed with the Nisei Patriotism argument would only get these bills so far in the 
U.S. Congress. High membership rolls were needed to prove that Japanese Americans 
were an organized constituency in need of consideration. Later in the bulletin, JACL 
leaders linked the membership problem to the legislation campaign more explicitly:  
IF JACL FAILS IN ITS EFFORTS THIS YEAR [1947] FOR THE NATIONAL 
LEGISLATION, IT WILL BE BECAUSE THE MAJORITY OF NISEI DON'T 
GIVE A DAMN… [all capitals in the original]…if the Japanese Americans 
show only lukewarm interest, what right have we to expect our friends to go to 
bat for us? What answer can we give to our fellow Americans of good will and 
the Issei who support us when they ask, “If your program is so vital and 
important, why don’t the Nisei themselves support it?”350  
 
Nisei seemed to see little benefit in supporting the JACL; that is not to say Nisei did 
not follow news of JACL efforts. In 1947, 1,600 JACL members had subscriptions to 
the national JACL newspaper Pacific Citizen. The Pacific Citizen’s total circulation, 
however, was 6,500.351 
 The Portland JACL’s frustrations with the membership drive were also tied to 
their 1947 fundraising campaign in that both reflected a distinct lack of interest in 
supporting the JACL on the part of Portland Nisei. First of all, correspondence with 
other JACL chapters led to frustrating comparisons in terms of membership. For 
instance, the Milwaukee, Wisconsin, chapter claimed that seventy-five percent of 
                                                        
350 National JACL, “Membership Campaign Must Be Organized,” 3 January 1947, Correspondence of 
the Membership Chairman, PDX JACL Collection, p. 3. Here after called Membership Campaign. 
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124 
Nisei in Milwaukee had become members.352 Although Portland membership more 
than tripled, growing to 115 in 1947, the representation was nowhere near 
Milwaukee’s numbers.353 In the 1947 JACL fundraising drive, staffed mainly by Issei, 
Mary Minamoto, along with Azumano and Hachiya, often found themselves in an 
awkward position when asked by Issei leader Iwao Oyama why Nisei were not joining 
the JACL or canvassing for donations needed for local JACL operations and the 
national JACL legislation campaign. Minamoto complained bitterly about the problem 
in Portland Hi-Lites: 
Surely if we are able to raise funds for athletics, etc., we must be able to raise 
funds for the national program too. “Isseis [sic] are benefiting from the nationals 
program” cries the Nisei but remember Niseis [sic] were not exempted from 
evacuation. Issei problems proved to be our problems and will remain to be one 
until we learn to combat them.354 
 
In 1947, Portland Nisei reestablished the Nisei Bowling league, with local businesses 
sponsoring teams, but were apparently largely uninterested in the political activities of 
the JACL.355 
 Despite the JACL commitment to telling the story of the 442nd Regimental 
Combat Team, the ranks of uninterested Portland Nisei included Nisei veterans. In a 
separate Portland Hi-Lites article, Minamoto castigated Nisei veterans for failing to 
attend the first annual convention of the Oregon and Southern Washington Council 
American Veterans Committee. She claimed that no Nisei veterans attended.                                                         
352 M. Kaneko, Letter to Milton Maeda, 6 June 1946, Correspondence of the Treasurer, PDX JACL 
Collection. 
353 “Northwest District Council Minutes,” 8 June 1947, Pacific Northwest Council, PDX JACL 
Collection, p. 4.   
354 Mary Minamoto, “Help Thyself…,” Portland Hi-Lites, 17 February 1947, p. 3.  
355 Nakata, p. 142. 
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Furthermore, she revealed that no Nisei veterans, besides the veteran from Arizona 
they paid to come, attended the Purple Heart Convention in the fall 1946, which was 
the first postwar project of the Portland JACL.356 Part of the point of the 1946 
convention was to encourage Nisei veterans to join other veterans organizations, like 
the American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars, thus allowing other American 
soldiers to meet Nisei veterans and cultivate more good will for all Nisei.  
 Faithful to this cause, Toshi Kuge, first president of the postwar Portland JACL, 
and fellow Nisei veteran and JACL member Jimmy Mizote, attempted to join the 
Portland American Legion Post #1 in 1946. However, in a continuation of wartime 
anti-Japanese attitude, the post did not accept their membership and told them to start 
their own group.357 In 1947, Toshi Kuge organized 25 Nisei veterans who met at the 
Japanese Methodist church to found their own organization, the Nisei Veteran’s 
Committee.358 Afterwards, it seems, they were uninterested representing the Nikkei 
community to white audiences. 
 A lack of interest in JACL activities extended to JACL members as well. One of 
the greatest problems for individual JACL chapters in the early postwar years was that 
nominations to chapter offices, especially president, were constantly turned down. At 
the end of 1947, when the Portland chapter nominating committee tried to find 
candidates, a large number turned down nominations claiming to be either to busy or 
uninterested. Frustrated by the process, 1947 Portland JACLVice President Paul 
Oyamada wrote Mas Satow, JACL national secretary, asking for help in persuading                                                         
356 Mary Minamoto, “Battle Not Won…,” Portland Hi-Lites, 10 March 1947, p. 4. 
357 Nakata, p. 143. 
358 Toshi Kuge, “Veterans! Forward! March!,” Portland Hi-Lites, 10 March 1947, p. 6. 
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members to accept leadership. Satow replied that the problem was widespread, 
mentioning how the lone candidate in Los Angeles withdrew after he was elected. 
Furthermore, in Chicago five members turned down the presidency in 1946.359 
Ironically, in 1948, Oyamada turned down a position as leader of the Political Action 
committee of the Portland JACL, although he agreed to maintain a role as speaker 
before other organizations and member of the deputation committee of the Portland 
JACL-ADC.360  
 Often in early postwar Portland, Nisei leaders like Azumano, Oyamada, and 
Hachiya embraced the JACL-ADC’s letter-writing network and an opportunity to 
work with outside groups on broader social justice issues. The JACL-ADC followed 
the model laid out by national leaders in the Membership Campaign bulletin as 
follows: 
1. Receive information emanating from Washington. (Here after Progress 
Reports will be sent to the Chairman of the Anti-Discrimination Committee 
instead of the Chapter President)  
2. Keep local people informed of developments.  
3. Plan and activate local action in cooperation with the National Legislative 
program. 
4. Keep the Washington ADC office informed of local developments that may 
have bearing upon the priorities adopted by ADC as outlined in “Statement by 
Mike Masaoka, Director of JACL ADC January 7, 1947.” 
5. Cooperate with the local Chapter Public Relations Committee in the 
cultivation of strategic contacts in the community. 
6. Recruit additional memberships and solicit funds for the Anti-Discrimination 
Committee361                                                         
359 Mas Satow, Letter to Paul Oyamada, 8 December 1947, Nominating Committee, PDX JACL 
Collection.  
360 Paul Oyamada, Letter to Portland JACL President Toshi Kuge, 12 April 1948, Nominating 
Committee, PDX JACL Collection.  
361 The “statement of Policy” memo referred to here lays out two guidelines for the JACL. First, the 
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These guidelines called for a direct information pipeline to Masaoka in Washington as 
well as an ideological commitment to his strategy in securing pro-Japanese legislation. 
In the days before crucial votes in U.S. Congress, such as the Evacuation Claims act in 
1948 and versions of legislation designed to secure citizenship for Issei like the 
successful Walter-MacCarran Act of 1952, Masaoka would send a telegram to a local 
ADC office calling on white community leaders to write their congressional officials. 
Collectively, these leaders were often called the “Caucasian advisory board.”362 Later, 
Masaoka explained the role of these advisory boards more explicitly: 
It is suggested that every chapter arrange to have a group of non-Japanese 
friends who know the congressmen personally to call upon them and urge them 
to support our legislative program. Such deputations should be followed up by a 
group of chapter members calling upon these same congressmen….Members of 
any deputation should be thoroughly grounded in the background and the 
reasons for this legislation. This is particularly true for our non-Japanese friends. 
No Nisei should be in these groups, in order that these non-Japanese citizens can 
call upon congressmen as constituents and friends.  
 
 
They were also encouraged not to pressure congressmen. They were trying to 
encourage friendly interaction on the issue.363 In a sense the national ADC sought a 
grass roots movements of white advocates for civil rights, with local Nisei playing a 
supporting role.  
                                                        
minorities in an unofficial capacity. In an interesting closing, the memo also claimed that the JACL 
only served to end discrimination against Japanese Americans, until their situation was similar to other 
American groups, at which time they would disband. National JACL, “Memorandum #4,” 5 February 
1947, Memos from National Headquarters, PDX JACL Collection. People in Motion, pp. 209-210. 
362 “Northwest District Council Minutes,” 8 June 1947, Pacific Northwest Council, PDX JACL 
Collection, p. 12.   
 
363 Japanese American Citizen’s League Anti-Discrimination Committee Inc, “Interim Project,” 25 
August 1947, Memos from National Headquarters, PDX JACL Collection. 
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 In 1947 and 1948, Azumano, as head of the Portland-ADC, tasked a deputation 
team to write up a contact list for the Caucasian advisory board to be sent to the 
national offices. The effort was an attempt to ensure continued support of Portland 
Citizen’s Committee Members, progressives like Gus Solomon and Monroe 
Sweetland, and Portland civic leaders like E. B. MacNaughton, who spoke out against 
the Japanese Exclusion League in 1945. The list also included former missionaries to 
Japan, like Alice Finley and Cora Oliver, local labor leader Irving Enna, and African 
American Edwin Berry of the Portland Urban League.364 Minamoto, who served on 
the deputation team, expressed some concern in sending their list to the national JACL 
because she knew they would be asked to “write, wire or telephone their 
Representatives or Senators when requested to do so by Washington, D. C. Office 
[ADC].” Minamoto knew they would be asking a lot of their Caucasian friends, so she 
proposed to ask every member on the list if they would be willing to help.365  
Responses to these letters are telling of perceptions of Japanese American in the 
Portland community in 1948. For instance, Marshall N. Dana, editor of the Oregon 
Journal editorial page, responded: 
I think there is a great deal of justice in the appeal for the grant of citizenship to 
those Japanese born in Japan who have demonstrated their loyalty to the United 
States and who are themselves parents of loyal American-born Nisei. I doubt, 
however, the desirability of pressing a measure of this kind until the effectuation 
of the peace treaty between Japan and the United States.366 
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Although Dana had spoken out in favor of Japanese American rights on his paper’s 
editorial page and to audiences at a Portland JACL rally in February 1942, calling for 
tolerance for “Americans with Oriental faces,” he was unwilling to advocate for 
Nikkei after the war.367 His refusal reveals the transnational position that he saw 
Japanese Americans occupying. He saw them as a bridge to Japan. Thus their fate 
could not be decided until the postwar relationship between the U.S. and Japan was 
again firmly established. Presumably, many former members of the 1945 pro-Japanese 
alignment, such as Governor Charles Sprague, felt the same way and opted not to join 
the Caucasian advisory board. 
  “Other Groups” 
  Occasionally, the Portland ADC used the Caucasian advisory board to help 
support broader legislative efforts. For instance, Azumano wrote members of the 
board in 1947 to support the Oregon Fair Employment Practices (FEP) Bill of 1947, 
HB 385.368 The successful bill set up a labor board to ensure equitable employment for 
women and minorities. Coincidentally, one of the first instances of public controversy 
over employers ignoring the bill involved a Japanese American as well. In 1951, 
disabled Nisei Veteran Sagie Nishioka scored the highest on a civil service exam of 
three candidates for a job with the state tax commission. The commission decided, 
however, not to hire Nishioka in the belief that the public would not want to deal with 
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a Nisei clerk. After the Oregonian ran a series of articles about how the state tax 
commission violated the FEP law, the tax board was forced to offer him a job.369  
 Cooperation with the Portland African American community by Portland JACL 
and ADC members was small and on a personal basis. Azumano served as a Nisei 
representative to the Portland NAACP and used the letter-writing network to support 
Anti-Lynching legislation in the U.S. Congress in 1947.370 Paul Oyamada served on 
the Masaoka-sponsored Civic Unity Council, but the effort failed in Portland due to 
lack of local support by Portland Mayor Earl Riley.371 Oyamada instead served on the 
Speaker’s Bureau for the Portland Council of Churches, along with Reverend Francis 
M. Hayashi, speaking to local churches and civic groups.372 This largely religious 
group functioned much like the Seattle Civic Unity Committee, providing education 
on issues of discrimination in Portland. 
A Minority Like Any Other 
 The Portland JACL and Portland-ADC suffered a severe lack of participation 
and had a restrictive relationship with the national JACL, limiting their capacity to aid 
Portland Nikkei. However, Portland JACL leaders approached two cases of                                                         
369 “Nisei Accepts Job in Salem: Veteran to Become Junior Accountant,” Oregonian, 3 April 1951, p. 
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370 Azumano became involved after George Thomas, of the Portland Council of Churches and the 
Portland NAACP, asked him to send out the word that Herbert Peet had planned a lecture on the subject. 
George L. Thomas, Portland Branch NAACP, Letter to George Azumano, 3 June 1947, Other 
Organizations, PDX JACL Collection.  
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discrimination, similar to issues faced by the Portland African American community, 
with particular effectiveness: Nikkei blood segregation and aid to refugee Japanese 
Americans in the aftermath of the flooding of the Vanport housing projects in 1948. 
 One of the greatest indications that military service by African Americans and 
Japanese Americans did not ensure equality was the segregation of blood by race in 
World War II and after. For instance, blood sent by the Red Cross to the European 
front had to be segregated by race. By the beginning of World War II, scientists had 
definitively proved that race played no significant factor in blood type. Despite this, 
public conceptions about blood difference persisted, so the U.S. War department 
advised military authorities not to mix blood, even though they knew there was no 
basis for the segregation. Blood segregation by the Army and the Red Cross continued 
until December 1950.373 
 The blood supply in Portland was not only divided between black and white 
supplies, but Japanese as well. In August 1946, Dr. Robert Kinoshita discovered that 
the Portland blood bank was short of Japanese blood, so he contacted national JACL 
president Hito Okada to find out how to proceed.374 Soon after the Portland JACL 
encouraged members to give blood and join a blood-donors list as a way to fill the 
need without publicly challenging the absurdity of blood segregation in the short term, 
while working to solve the problem in the long term. Archival records do not reflect 
when Nikkei blood segregation ended, but by June 1947, Dr. Rieke at the Vanport 
hospital JACL member Juneus Oba began a campaign to found a blood donor service  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that ignored the color line.375 Mary Minamoto’s column provides a window into 
Portland JACL sentiment on the issue:  
Obviously the above program is an adoption of existing Jim Crow practices as 
now exist in many Portland medical quarters but faced with the dilemma of 
aiding persons in distress under existing circumstances, it is felt that for the 
present, at least, a donor list for Japanese ancestry persons is a practical 
approach to the problem in that immediate results are obtained. However, such a 
setup should not be permanent as the pattern tends to become entrenched. So it 
has been gratifying to learn that a committee of the Mult. County Medical 
Society has been working on a community wide blood bank to be available to all 
Portland Community members irrespective of race, color and creed.376 
  
Minamoto demonstrated a firm belief in Portland’s turn toward civic nationalism. 
Whereas Japanese Americans faced a broader type of Jim Crow style racism, she had 
faith that such discrimination was temporary.  
 Racial restrictions and discriminatory sales practices by Portland realtors 
prohibited African Americans and Japanese Americans alike from renting or 
purchasing homes in white neighborhoods.377 Housing was hard to come by for 
Japanese Americans because of a large wartime increase in Portland’s population, as 
well as a restriction in the Portland Realty Board’s code that barred realtors from 
selling to minorities on the grounds that it would lower home values.378 As a result, 
900 Japanese Americans, the majority of the postwar Portland Nikkei population,  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lived in the Vanport Federal wartime housing development.379 Some realtors were 
willing to canvass neighborhoods to make sure white neighbors would not object to 
Nikkei moving in, reminding Japanese Americans that they were not welcome in a 
majority of Portland’s neighborhoods.380 Subsequently, home ownership by Japanese 
Americans in Portland was only about two percent and Portland Nikkei tended to be 
segregated in the two former Portland Japan towns.381 
  Groups like the Urban League and Portland Council of Churches had long 
protested housing discrimination, but Mayor Riley and Chester Moores, his appointee 
to the Housing Authority of Portland (HAP) were uninterested in actions opposed by 
realtors. Because Moores believed industrial uses were much more profitable, and that 
the HAP’s main purpose was to make money for Portland developers, they saw fair 
housing for minorities as a liability. Despite the lack of available housing, Moores 
even wanted to close Vanport so that its land could be sold to industrial developers.382 
Riley hoped the nonwhite residents would just leave after the war, and had a plan in 
place to evict them from Vanport.383 
 An ugly public debate over the fate of Vanport was averted by catastrophe when 
the entire city of Vanport was destroyed by flood on 30 May 1948. Despite days of  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advance notice of severe flooding to the Red Cross and Portland leadership, Vanport 
was not evacuated ahead of the breach of a railroad dike. The HAP even distributed 
flyers to Vanport residents claiming that there was no immediate danger of 
flooding.384 In the aftermath of the flood the Portland JACL opened a relief station at 
the J. K. Kida electronics store with the aid of the Red Cross. Thankfully, the majority 
of Japanese Americans living in Vanport harbored enough distrust for Portland 
leadership to not trust HAP flyers. 550 of the 900 Nikkei Vanport residents left ahead 
of the flood, though many had only left for the day to attend Memorial Day services at 
the Rose City Japanese Cemetery.385 Alan Hart, lawyer for the Namba test case, was 
on his way to Vanport the morning of the flood to convince holdouts to leave before 
the dike broke.386 Nearly all Nikkei residents escaped harm. Photographer Sadao 
Mizuno and Izumi Oyama, Issei leader Iwao Oyama’s wife, who was hard of hearing, 
were unfortunately among the few casualities of the flood.387 
 The Vanport disaster was also a good example of the way the JACL could 
facilitate cooperation with white civic groups.388 Close connections with the Red 
Cross by JACL members facilitated quick formation of a refugee shelter and aid center 
at J. K. Kida electronics store so that the mostly non-English speaking Issei would not 
have to go to Red Cross headquarters for aid and even provided the funds for Red                                                         
384 Richard L. Neuberger, “Housing Dispute in Aftermath of the Vanport Disaster,” New York Times, 11 
July 1948. 
385 Toshi Kuge, Letter to Eiji Tanabe, 5 June 1948, PDX JACL Collection. Nakata, p. 145. 
386 Linda Lesowski, “Vanport Remembered,” Oregonian, 21 May 1978, Northwest magazine Section, p. 
10. 
387 Oregon Nippo, 8 June 1948. Nakata, p. 145. 
388 Not only did the Red Cross have a strong presence in WRA camps, leading to general association 
with JACL leaders like Milton Maeda, Mary Minamoto, Portland JACL secretary worked for the 
Portland-Mutlnomah County Chapter Red Cross. Abe Oyamada, Letter to Mary Minamoto, 26 
November 1951, PDX JACL Collection. 
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Cross aid to homeless Issei.389 Members of the Japanese American community took in 
the majority of refugees, many of whom stayed at Epworth Methodist and Nitiren 
Buddhist Church, just as they did in the earliest days of the Japanese American return 
to Portland.  
 The nation-wide network of JACL and ADC chapters collected donations for 
refugees, netting $9,400  after national JACL president Hito Okada sent out a bulletin 
seeking aid for Vanport flood victims.390 The funds went to refugees quickly. Within a 
week of the Vanport flood the Portland JACL had received almost $7,000 in donations, 
and the Portland Issei-Nisei Vanport Relief Committee had already distributed $5,200 
of the funds.391 In the weeks after the flood the Portland JACL saw a surge in 
membership and community support due to the aid of JACL chapters from over the 
U.S.392 
A Stronger Portland JACL? 
 Surprisingly, after the upswell of support for the Portland JACL in June 1948, 
the chapter went inactive for three years. 393  Two factors explain the chapter’s 
dormancy. First, with the Portland-ADC framework of funding and letter writing in 
place, there were few local causes to rally behind. Masaoka saw the national                                                         
389 “Vanport City Flood,” p. 31. For an account of a family that took in an elderly Vanport refugee, see 
Making Home From War: Stories of Japanese American Exile and Resettlement, Brian Komei 
Dempster Ed, (Berkeley: Heyday, 2011), pp. 31-56. 
390 The donation of $3,000 from the Snake River JACL was particularly notable. “JACL Chapter 
Donations Received by Portland JACL for Nisei-Issei Vanport Flood Relief Committee,” and Samuel 
Ishikawa, Letter to Toshi Kuge, 10 June 1948,Vanport Donations from JACL Chapters, PDX JACL 
Collection. 
391 I refer to this committee as a JACL venture because Portland JACL president Toshi Kuge chaired 
the committee and the large majority of donations came from other JACL chapters.“Donations: Vanport 
Flood Relief Fund as of June 5, 1948,” Vanport Flood: Thank You Letters, PDX JACL Collection. 
392 Toshi Kuge, Letter to Al Tsukamoto, 16 June 1948, Vanport Donations from JACL Chapters, PDX 
JACL Collection. 
393 Dick Akagi, Letter to Mas Satow, 1 February 1951, PDX JACL Collection. 
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legislative campaign, for Issei naturalization and the Evacuation claims Act as the 
main goal of these networks.  
 The national JACL and ADC, since the beginning of internment, had ignored or 
strongly discourage civil rights efforts, including Min Yasui’s test case, the motion to 
overturn the Portland municipal business license ban, and the Alien Land Law Test 
Committee. While many other Issei and Nisei in Portland were interested in broader 
social justice issues, for all minorities, the Portland JACL encouraged participation in 
such efforts only on an individual basis. The demands on JACL leaders were 
particularly heavy, so when new leaders failed to volunteer for positions in 1948, 
Kuge, Azumano, and others chose to focus more on their careers and families. Other 
Portland JACL leaders, like Minamoto, continued their work on Nisei civil rights. 
Furthermore, she continued to aid local Nikkei filing claims under the Evacuation 
Claims Act of 1948.394 
 The second factor was financial. The ADC financial pipeline bypassed the 
Portland JACL. Therefore, when the chapter became inactive in 1948, national ADC 
leaders did not need to contact the Portland JACL, they merely wrote Issei leaders 
Daiichi Takeoka, Iwao Oyama, and Masuo Yasui.395 That is until the Issei funding 
pipeline started to run dry. National JACL leader Mas Satow told Azumano, “In this 
connection [the ADC debt], I understand that Portland does have some money on hand 
in its treasury, and I am wondering if the Portland Chapter can help us out.”396 The                                                         
394 Mas Horiuchi, Letter to Mary Minamoto, 15 December 1949, Circulars, PDX JACL Collection.  
395 Toshi Kuge, Letter to Mike Masaoka, 17 May 1948, Anti-Discrimination Committee, PDX JACL 
Collection.  
396 Mas Satow, National Director JACL, Letter to George Azumano, 1 February 1951, loose material, 
PDX JACL Collection. 
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Issei funding connection through the ADC, it seems, was starting to run dry. Therefore, 
the Portland chapter met again shortly after receiving the letter to elect leaders, though 
no one showed interest in taking on the presidency until March when Azumano 
“railroaded” Dr. Matthew Matsuoka, a Nisei with no prior experience with the JACL, 
into the position.397 Thereafter, the chapter was much more active, but funding 
continued to be a problem. Meanwhile local Japanese American businessmen focused 
on building up successful businesses, such as the Azumano Insurance and Travel 
Agencies, Umata Matsushima’s Anzen store and importing, Ted Hachiya’s Byron’s 
Furniture, and Bill and Sam Naito’s Norcrest China.  
   
                                                        
397 “Names and News Portland JACL,” p. 2. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
After laying out the social and political environment in postwar Portland, the 
reformation of the Portland JACL, and arguments made by the Japanese Americans 
for acceptance and social justice after World War II, several questions of significance 
remain. The return of Japanese Americans to Portland is more than a story of 
rebuilding community after an unjust incarceration. Debates over the return of 
Japanese Americans in 1945 highlight a schism between progressives, a shift to civic 
nationalism, and the strengths and limitations of minority groups’ appeals to 
patriotism based on service to the armed forces in World War II.  
 Placing Japanese Americans at the center of a narrative of Oregon 
progressivism in the 1930s recovers figures such as Oregon Governor Walter M. 
Pierce from a historical narrative of paradox. Pierce’s transnational, racially exclusive 
progressivism sought to protect Oregon’s white producer class of farmers and workers 
from conservative Portland business interests such as the Portland Chamber of 
Commerce, and preventing Asian immigration that he believed posed a racial and 
economic threat. For Pierce advocacy for public power and Japanese exclusion both 
furthered the goal of protecting Oregon producers.  
During the 1930s, support for the New Deal and public power brought Pierce 
and the Oregon State Grange into alliance with labor leaders and civil rights 
progressives, such as Gus J. Solomon and Monroe Sweetland in the Oregon 
Commonwealth Federation (OCF). Sweetland and Solomon failed to protest Japanese 
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incarceration in 1942 after the failure of a series of key public power ballot initiatives 
in 1940, which proved to be the death knell for the OCF. Following the collapse of the 
OCF alliance in 1940, civil rights progressivism faltered in Oregon because of a lack 
of organization and the defection of Pierce and others who used the Pearl Harbor 
incident as a pretext to support the exclusion of Japanese Americans.  
Between 1942 and 1945 a debate in public and in the press over the right of 
Japanese Americans to return to Oregon embodied a shift from racial nationalism to 
civic nationalism. Although the American Legion, the Portland City Council, Pierce, 
Oregon Legislator Thomas Mahoney, and the Japanese Exclusion League all argued 
that Japanese Americans held racial loyalty to the Japanese Empire and must not be 
allowed to return to Oregon, their calls were unsuccessful. Civic leaders, such as 
banker E. B. MacNaughton, religious groups like the Portland Council of Churches, 
the lawyer Solomon, the Portland Citizen’s Committee to Aid Relocation, and 
returning white soldiers won the day by branding anti-Japanese organizers as fascists. 
The loudest proponents for one-hundred-percent-Americanism were the ones branded 
as un-American by summer 1945.  
 Portland’s shift to civic nationalism excised Asian exclusion from the bounds 
of publicly acceptable progressivism while expanding the definition of Americanism 
to include Japanese Americans. Racial exclusion was no longer an acceptable public 
argument and Pierce became a rural, reactionary relic of an earlier age of intolerance. 
Solomon, who became the head of the Oregon ACLU in 1944, and other civil rights 
progressives, continued to support rural public power efforts, but more actively 
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pursued civil rights reform in the postwar.398 For instance, in 1950 the Progressive 
Party of Oregon wholeheartedly supported an effort by Portland Mayor Dorothy 
McCollough Lee to remove the controversial “white trade only” signs from downtown 
hotels and restaurants. An article in the Oregonian reveals disdain for prejudice that 
progressives tolerated before World War II: 
The social and economic justice for this ordinance [to remove “white trade 
only” signs] has its very roots in the fact that general welfare of the Portland 
community will be enhanced through the eradication of a festering sore that 
reveals “second-class” citizenship and “Jim Crow” in its naked ugly form. The 
extension of service by all public places licensed by the city is a necessary step 
in this direction.399 
 
While many racially exclusive progressives saw Japanese Americans as the race 
problem, civil rights progressives saw white supremacy as the real race problem. Of 
course anti-Japanese discrimination in employment, housing, and vandalism of the 
Rose City Japanese Cemetery continued until 1948 and possibly after.400  
Studying the return of Japanese Americans to Oregon, especially the JACL’s 
embrace of the Nisei Patriotism argument, allows us to broaden the focus of Japanese 
American history beyond the civil rights approach. The main factor that brought 
Portland’s white community and its Japanese American community together was the 
argument that Nisei military service proved the loyalty of Japanese Americans. The 
argument led church groups and civic leaders to marginalize race-based nationalism 
and served as a keystone for Mike Masaoka’s legislative campaign for Issei                                                         
398 Gus Solomon continued membership in the Oregon Committee of the Public Power League of 
America throughout 1945 and after. He served on the executive board until at least the end of 1945 
along with wartime anti-Japanese organizers, such as Morton Tompkins of the Oregon Grange, and one 
of Walter Pierce’s close associates Vernon Bull. Carl D. Thompson, Letter to Walter M. Pierce, 8 
January 1945, Box 16, Folder 8, Pierce Papers, University of Oregon Archives.  
399 “Local Groups Support Ban on Discrimination,” Oregonian, 10 July 1950, p. 4. 
400 “Minutes,” Minutes, PDX JACL Collection.  
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naturalization and the Evacuation Claims Act. Furthermore, the focus on military 
service was at the heart of the Portland JACL’s postwar revival.401 
 The JACL’s Nisei Patriotism argument was not without is limitations. To 
begin with, many Nisei questioned JACL leadership because of the JACL’s wartime 
collaboration with federal authorities and the JACL’s obsession with becoming the 
chief representative of the Japanese American community. Many Portland Nisei 
refused to participate in chapter activities because they saw the JACL as mainly 
interested in aiding the Issei. Furthermore, the Nisei patriotism argument itself 
marginalized draft resisters, repatriates, and other Nikkei who were unwilling to fight 
for a government that had incarcerated them. Because the legitimacy of Japanese 
Americans claims to their constitutional rights depended upon a narrative of military 
service, those that stood up the most for their constitutional rights, such as the Heart 
Mountain draft resisters, were those that were the most marginalized in the postwar. 
Unfortunately, accounts of the intense bitterness experienced by Japanese Americans 
who resisted American authorities rarely survive into the present day, making 
inclusion of their struggles difficult.402 
 Efforts by the Portland Citizen’s Committee to Aid Relocation and the 
Portland Council of Churches were also limited in that they raised the public status of 
Japanese Americans from possible wartime enemy, but only to the limit status of 
provisional, honorary Americans. In housing, employment, and blood segregation,                                                         
401 In 1950, the Japanese American community collected funds for a marble obelisk that now serves as 
the dominating feature of the Rose City Japanese Cemetery. “Monument Dedicated to Memory of 15 
Nisei Servicemen Killed in War,” Oregonian, 30 October 1950, p. 9. 
402 One of the most famous accounts of that bitterness exists in a fictional story of the return of a 
Japanese American draft resister to Seattle. See, John Okada, No-No Boy, (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1976). 
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Portland Nikkei faced the same discrimination as African Americans. Japanese 
Americans were just one group aided by a wide variety of civic and religious groups 
interested in proving the fair-mindedness of Portland on issues of race.  
That is not to say that Japanese Americans successfully shed their transnational 
identity. Even before World War II, members of the Portland JACL sought to publicly 
distance itself from its Japanese heritage after tensions mounted between Japan and 
the U.S.403 However, though a connection to the 442nd Regimental Combat Team 
helped Japanese Americans argue for their constitutional rights during and after World 
War II, the white community still saw them as transnational figures. For Mayor Earl 
Riley and Pierce, Japanese Americans were still basically equal to citizens of the 
Japanese Empire who constituted a racial threat to Oregon. 
 Some white Portlanders supported Japanese Americans out of a desire to 
protect people of Japanese descent, not out of a need to protect the rights of all 
American citizens. In 1942 pro-Japanese missionaries, like Emma Azalia Peet, had 
spoken out for fair treatment of Japanese Americans because her extended experience 
with Japanese in Japan.404 Marshal Dana, editor of the Oregon Journal, who gave an 
impassioned speech for tolerance of Japanese Americans in 1942, declined to                                                         
403 Much more could be said about relations between the Japanese Chamber of Commerce (which was 
really just another name for the prewar Japan Society) and the JACL and other Nisei community 
organizations, especially their frank public meetings over citizenship, and the degree to which Japanese 
Americans should embrace their Japanese identity. See “JACL Town Meeting—Feb. 14, 1941,” Town 
Meeting Reports, PDX JACL Collection. 
404 As mentioned in Chapter 2, Peet was the only individual to protest interment at the Portland Tolan 
Hearings in 1942. She was also a Methodist missionary to Japan for 25 years and returned to Oregon 
just a month prior to work with Japanese Americans in Portland and later worked with the Farm 
Security Adminstration to help Japanese Americans on work leave from Minidoka. In her career, she 
aided Japanese in America and abroad equally, practically ignoring the line of American citizenship. 
Robert Shaffer, “Opposition to Internment: Defending Japanese American Rigths During World War II,” 
The Historian, Vol. 61 (1999), p. 608.  
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participate in Caucasian advisory board letter writing campaigns in 1947 because he 
did not want to upset peace treaty negotiations between Japan and the U.S.405 Unlike 
European immigrants, Japanese Americans could not truly assimilate into the white 
majority. Visible otherness prevented it. As Portland JACL leader Howard Nomura 
put it, “we have Japanese faces and nothing can be done about it.”406 
That is not to say that sentiment towards Japanese Americans did not change 
over time.  By 1948, Portland’s shift towards civic nationalism led to the election of 
Dorothy McCullough Lee as Portland mayor. The change in leadership marked a shift 
in the city’s official attitude towards people of Japanese ancestry. In 1950, a group of 
Nisei veterans and other Japanese American community leaders calling themselves the 
Japanese American Memorial League collected funds to erect a monument to Frank 
Hachiya and the fourteen other Nisei soldiers who died during World War II. Over one 
hundred Portland Nikkei attended the ceremony, proclaiming, in the words of Oregon 
Nisei Veterans leader Dr. George Y. Marumoto, that “They have earned the right for 
their families and themselves to share in the American way of life.” Speaking at the 
funeral, Mayor Lee also attested to the importance of the Nisei soldiers’ military 
service: 
The one thing that these men might want us to do would be to attempt to live 
our lives as citizens of this great country in a way that carries out the spiritual 
values for which they died. With all deference to this monument, there could 
be no memorial, which could do justice to the sacrifice of these young 
Americans.407                                                         
405 “Summarized Report of the JACL Rally,” JACL Activities circa 1941-1942, PDX JACL Collection. 
Marshall N. Dana, Letter to Toshi Kuge, 26 April 1948, Anti-Discrimination Committee, PDX JACL 
Collection. 
406 “Nisei Placed in a Tough Spot,” Oregonian, 8 December 1941, p. 9. 
407 “Monument Dedicated to Memory of 15 Nisei Servicemen Killed in War,” Oregonian, 30 October 
1950, p. 9. 
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Lee’s acceptance of the Nisei, as full-fledged Americans was a marked difference 
compared to Riley’s calls for exclusion.  
Lee’s public gestures of friendship were not limited to Japanese Americans. In 
1952, Lee accepted from Consul Masayuki Harigai two thousand cherry seeds as a 
symbolic gift from the school children of Japan. Edgar Smith, president of the 
Portland Chamber of Commerce, was also present at the gift ceremony, signaling that 
good relations with Japan were once again a chief interest to Portland businessmen.408 
Individual accounts of housing discrimination and Sagie Nishioka’s rebuff by 
the Oregon tax commission attest to continuing anti-Japanese sentiment in Portland. 
However the shift towards public acceptance of Japanese American constitutional 
rights by Portland officials and community leaders discouraged further anti-Japanese 
acts. Although the leadership of the Portland JACL may not have accomplished a 
seamless integration into postwar American life, the Nisei patriotism argument served 
as a powerful and positive point of contact between the white and Japanese American 
communities in the postwar. 
This work provides only a glimpse into the issues of identity and visions of the 
future negotiated in Portland surrounding the status of Japanese Americans before and 
after internment. Although it is important to recognize that for Japanese Americans the 
return period between 1945 and 1948 was a time of recovery from the ideological and 
economic trauma of internment, the return affected more than just them. The return of                                                         
408 By 1952, trade between Oregon and Japan had fully resumed. On the same day as the ceremony at 
least six ships were scheduled to depart Portland harbor with grain and other goods bound for Japan. 
“Japanese Amity Token Gratefully Taken,” Oregonian, 4 December 1952, p. 18. “Daily Calendar of 
Ship Movements,” Oregonian, 4 December 1952, p. 18. 
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Japanese Americans sparked a public reevaluation among Portlanders of the place of 
ethnic minorities in American society. Most importantly debates around the return 
refuted, in terms of publicly acceptable discourse, the vision of Oregon as a white 
man’s haven endangered by Asian immigration. Thus, the story of Japanese 
Americans’ return to Portland is more than just a chapter in the history of an American 
minority group’s struggle for acceptance. The return story highlights origins of civil 
rights coalitions and early postwar attempts, through the challenge of racially 
discriminatory laws and public education, to ease interracial tensions in Oregon.  
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